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Abstract
The Effects of Punctuation Events on the Oil Policy Network: A Network Analysis of
Rulemaking Outputs

In this dissertation, I display the effect of punctuating events on the oil policy subsystem
and network and, in turn, on the rulemaking process. Here I examine whether, and to what extent,
the changes in the dynamics of the policy network and the composition of the subsystem caused
by the punctuation could alter rulemaking outputs and whether these changes occur simultaneously
or sequentially across the policy subsystem and network.
Building upon Punctuation-Equilibrium Theory (PET), Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF), and the Policy Network Approach (PNA) alongside the political control literature, I
provide explanations for the routines and outputs of rulemaking. Accordingly, I analyze changes
in the set of oil and gas related administrative rules that are proposed and/or finalized during the
period of 1996-2016. I then link these changes with the fluctuations in interactions occurring in
the oil subsystem and network. For this purpose, I apply both Social Network analysis (SNA) and
the exponential-family random graph models (ERGM) for statistical inferences.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 An Overview of the Dissertation
In the field of public policy, much of the literature is concerned with the policymaking
process focusing on the contributions of Congress and congressional committees, the president,
federal agencies, and interest groups. Understanding the interactions among these actors is vital to
explain stability and change in public policy (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Cairney 2012; Kingdon
2011; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007; Worsham 1997,
2006). In addition, recent studies focus on the rulemaking process, given the notion that agencies
play an important role in forming and implementing public policy via rulemaking (McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1987; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McKay and Yackee 2007; Nelson
and Yackee 2012; Worsham and Gatrell 2005; Yackee 2006).
In this regard, I am interested in studying the rulemaking process, trying to understand how
the activities of bureaucracy are shaped by punctuating events, and whether and how the
bureaucracy alters its rulemaking routines and outputs following punctuations. In general, the
literature of policy subsystems with such theoretical approaches as Punctuated-Equilibrium
Theory (PET), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), and the Policy Network Approach
(PNA) elaborate on change and stability in public policy (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Sabatier
and Weible 2007; Worsham 1998, 2006). Nevertheless, a considerable portion of that literature is
devoted to explaining changes in policy at the level of political principals such as Congress and its
committees. Rather, I look at public policy from the angle of agents – or the bureaucracy –
examining how the interaction among the agents, principals, and interest groups who influence
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policy subsystems contribute to the process of rulemaking and to what extent the activities of
agencies are affected by such abrupt stimuli or punctuations.
As PET suggests, punctuations affect the context in which the policy subsystem operates.
Consequently, the policy monopoly is challenged, and an opportunity opens for the involvement
of other actors, which may alter the dynamics of the policy network and the composition of the
policy subsystem. As a result, the policy subsystem moves toward a more competitive form and
the opportunities for change increase (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Baumgartner, Jones, and True
2007; Worsham 1997, 1998). In this context, agencies are more than participants in the policy
subsystem during the stage of agenda setting. Rather, they play the most important role as
implementers of law. Accordingly, agencies may promulgate regulations or rules specifying the
meaning of unclear laws and the way these laws are executed. In doing so, agencies are considered
an extension of Congress. In view of that extension, the rulemaking process, like legislation, is not
far from politics (Kerwin 1999; Rosenbloom 2002). Here, I am trying to show the extent that the
change in the dynamics of the policy network and composition of the policy subsystem, caused by
the punctuation, may affect the routines and outputs of the rulemaking process. I am therefore
concerned not only with the direct effects of the punctuations on the process of rulemaking, but
also the indirect effects that go through the policy subsystem.
Furthermore, the rulemaking process might receive attributions from other political
principals such as the president and courts. Therefore, agencies have had to deal with them
alongside with congressional committees when rules are considered. Accordingly, agencies’
relationships with congressional committees, the president, and courts are described as a multiple
principals-agent relationship (Worsham and Gatrell 2005). Thus, the analysis goes beyond
studying congressional committees and interest groups to include the involvement of the president
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in the rulemaking process and to what extent the involvement of those principals could be a result
of the abrupt stimuli or punctuations. Additionally, I examine the time sequences of the
punctuating effect. Although the impacts of punctuations are well studied by PET at the stage of
agenda setting, the punctuating impact on the rulemaking process and policy implementation needs
further investigation. I attempt to ascertain whether the impact happens simultaneously across the
policy subsystem and rulemaking process or if it retains some residual impact over time.

1.2 Policy Domain and Methodology
For the policy domain, I focus on the oil sector because of its importance to the U.S.
economy. For example, in 2013, oil and gas formed 61% of all energy sources consumed in the
United States and they are heavily used in the transportation, industrial, residential, and
commercial sectors (Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector, 2013 n.d.).
Consequently, the stability or instability of oil policy influences other sectors of the U.S. economy.
Moreover, the number of administrative rules issued with regards to the oil sector is manageable
comparing to the other sectors of the economy (Regulations.gov n.d.). Primarily, my attention goes
to the policy areas in which the agencies have authority over issue rules such as oil production and
offshore drilling, prices and consumption of oil and gasoline, and environment and safety. I
identify the rules that deal with or regulate the oil industry in any of the aforementioned policy
areas, and then specify the programs under which they perform; as well as including agencies
responsible for carrying them out.
By tracking the rulemaking activities over time, I can display which agency is a part of the
policy monopoly, if any, and over which oil policy area, there is a shift or intervention from other
agencies in that policy area. More importantly, such time tracking can reveal the punctuating effect
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of the focusing events on ongoing programs. It may further shed light on the origin of the rules.
As West & Raso (2013) pointed out, the rules may come as a direct request from political principals
or could be required by statutes, considered as non-discretionary rules. However, some rules may
be authorized by statutes but not required, in which case agencies enjoy discretion to pursue rules
on their own. By studying these changes over time, I may be able to demonstrate the effect of
abrupt stimuli on rulemaking activities and the origin of rules. Also, I can describe political
principals and interested parties involved in the agenda setting, along with their rulemaking and
policy implementation actions, and which policy areas and programs they correspond to. In this
regard, the analysis will involve two levels. The first is the aggregated level that includes both
open and closed rules to display the involvement of political principals, agencies and interest
groups as well as their roles in setting the agenda for rulemaking. The second level is an in-depth
analysis of selected rules, which should shed light on the influence of political principals and
interest groups on rulemaking outputs.
In order to demonstrate the effect of punctuations on the rulemaking process, I utilize
Social Network Analysis (SNA), exhibiting the relationships among the political principals,
agencies, and interest groups in the form of a network that governs the rulemaking process.
Primarily, I seek to map the policy network of the oil sector, displaying the participants in the
subsystem along with other actors that influence oil policy and rulemaking. Besides the visual and
descriptive measurements of SNA, the structures and attributes of the policy network are
considered as covariates for statistical inference. Particularly, I utilize the exponential-family
random graph models (ERGM) and its time series version (TERGM) to explain changes in the
rulemaking outputs within the policy network caused by punctuating events. Hence, tracking the
changes in network structures could provide information about the shifting importance and role of
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actors in the subsystem. This further informs our inferences about the causes and results of such
behavior.

1.3 Significance of the Dissertation
This dissertation offers several contributions to the literature of public policy. Importantly,
it links the studies that analyze agencies and the rulemaking process with studies of subsystems
and policy dynamics. By looking for indicators within the policy network, it illustrates the effect
of punctuations on political principals such as congressional committees and the president, in
addition to interest groups, and then connects them with the changes in the rulemaking routines
and outputs. Furthermore, it presents the time sequence of the punctuating impacts, describing
what elements of the policy network are affected by the punctuation and at what time these effects
take place. In other words, it studies policy dynamics, but from the viewpoint of bureaucracy.
In addition, this dissertation goes beyond studies of agenda setting and adoption to
incorporating the bureaucratic/implementation angle of the literature on policy subsystems. By
mapping the dynamics of the policy subsystem utilizing congressional hearings’ data that is
associated with data collected from rule comments, a comparison between the agenda setting stage
and the implementation stage is demonstrated. Accordingly, it can be determined whether what
happens at one stage is mirrored at the other stage. If so, does it happen simultaneously or
sequentially? In view of that comparison, the central interest of this dissertation focuses on its
theoretical contribution to the public policy literature more than it does on petroleum/energy
policies.
Another contribution is to promote SNA and its models for statistical inference in political
science in general, and public policy in particular, highlighting the utility of this method. Even
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though it has been used in the social sciences for some time, only a small number of studies apply
SNA and its statistical models to policy networks, and fewer still focus on the rulemaking process.
Therefore, it will allow me to expose some aspects of the subsystem and policy network behavior
such as the interdependencies between the political principals, agencies, and interest groups that
have not previously received enough attention. In this regard, I argue that SNA could be an
alternative method for explaining outputs of the rulemaking process and policy dynamics. For
instance, it is able to handle the complexity of the subsystem and analyze the effect of network
structures on policy dynamics and outcomes.

1.4 The Outlines of the Dissertation
This study has eight chapters. In the first chapter, an overview of the dissertation is given
including a brief discussion of the argument, policy domain, methodology, and significance of the
dissertation. After the introductory chapter, the second chapter presents the relevant literature
regarding the subsystems, bureaucratic politics, and rulemaking. In addition, I point out some gaps
in literature that the dissertation attempts to bridge. In the third chapter, I focus the arguments and
the models used in the study. After articulating the research questions, I present an argument for
presumed effects of the punctuation on the rulemaking routine and outputs. Then, I discuss the
reasons and utility of the social network analysis illuminating how SNA can be used for statistical
inferences. Specifically, I focus on the exponential-family random graph models (ERGM) and the
time series version (TERGM).
The empirical analysis is presented in the next four chapters. In Chapter 4, I provide a
description for the process of data collection, displaying the sources and constructions of the data
sets. Given the large size of the dataset, I present the software and computer codes I developed to
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automate the process of downloading and organizing the data to provide readers who might be
interested in replication or conducting similar studies with information on how to do so. In the
fifth chapter, I provide a discussion of the potential punctuations that affect oil policy and its
network. Furthermore, the oil policy subsystem is mapped, describing and tracking the dynamics
of the oil policy network over time. In addition, the main actors who may constitute the oil
subsystem are distinguished from other participants in the oil policy network, identifying the
relevant congressional committees, public agencies, and interest groups.
Chapter 6 provides description and analysis for the administrative agenda setting and
rulemaking process in light of the actions and reactions of interest groups. The aim is to display
how the punctuations and activities at the principal level influence the dynamics of rulemaking
process and its lobbying behavior. In Chapter 7, which analyzes the outputs of rulemaking, I
examine the responses of public agencies to the demands of interest groups, and identify the
beneficiaries of rulemaking, and the variables that affect the probability of being beneficiaries are
empirically examined. Finally, in Chapter 8, , I present the argument and findings of the
dissertation, emphasizing its theoretical contributions to the field of public policy as well as its
limitations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I review the relevant literature of public policy and administrative
rulemaking. Accordingly, this chapter is divided into five sections. The first part reviews the
dynamics of policy subsystems, which includes notions of policy monopoly and policy regime.
The second section introduces the policy network approach (PNA) and discusses to what extent
the PNA is useful in studying public policy. The third section presents important studies regarding
agencies, rulemaking, and political control. The fourth section studies the dynamics and structures
of policy networks and rulemaking, showing the similarities and differences between the networks
governing the policy subsystem and the rulemaking process. Finally, I point out the gap in the
literature and set the research questions of this dissertation.

2.2 Policy Monopolies and Policy Regimes
Not only does the examination of the punctuating effects on the policy subsystem explain
the change and stability of public policy, but it may also explain the outputs of bureaucratic policy
and the rulemaking process. As agencies affect and are affected by the politics of policy
subsystems, analyzing the interaction among participants within the subsystem and tracking the
changes caused by punctuations may provide important clues for understanding the rulemaking
outputs. Thus, the literature of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) might be a good start. Based
on PET, the policy subsystem is characterized by an institutional structure that limits access for
outsiders and reinforces ideas that are linked to core political beliefs, which seek to establish policy
monopoly (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 7). At the highest profile, these institutional structures
8

and barriers manifest in particular congressional committees or subcommittees that function as a
keystone or anchor for the subsystem. At the least, the participants in any subsystem are
congressmen from related congressional sub/committee(s), agency staffs, and organized interest
groups (Worsham 1998, 486, 2006, 439).
As True, Jones and Baumgartner (2009) asserted, a combination of institutional tendency
of stasis and abrupt stimuli coming from the environment generates a pattern of punctuatedequilibrium. The punctuation could be one of the following abrupt stimuli. First are the indicators
that enlighten the change in the size of the problem and whether there is a need to take a specific
action or not, such as unemployment rates, GDP, and oil prices. Second are the focusing events
such as natural disaster and economic crises. Third is the feedback in which policy performance is
evaluated, indicating whether there is failure in achieving the goals of the policy, so that an action
should be taken (Kingdon 2011, 90–103). In this context, the subsystem is put under pressure when
it receives abrupt stimuli, or punctuation, leading to an increase in media and public attention. As
a result, other political principals and actors who, while often previously inactive, tend to become
involved in the policy subsystem, seeking to alter powers and resources in order to influence the
subsystem (Baumgartner and Jones 2009).
Simultaneously, the increase in public and media attention due to the abrupt stimuli could
change the image of issues as well as the tone of coverage. Accordingly, changes in image and
tone mostly are associated with the involvement of multiple policy venues such as other
sub/committees and agencies that sequentially have access to the issue. Since these multiple policy
venues differ in their responsibilities and their standpoints, different parties find in the image
change an opportunity to advance their views and alter the subsystem. Furthermore, the tone of
issue attention could be either negative or positive. Here the consequences of each case are
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different. In the case of high attention with positive tone, powerful institutions may be created with
broad jurisdictions. In contrast, the subsystem may be dissolved in the case of high attention with
negative tone (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 80 and 100). However, such involvement does not
necessarily guarantee success for challengers. Privileged coalitions will fight back to maintain
their policy monopoly. Here the advancement of the new ideas associated with the availability of
multiple venues opens opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to place issues on the agenda. As a
result, success in challenging the policy monopoly and changing policy depends on whether
challengers of the status quo are motivated enough to find allies elsewhere and shop for other
venues that are more sympathetic with their cause (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 8–9; Cairney
2012, 189–98; Kingdon 2011, 87; True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007, 162).
In this context, the policy subsystem is not static. It may take different forms and produce
different outputs consistent with the level of monopoly it enjoys. According to Worsham, the
subsystems are classified into three types according to the degree of dominance and competition
among coalitions within the subsystems. The first type is the subsystem with dominant coalitions
where a small and narrow number of players appear regularly and control the process of
policymaking in the subsystem with a high degree of autonomy. In addition, access to the
subsystem is limited, producing distributive policy that seems consensual. The second type is the
subsystem with transitory coalitions characterized with moderate variety. Here the subsystem is
open access to reasonable degree with high to moderate degree of autonomy in the policymaking
process, producing mildly redistributive and regulatory policy that is often entrepreneurial. Third
are competitive coalitions which have moderate or high variety and open access with a moderate
to low degree of autonomy in the policymaking process, producing radically redistributive and
regulatory policy that is often conflictual (1997, 18).
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In sum, the policy outputs depend on the type of the subsystem. Therefore, the shift from
one type of subsystem to another could cause changes in the produced policies. In this regard, the
concept of wavering equilibrium may explain the policy change that occurs when the unstable
subsystems move from the dominant-coalition to less restricted arrangements then go back to the
dominant coalitions again. Accordingly, the type of the subsystem whether is dominant, transitory,
or competitive along with systemic events, institutional conflict, party politics, and economic
dislocation determines the nature of policy outputs whether distributive policy, mildly
redistributive and regulatory policy, or radically redistributive and strongly regulatory policy
(Worsham 1997, 14–17).
Moreover, the essential ideas that undergird the policy subsystem are subject to changes as
well. Here, the policy change could be combined with the process of policy-oriented learning that
is a “relatively enduring alteration of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience
and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives”
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 123). In this context, the belief system according to which the
subsystem operates is hierarchically threefold: deep core beliefs concerning the primary norms and
ontological values; policy core beliefs which determine the main policy positions and sets the
essential strategies; and secondary aspects that regard the instrumental decisions and necessary
information for achieving the policy core. In general, the change in secondary aspects is moderate
or even easily occurring, and the activities of the administrative and legislative policymakers are
most concentrated here. However, a transformation in the external non-cognitive elements of the
subsystem—such as changes in socio-economic conditions, changes in systemic governing
coalition, and changes caused by policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems—is required
in order to alter the aspects of policy core beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 133).
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While the dramatic transformations in the external non-cognitive elements could be a
source of abrupt stimuli or external shocks, the subsystem may receive internal shocks as well,
which Sabatier and Weible (2007, 204–7) emphasized as an alternative path for policy changes.
For more clarification, Sabatier and Weible distinguished between the impacts of external and
internal shocks on the compositions and belief system of the subsystem. Although both shocks
have something in common, the internal shock has extra implications relative to the external shock.
At the beginning, both external and internal shocks may lead to redistribution of critical political
resources among the actors involved in the policy subsystem. Additionally, the internal shocks
could put the core policy beliefs of the dominant coalition into question. Subsequently, these
shocks may increase the credibility of the core policy beliefs of the minority coalition within the
subsystem. As a result, doubt about the effectiveness of the dominant coalition’s policy increases
and the policy core beliefs of minority coalitions are confirmed. As a consequence, the dominant
coalition becomes more willing to compromise and engage in negotiation with the minority
coalition. In other words, such shocks or events may affect the degree of dominance and
competition among coalitions within the subsystems, causing instability in the subsystem that
might move from the dominant-coalition model to less restricted arrangements such as transitory
or competitive coalition models. Accordingly, the movement back and forth among these types of
subsystems, or what is identified as wavering equilibrium, could explain the change in subsystem
outputs (Worsham 1997, 14–17, 1998).
Besides, challenges can come from cross-subsystem where the policymakers encounter
messy policy problems that bridge several policy areas. Consequently, the policy communities
from different policy subsystems may overlap (Grant and MacNamara 1995; Jochim and May
2010; McCool 1988). In this context, as Baumgartner and Jones explained, with the change in the
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issue image in terms of attention and tone, multiple policy venues tend to be involved
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 80). Therefore, not only does the alteration in the type of the
subsystem cause changes, but also the changes may come from other venues or subsystems. As a
result of that intervention, multiple subsystems might be spanned together in one regime so as to
achieve a common goal, which highlights the need for establishing political institutional
arrangements that characterize the relationship among economic actors, social interests, and the
state. In order for the regimes to emerge, substantial institutional changes and new policies in
multiple regulatory areas have to be combined (Eisner 2000, 2–3).
For more explanation, Jochim and May (2010, 307) advance the concept of a boundaryspanning policy regime that is “a governing arrangement” in which several subsystems are spanned
and integrative policies are fostered. By putting the policymakers under pressure, these policy
regimes promote integrative measures among several subsystems. Here the policymakers establish
institutional frameworks supporting coordinated activities, and form forces that affect the
mobilization of interests. Significantly, the boundary-spanning policy regime is concerned with
the complicated problems which interact with different governmental levels and several
subsystems. Also, its mechanism is based on the incorporation of subsystem components which
seek similar policies. Boundary-spanning policy regimes aim to generate attention for an issue
among subsystems, and a common purpose may be achieved by binding components of related
subsystems. In this regard, representing interests grant the policy regimes legitimacy and political
power. As a consequence, the policy regimes are institutionalized by combining authority,
information flow, and attention that structure consistency. In sum, the regime overcomes the policy
monopoly in order to deal with complex problems (Jochim and May 2010, 307–11; Worsham and
Stores 2012, 171–72). Also, the propensity of a policy regime to evolve and increase its strength
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and durability depends on the salience and complexity of policy issues targeted by the regime
(Jochim and May 2010; Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner 2003).
However, the relevant institutional force for a boundary-spanning policy regime could be
provided by a dominant congressional committee. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of power and
overlapping of subsystem jurisdiction open the domain for an agency to play a dominant role as
the institutional force that is necessary for cooperation among several subsystems within the policy
regime (Jochim and May 2010, 312).
Enhancing the attractiveness of the concept of a boundary-spanning policy regime, it is
appealing when multiple subsystems cooperate with each other and are institutionally arranged to
serve a common goal. In the absence of such cooperation and institutional arrangements, the
policy outcomes might differ. Therefore, the analysis should include other situations where several
subsystems may overlap with each other and have a different relationship other than cooperation,
such as bargaining or conflict. Accordingly, there is a need to consider other frameworks that may
analyze other types of relationships.

2.3 The Policy Network Approach (PNA) and its Integrative Theoretical Perspective
The fact that multiple subsystems may overlap with each other and/or receive attributions
from individual actors outside the policy communities channels the analysis of the policy
subsystems to consider the wider policy networks. In a critique of the standard political
conceptions of power that focuses much on the dominant groups or subgovernments (subsystems),
Heclo (1978, 94–103) pointed out that the growth in responsibilities of an executive’s
administration mobilizes a large number of interest groups. As a result, the policymaking process
is opened to wide range of participants. Therefore, any study of the traditional iron triangle and
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subgovernment becomes incomplete because focusing on a small number of powerful actors and
interests overlooks the webs of participants who may guide and influence the exercise of power.
Accordingly, these webs, or what he called issue networks, have different characteristics from the
iron triangle or subgovernment. Instead of having small and stable circles of powerful participants
who fairly control or dominate specific public policies, the issue networks are characterized with
large number of participants who are mutually committed or interdependent, where no one is in
complete control over a policy area. In general, it is difficult to determine the boundaries of
networks. The actors constantly move in and out the network.
Heclo’s concept of issue networks moves from looking for who controls the subsystem to
who influences it, laying the foundation for the policy network approach (PNA). As Kenis and
Schneider indicated, the perspective of policy networks reflects the decentralization of social
organizations and governance where social control and intelligence are dispersed among multiple
political and social entities. Accordingly, coordination among these entities is a result of the
purposeful interaction and exchange of information and other resources (1991, 26). There are some
developments that make PNA an appropriate approach: 1) the emergence and growth of organized
society that increasingly produces resources affecting more social and political affairs by collective
actions and interdependency among actors and organizations; 2) sectoralization and functional
differentiation; 3) overcrowded policy making as a result of increasingly organized interests and
sectoralization; 4) an increase in the scope of state policy making; 5) the decentralization and
fragmentation of the state; 6) blurring of boundaries between the public and private; 7)
transnationalization of domestic politics to the international affairs; and 8) the escalation in
interdependency and complexity of social and political affairs (Kenis and Schneider 1991, 34–36).
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As an important contribution that has broad consensus among policy network scholars,
PNA emphasizes the role of interdependencies and the structure of networks in influencing the
behavior of actors and in turn the policy outcomes in a manner that other public policy approaches
have not sufficiently analyzed (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Dowding 1995; Galey and Youngs 2014;
Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Heclo 1978, 94–105; Kenis and Schneider 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992;
McCool 1988; Raab and Kenis 2007; Salancik 1995; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). For more
clarification, McCool explained that the American policymaking process is the swing between two
tendencies, fragmentation and accommodation. On one hand, the policymaking process is
fragmented to the degree that allows a variety of discrete decision-making units to have some
degree of, but not complete, control over policy arenas. On the other hand, such fragmentation of
power makes it difficult for any decision-making unit to achieve its causes without accommodating
the needs of other units. As a result, these two tendencies promote interdependency among various
power structures in a seamless web (1988, 266). Consequently, the actors and organizations within
and across the subsystems are affected by the actions of each other. Therefore, the functional
interdependencies becomes an important factor in explaining coordination among the variety of
actors within the networks. By focusing on the type of interaction or the linkages among actors,
the options for actions are constrained by the structure and the pattern of behavior embedded in
the networks. In other words, this approach focuses on the structure of the networks viewing the
causes and consequences of connection patterns in social and political behavior (Galey and Youngs
2014, 7; Hanf and Scharpf 1978, 12; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998, 475).
In regard to the nature of policy networks, it is problematic to portray the policy network
approach as identical to Heclo’s concept of issue networks that somehow is the opposite of iron
triangles or subgovernments (subsystems or dominant policy communities), in which the power
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within issue networks is distributed among a large number of participants rather than being
concentrated among a small set of powerful actors as it is the case with subgovernments (Heclo
1978, 102). This concept is challenging. As McCool indicated, it is difficult to identify the
boundaries, participants and who is in power within the networks, which reduces the practical
application and theoretical utility of the issue network concept. As a result, it becomes more
difficult to distinguish between the iron triangles and the more flexible and open arrangement of
the subsystem, which limits the explanatory power of the issue network concept (McCool 1998,
554–55). In contrast, it may be more applicable to give emphasis to the concept of policy
community that is a long-lived entity characterized by cohesiveness, exclusiveness, frequent
interaction, and exchange of resources among its participants. Here policy communities seek to
block the entrance of outsiders and establish a policy monopoly. Accordingly, the policy outcomes
may be explained by whether the policy community succeeds in building a dominant coalition
from of a subsystem or whether it faces competition within and across the subsystems (Cairney
2012, 176; Grant and MacNamara 1995, 509; Worsham 1997, 1998). In this regard, the concepts
of policy community and issue networks encounter a real dilemma. On the one hand, the notion of
a policy monopoly allows for the distinction between insiders and outsiders, which fits with the
crux of the PET and ACF arguments. Yet, it overlooks the webs of participants who may guide
and influence the exercise of power. On the other hand, abandoning the perception of policy
community in favor of issue networks gives up a lot of leverage and returns us to the problem of
identifying the boundaries, participants and who is in power within the networks.
Rather, it might be more appropriate to consider the policy communities and the issue
networks as two different forms or configurations of policy networks. Here Marsh and Rhodes
provided an adequate classification for the policy networks based on number of actors present and
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their distribution of resources. Accordingly, policy communities and issues networks are treated
as different kinds of policy networks that reflect relationships between government and interest
groups where both forms are located on opposite sides of the same continuum (1992, 13–14 and
249). In this context, Marsh and Rhodes indicated that the membership, kind of interaction, and
distribution of resources among actors in the networks are the main characteristics which
distinguish policy communities from issues networks. On one side, the policy community is
characterized by a limited number of participants, frequent and high-quality interactions, persistent
values and outcomes, and availability and mostly equal distribution of resources. On the other side,
an issue network is characterized with a large number of participants, fluctuating interaction, and
bounded by unequal distribution of resources (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, 13–14 and 249–51).
However, Marsh and Rhodes found that both types of networks could coexist with each
other. Specifically, they are not mutually exclusive. There are two layers that can be distinguished
within the policy network. These layers are the core layer and periphery layer, where the
interaction and distribution of resources vary among actors within the policy networks. Here, the
core layer reflects the policy community while the periphery layer reflects the issue network (1992,
255). In other words, we may find a network where subsets of actors representing the policy
community dominate the interactions and resources. Meanwhile, the rest of the participants in the
network are considered as the outsiders and have similar characteristics to those in issue networks.
Nonetheless, the policy network is not limited to one policy community. As Grant and MacNamara
(1995, 510) mentioned, in many issues there are multiple policy communities that intersect with
each other. When such an intersection happens, there are at least four potential outcomes : mutual
repulsion, absorption, subdivision, or joint venture. Also, Zafonte and Sabatier (1998, 474) defined
several types of interaction between policy subsystems that may coexist within the policy network,
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which are “(a) multiple functional subsystems in a given territory, (b) nested territorial subsystems
involving a given function or, most complex of all, (c) both multiple functions and nested
territories”. Counting for the potential overlapping among subsystems within the policy network,
Dowding concluded that the properties of the components within the networks provide
explanations for the nature of policy rather than the characteristics of networks as a whole (1995,
137). As a result, the policy networks may nest more than one community as well as a number of
participants who are not necessarily associated with a specific policy community. So rather than
defining the policy networks as either a policy community or issue network, it is more appropriate
to study the components and structures of the network, whether it has one or more policy
community configurations, and to what extent the outside participants affect the inputs and
outcomes of the policy networks.
However, the PNA lacks a clear and unified set of causal mechanisms that helps to develop
and test empirical postulations due to the adolescent stage of that field. Therefore, it is essential to
incorporate Social Network Analysis (SNA) in the analysis of policy networks (Dowding 1995,
137; Galey and Youngs 2014, 6; Kenis and Schneider 1991). What could be a promising
contribution of PNA and SNA is to link the quantitative analysis of network structure to the
existing theories of public policy, which adds more dynamic aspects of the established literature.
While qualitative analysis illustrated in the theoretical approaches of public policy such as PET,
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), and Multiple Streams Theory describe the dynamics of
network, the quantitative analysis of policy networks can present the structural base of these
approaches. For example, it shows to what extent some elements described in policy literature such
as policy images, punctuating events, belief systems, and institutions can affect and be affected by
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the interaction, interdependency, and distribution of power among actors, which constitutes the
structure of the network (Adam and Kriesi 2007, 131).
Moreover, Galey and Youngs argued that by integrating multiple theories, the PNA is
promising in elucidating change and stability in public policy. In general, there are two areas where
the PNA can show its compatibility with existing theoretical frameworks of public policy. On the
one hand, postulations from ACF and the Policy Entrepreneur Model (PEM) can be incorporated
to display the formation of coalitions and explain the behavior of individuals and groups within
the networks, using, for example, beliefs system and informational exchange as attributes (or
covariates). Here the policy networks are treated as the dependent variable. On the other hand,
insights from PEM and PET may be utilized to illuminate how the dynamics of policy networks
affect the policy outputs. Here the policy networks are considered as the independent variable. In
sum, this approach focuses on the structure of the network viewing the causes and consequences
of connection patterns in social and political behavior, which significantly and increasingly
incorporates the social network analysis (2014, 6–7 and 28–30). According to Galey and Youngs,
PNA goes beyond being a complementary framework to play a synthesis role where multiple
theories are blended creating a comprehensive framework. It has great potential to span several
policy theories and approaches such as PET, ACF, and PEM under one paradigm (2014, 2–5). For
more explanation, the next chapter contains an explanation of the application of social network
analysis with a representation of network structure and attribute effects relevant to the subject of
this dissertation.
2.3.1 The Network Boundaries
One challenge that students of policy network encounter is the boundary specification. In
general, there is agreement that the boundaries of the network should be determined by specifying
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a set of actors who participate in a particular policy domain (Adam and Kriesi 2007, 135; Heclo
1978, 103; Knoke and Laumann 1982; Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1989) although it is not
easy task. As Heclo admitted, it is difficult to determine the boundaries as issue networks consist
of a large number of mutual commitment participants who constantly move in and out of the
networks. However, the main incentive for participation in a network or another is their interest in
common policy problems or issues (1978, 100–103). Also, in term of SNA, the problem with
boundary specification is that if the relevant and/or important actors are omitted such as high
degree centrality and bridges, the network analysis might become meaningless (Laumann,
Marsden, and Prensky 1989, 63). Therefore, proper selection of participants is crucial for the
network analysis.
For that purpose, Knoke and Laumann (1982) set two criteria for network boundary
specification. First is the policy domain. Accordingly, membership in the policy network is
initially similar to any social system where the “mutual relevance to one another or…common
orientations to some shared reference point” (1982, 256) are the bases for mediating the
interdependence among the members of that social system. Herein, the reference point that
determines the relevant mutuality and orientated commonality in policy network is the policy
domain where an array of consequential actors is interested in advocating, formulating, and
adopting courses of actions related to a policy issue. The second criterion for network membership
is the organization’s consequentiality that is determined by the ability of the organizations to affect
the formation and distribution of particular domains presented in the policy subsystem.
Conclusively, the consequential participants are not only those who are controlling the subsystem,
but also those who are coordinating and directing it. Specifically, this organization’s
consequentiality is ascertained by the degree to which the actions of some actors are being
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considered by the others when the collective decisions are made (Knoke and Laumann 1982, 256–
57). In other words, the network membership includes the insider actors who are part of policy
monopolies in addition to the outsider actors who could influence the subsystem.
In this context, social network analysis (SNA) primarily offers two methods for defining
the network boundaries. First is the realist method according to which the researcher depends on
the actors themselves to identify the boundaries of the network, adopting their point of view for
who should be included or excluded. Here the network is considered a social entity that has
subjective meaning for its participants. Second is the nominalist method where the network
boundaries are determined based on the purposes of researchers. Here the analytic framework is
set to constructed the network, but the network does not have ontological or social status by itself
(Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1989, 65–66). Whether the realist or nominalist method is used,
the process of assembling the network consists of at least one of three mechanisms: selecting actors
based on specific attributes, engaging in relations, and/or participating in particular types of events
or activities (Knoke and Yang 2008, 15–20; Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1989, 79). In
addition, SNA advances many ways to construct the networks such as direct or indirect networks,
value or non-value networks, and one-mode or two-mode networks (Knoke and Yang 2008;
Wasserman 1994). However, the selection among these methods and mechanisms is an empirical
question and what is important is to apply the method(s) that best reflects the community under
investigation. Most importantly, when the policy networks are constructed, the SNA methods of
boundary specification should be coupled with Knoke and Laumann’s criteria of policy domain
and consequentiality.
Admittedly, Knoke and Laumann’s criteria are not strict. In despite of their assertion that
the actors with inconsequential or trivial effect could be safely overlooked, Knoke and Laumann
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indicated that inaction does not necessarily reflect peripheral actors. An inactive actor could belong
to a particular policy network so far as other actors in that network anticipate and consider its
reaction regardless of the need to perform an actual response. Nevertheless, they acknowledged
that what distinguishes between the consequential and peripheral participants could not be strictly
determined (1982, 257). Moreover, their determination that the membership of the network is only
confined by organizations is not completely accurate. Individuals could be included as well.
Interestingly, Knoke and Laumann’s definition of an organization’s consequentiality also could be
applicable to some individuals as long as those individuals could exert influence over a policy
domain and that their reactions are being considered by other participants in the network.
In conclusion, I believe that students of policy network should take into account two
precautions. On one hand, the criteria for boundary specification should not be relaxed to the
degree that the policy network include inconsequential actors and/or actors from a non-related
policy domain. On the other hand, the criteria should not be restricted to the point that the network
might exclude some important actors. For example, Marsh and Rhodes, and Sabatier have set
several criteria that reduced the policy network to the policy community or subsystem, which
excludes outsiders who may influence policy outputs (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, 476; Zafonte and
Sabatier 1998, 251). In fact, Sabatier has applied SNA techniques such as blockmodeling and
structural equivalence to distinguish policy subsystem and used terms of policy networks and
subsystem interchangeably (Sabatier and Weible 2007; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). In the end, the
network boundaries depend on researchers’ judgement to not omit or overstated relevant actors. In
general, there is room for trial and error in PNA and SNA and students of the policy network have
plenty of creative ways to apply SNA to the approaches and theories of public policy.

23

2.4 Agencies, Rulemaking, and Political Control
In general, the literature of the policy subsystem mostly studies the stage of agenda setting
and adaptation. However, when it comes to the stage of policy implementation, public
administration becomes the center of attention. Yet the distinction and sequence between two
stages are not unambiguous as many scholars previously thought (Adolino and Blake 2010, 8–10;
Cairney 2012, 41–42). In this regard, the delegation of power is one overlapping area. As they deal
with the diversity of complex and salient issues, legislators tend to delegate more authority to
agencies for a variety of reasons. It may be to avoid the blame and shift the responsibility of policy
choices to agencies or to deal with uncertainty and collect information. In many cases, politicians
seek to design a process that enables agencies to collect information about the desirable policy and
its consequences in order to alleviate the problem of uncertainty on one hand, and on the other
they would ensure that process serves the intended interest. In short, the agencies are required to
collect information about the nature of problem, the related options and their outcomes, who
receive the benefits and bear the costs, and the reactions of different parties (McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast 1987, 256–57).
In this context, agencies play an important role that goes beyond being participants in the
policy subsystem during the stage of agenda setting. As implementers of laws, agencies may
promulgate regulations or rules specifying the meaning of unclear laws and the ways these laws
are executed. In doing so, agencies are considered an extension of Congress. In view of that
extension, the rulemaking process, like legislation, is not far from politics (Kerwin 1999;
Rosenbloom 2002; W. West 2005). Despite the delegation of power, agencies do not have absolute
discretion. They are often overseen by political principals; the President, the Congress, and/or the
courts. In this context, political principals may be involved in the rulemaking process, blocking or
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facilitating specific rules (Kerwin 1999; Yackee 2005). As the President, Congress, and the courts
have jurisdiction over the administration, the agencies receive multiple signals from multiple
principals. Accordingly, the best description of the bureaucratic compliance problem is multiple
principal-agent relationships (Worsham and Gatrell 2005).
In order to control the process and the outputs of the rulemaking, the political principals
use different methods. One common method for political control is the police-patrol where the
political principals look for agencies’ wrong doing. This method includes several means associated
with rewards and punishments to monitor and discipline agencies such as congressional hearings,
legislative sanctions, budget review, and investigations. However, these tools are not always
available for the political principals. Some of them may cause high costs or face legal and political
limitations. Also, the agencies receive several signals from different political actors, which may
contradict one another. Besides, the judiciary is not a better venue for the police patrol method. In
many cases, courts provide limited review for administrative actions. Sometime, legal boundaries
of agency decisions are vague because the legislative mandates are not clear or are too broad. Also,
the judiciary depends on principles such as legitimacy and fairness and the courts cannot rule on a
political basis; therefore, using the courts as means of political control is insufficient. In regard to
police-patrol method, no perfect venue can be implemented for controlling administrative actions
since the politicians cannot always depend on monitoring and sanction methods alone without
costs; as well, they are subject to several fundamental limitations and uncertainty (McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast 1987, 244–53; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166).
In addition, the rules enacted by agencies are run under a different set of procedures
manifested in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) which provides the political
principals with another mechanism for political control, depending on the fire alarm method. Here,
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the administrative procedures facilitate the involvement of interest groups and individual citizens
in the process of rulemaking in order to detect any violation to the goals of legislation so that the
interest groups would have their chance to seek solutions through the administration, courts, or
Congress. In this regard, the principals wait until the alarm is sounded by interest groups rather
than looking for wrong doing (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166; W. West 2005, 657). The
APA has several features, which can alleviate the information problem for political principals and
enfranchise legislators’ favorable constituents. Also, it transfers the responsibility of policy
outcomes from elected politicians to agencies (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 244–53). As
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast argued, an important consideration led to the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Significantly, the coalition that enacts a bill or/and create an agency aim
to ensure that the deal continues after the coalition dissolves. In this regard, the coalition that
establishes the law creates an institutional structure and puts sanctions on agencies in order to
create pressures to ensure that the process of decision making will be directed toward the interests
of the coalition and reflects the political environment without attention or guidance from the
political principals. Therefore, procedures are designed to respond to favorable constituents, using
tools such as staff, resources, and subsidies. In other words, it stacks the deck in the agencies’
process of decision making, or what is known as the “deck-stacking” argument (1987, 255).
To guarantee that the outcomes of policies are not random, political principals seek to
control the details of procedures and participation process. In general, the APA has some political
implications that support the “deck-stacking” argument. By announcing agencies’ intention in
advance, the procedure prevents secret arrangements that may work against the interests of elected
officials. In addition, the public disclosure requirement, which opens the rules for notices and
comments, provides agencies with valuable information about the related parties, and the benefits
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and costs. Also, these notices and comments display whether agencies move toward the actions
that political principals want. Significantly, it allows the relevant parties to know about the
intention of agencies before constituencies are mobilized or policies are changed. It disadvantages
agencies in the same manner that enables the political principals and other relevant parties to
intervene early in the administrative policy-making process. Furthermore, participation in the
administrative procedures can be considered as a measurement for political debate and interests
regarding controversial course of actions (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 258–69). In this
context, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast emphasized other features for the deck stacking argument
placed in APA. Interestingly, the evidentiary standard requirement indicates that agencies’
decisions have to be built upon strong evidence that can stand before courts. This requirement may
work in opposite direction either. For example, in the case where political principals are confident
that agencies will comply, weak evidentiary standards could be preferable as it minimizes the
possibility that the desirable policy may be blocked by evidence in the courts. The burden of proof
is another way for deck-stacking. Agencies are required to demonstrate that cause-effect
relationships in administrative decisions work in favor of intended constituents after the
establishing coalition is disbanded; otherwise, it may be subject to judicial review. Besides, the
APA could perform an autopilot function. As the political interests and the costs and benefits of
policy outcomes change over time, the APA allows agencies to respond to challengers driven by
changes in the political environment without the need for new legislation. Subsequently, the
autopilot feature gives more flexibility to the politicians (1987, 259–69).
However, the “fire alarm” and “deck-stacking” arguments enlighten the importance of the
interaction between the principals and interest groups in influencing the rulemaking process. Not
only do the direct relationships between interest groups and agencies matter, but also, the indirect
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relationships are vital. For example, when the alarm is sounded, interest groups may lobby the
related congressional committee to intervene in the rulemaking so that the agency produces
optimal results. Thus, the analysis of the rulemaking process should not be confined to the direct
interactions between interest groups and agencies. It also should include the indirect interactions
between interest groups and agencies that go through the political principals, which leads to the
question who participates in rulemaking noted by West (2005, 663). In this context, is the
rulemaking process limited to the participants in the policy subsystem or is it open to outside
stakeholders? Under which conditions do political principals intervene in regulatory policy? These
questions highlight how important it is to connect the studies of rulemaking with the studies of
policy subsystems and boundary-spanning policy regimes. It may be that the dynamics of the
subsystem and regime explains at least partially the rulemaking process and its outcomes.
In light of this connection, Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner found that salience and
complexity increase the tendency of congressmen, as political principals, to utilize legislation to
interfere in regulatory policy that is typically left to agencies to deal with (2003, 160). Meanwhile,
Webb Yackee found that as the attention of the President, the Congress, and the courts escalates,
agencies respond to those principals. Yet if the attention of principals is low, agencies are freer to
respond to interest groups (2006). Moreover, the President, Congress, and the courts as well as
interest groups may play an essential role in setting the agenda for rulemaking. As West & Raso
pointed out, the rules may come as a direct request from political principals or could be required
by statutes, considered as non-discretionary rules. However, some rules may be authorized by
statutes but not required, in which agencies enjoy discretion to pursue rules on their own (W. F.
West and Raso 2013). Nonetheless, this interaction between the agencies and the political
principals is not confined by the boundary of the policy subsystem. It may include multiple
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subsystems or policy regimes. Given the fragmentation of power in the American political system,
a dominant agency may emerge as the relevant institutional force that integrates several
subsystems (Jochim and May 2010, 312). In return, the policy regimes could offer an institutional
umbrella for implementation of public policy by providing legitimacy, coherence, and durability
(May 2015, 20).
In sum, the significance of studying the participants in rulemaking and their connection to
the subsystem and policy regime is to bring attention to the effect of the rulemaking context and
political environment. However, the subsystem and policy regimes literature may explain in part
the context of policy making where there is a policy monopoly or cooperation among several
subsystems, but the analysis should go farther to study rulemaking process in a highly complex
and conflicted environment as well. In this regard, West implied that the structures of bureaucratic
policy making may differ when agencies operate in a highly fluid, conflicted, and complicated
context from those who operate in stable and simple environment (2005, 664). Consequently, some
inquiries are raised. For example, how do agencies deal with contradictory signals sent by the
political principals such as in the case of divided government? Whose prevail? Does the dominant
coalition in the policy subsystem enjoy the same level of dominance in the rulemaking process as
well? To what extent is the process open for outside participants? How, if any, do the contextual
factors influence patterns and the outcomes of rulemaking. These questions emphasize the
importance of studying rulemaking as a part of wider network where the outcomes of the
rulemaking process are determined by the interactions between agencies and other participants in
the network as well as among those participants themselves.
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2.5 The Dynamics of Policy Network and the Structures of Rulemaking
In this section, I review the dynamics of the policy network that may dictates the
rulemaking process. Even though there is not that much literature studying rulemaking in the form
of networks, the policy network assumptions are applicable to rulemaking since agencies are
important actors in policy networks. As the literature has not sufficiently covered some important
subjects in this regard, I expect, nevertheless, that the behavior of rulemaking networks differs
from networks that studies of policy subsystems describe. Therefore, I underline such differences
or expected differences at the end of this section putting these differences in form of inquiries.
On this subject, many scholars have suggested a variety of typologies characterizing the
policy network as a whole, which potentially explains the inputs and outputs of the policy process.
Depending on public policy theories, they were able to ascertain attributes and define structural
configurations for analyzing the policy networks (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Dowding 1995; Galey
and Youngs 2014, 10–11; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; McCool 1998; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). In
this context, Marsh and Rhodes indicated that the characteristics of the policy network could
explain both change and stability. They found that policy networks further stability and continuity
through routinizing relationships, and the networks with dominant professional and economic
interests are most likely to resist the changes (1992, 257–61). The importance of Marsh and
Rhodes’ finding is that it brings attention to the role of power and resource distributions in
analyzing the network behavior and outcomes. In general, the resources could be formal legal
authority to make policy decisions, public opinion, information, troop mobilization, financial
resources, and/or skillful leadership. Accordingly, the types of resources available to groups or
coalition vary, depending on nature of actors within policy network (Sabatier and Weible 2007,
201–3). For example, the resources that business organizations possess differ from those the
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environmental groups have, and the resources that are largely available to interest groups differ
from those available to public institutions. Here demonstrating the resources that network actors
possess is necessary to determine the power distribution or power structure within the policy
network, which is considered as an important determinant of the behavior and outcomes of
networks (Adam and Kriesi 2007, 145; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Waarden 1992).
However, while the power of the resources is a necessary condition, it is insufficient. In
term of campaign contributions as a kind of resource, Wright argued that the campaign
contribution is not a sufficient explanation for voting decisions at the level of congressional
committees. Instead, the number of representative lobbying contacts provides adequate
explanation for committee voting whereas campaign contributions seem to have no effect on
voting decisions. Rather the effect appears in lobbying efforts (1990). In other words, the effect
of resources is conditioned on lobbying efforts, or the interaction between interest groups and
members of committees. In this regard, interest groups vary in their lobbying behavior. They may
lobby to change the status quo or to block the change. Also, they may counter-lobby in order to
prevent their opponents from achieving their goals. Moreover, interest groups may engage in
coalition building so that their efforts would be more effective (Baumgartner et al. 2009; McKay
and Yackee 2007; Nelson and Yackee 2012). These different types of behavior highlight the
important of the interaction and interdependency among actors within and across the policy
subsystems and networks. Here the effect of the interaction may differ according to the kind of
relationship between actors and components within policy subsystems and networks. In the case
of a conflictual relationship, McCool found that the level of conflict could determine the typology
of the subsystem and its strategic context of policymaking (1988). On the other hand, if the
relationships among multiple subsystems are characterized by cooperation, a policy regime may
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emerge spanning several subsystems so that a common goal may be achieved (Jochim and May
2010). In sum, the distribution of power and resources does not fully display the characteristics of
policy network. Therefore, the nature of interaction among the network’s actors has to be
considered as another determinant that could explain the behavior and outcomes of networks.
In view of that, Adam and Kriesi presented a description of network structures based on
the abovementioned determinants or criteria: the distribution of power, whether it is concentration
or fragmentation; and the kind of interaction among actors, whether it is conflict, bargaining, or
cooperation. Consequently, policy networks can be classified into six types of structures, according
to which the policy outcomes can be explained. The first type of policy network are those with a
concentration of power and cooperating interactions, which have a low possibility of change and
maintain the status quo. Second are networks with a concentration of power and bargaining style
of interactions, which have a low to moderate possibility of change with an incremental tendency.
Third are networks with a concentration of power and conflictual interactions, which have a
moderate possibility of change with a speedy tendency for serial modifications. Fourth are
networks with a fragmentation of power and cooperating interactions, which have low to moderate
possibility of change with a tendency to maintain the status quo. Fifth are the networks with
fragmentation of power and bargaining style interactions, which have a moderate to high
possibility of change with incremental tendency. The last type is the network with fragmentation
of power and conflictual interactions, which have a high possibility of change with speedy
tendency for serial modifications (2007, 144–45).
In addition, the formation of coalitions within and across subsystems is another dimension
that describes the structure of policy networks. In this context, the ACF provides insight into the
way coalitions are formed within the policy networks. According to ACF, the participants who
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hold similar beliefs seek to translate their views to actual policy. In doing so, they pursue allies
and form coalitions which enable them to share resources, and develop strategies (Sabatier and
Weible 2007, 196). Because of rigid nature of normative beliefs and the tendency of viewing the
world through a set of preexisting beliefs, different coalitions tend to interpret same information
in a dissimilar way. In addition, people are psychologically affected by defeats more than they are
with victory, which leads to what Sabatier and Weible called “the devil shift” according to which
the opponents perceived each other as less trustworthy. As a result, actors within each coalition
intensify their ties, leading to escalation of the level of conflict between coalitions, which puts the
subsystem under pressure (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 194). In regard to which level of belief
system are the most important in explaining the coordination within and across the subsystems,
Zafonte and Sabatier point out that unlike deep core beliefs and secondary aspects, the policy core
beliefs are most related to the policy substances that receive maximum attention from the actors
and organizations within and across the subsystems. Therefore, congruence in the policy core
beliefs is most likely to be the glue that drive the coordination (1998, 478–79). Commonly, there
are enough policy core beliefs in any given issue to define at least two advocacy coalitions
(Sabatier and Weible 2007, 195). Nonetheless, some actors within a policy network may choose
to join a coalition for reasons other than their belief system. As a critique for ACF, Cairney
indicated that the notion of coalitions could explain the stability, but it does not fully explain the
change which may be accounted for by external shocks. Additionally, not only do alliances form
based on core beliefs, but also some coalitions are temporarily founded on self-interest, which
explain why some actors switch positions from one coalition to another even though they do not
share the same core beliefs with the new coalition (2007, 58).
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Although network typologies and characteristics might explain policy outcomes, they do
not explain why and how the change in network structure occur. In this regard, many network
scholars emphasized the role of contextual variables in making structural transformations (Adam
and Kriesi 2007; Marsh and Rhodes 1992). In this context, Marsh and Rhodes found that the
economic changes and salience of issues disrupt the policy network and stability, which cause
alteration in policy outcomes (1992, 257–62). Additionally, Adam and Kriesi hypothesize that the
interaction and structure network may be shaped by the merit of policies. Accordingly, the policies
that motivate and provide resources for group formation might produce networks characterized
with fragmented structures while the policies with high expectations, high visibility, and easy
traceability may provoke conflictual interaction since public officials are put in position of
defending themselves against interest groups and the public (2007, 141–42). In addition, Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith indicated that the alterations in policy core beliefs, and in turn policy outcomes,
requires a transformation in the external non-cognitive elements of the policy subsystem and
network such as changes in socio-economic conditions, changes in the systemic governing
coalition, and changes caused by policy decisions of other subsystems (1999, 133).
The subsystem literature provides considerable insight into the effect of punctuations that
might be utilized to explain the dynamics of the policy network as whole and its components such
as policy communities and coalitions. Based on PET, when a punctuating or shocking event hits
the policy subsystem and network, the relations among actors and coalitions within and across the
subsystem may change. Simultaneously, it is associated with an increase in media and public
attention, which encourages more people and interest groups to participate in the relevant
subsystem. In addition, other policy venues become involved and a shift in policy venue may
occur. Consequently, a wavering equilibrium occurs where the subsystem move from a dominant
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coalition type to more competitive type, opening a window for change in public policy
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Worsham 1997, 1998). Thinking of this view in terms of network
changes, not only is the policy network activated, but also power and resources are redistributed,
which alters the structure of the network as well. On this subject, Sabatier and Weible distinguished
between the ramifications of internal shocks and external shocks, although both shocks have
something in common. The first ramification is that both external and internal shocks bring
attention to and put a problem on the agenda, which draws more participants to a subsystem. As a
result, critical political resources are redistributed or new resources are brought into the subsystem.
However, the internal shock has a second ramifications which is that the policy core beliefs of the
dominant coalition are put into question due to the internal shock, increasing the credibility of
policy core beliefs of minority coalitions within the subsystem. As a consequence, doubt about the
effectiveness of the dominant coalition’s policy is raised and the policy core beliefs of minority
coalitions are confirmed. Thus, the dominant coalition become more willing to compromise and
engage in negotiation with the minority coalition (2007, 204–7).
Furthermore, the resources and behavior of coalitions within the policy network are
affected by another contextual factor which is coalition opportunity structures. According to
Sabatier and Weible, the coalition opportunity structures are “relatively enduing features of a
polity that affect the resources and constraints of subsystem actors (2007, 200).” Here, Sabatier
and Weible indicated that coalition opportunity structures are composed of two sets of variables
shaping the resources and behavior. First is the degree of consensus that is necessary for achieving
important policy change. If a high degree of consensus is required for changes, then the coalition
is motivated to be inclusive. This will help in making compromise, increasing information sharing,
and reducing the devil shift (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 199–200). In the case of rulemaking, the
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literature shows that the degree of consensus matters. As McKay and Yackee (2007) mentioned,
if there are two or more sides lobbying federal agencies through comments on rules, the agencies
respond to the side who dominates the lobbying effort. Nonetheless, Nelson and Yackee pointed
out that the success of the dominant side in rules’ comments is conditioned on whether there is
consensus within the dominant coalition and the size of the coalition and its composition (2012).
The second variable is the openness of the political system which is determined by the number of
venues that a policy proposal could go through and the degree of accessibility of these venues. In
general, the political system in United States is considered very open with the availability of
multiple venues with high degree of accessibility. As a conclusion, Sabatier and Weible pointed
out that pluralist coalition opportunity structures as is the case of the United States are
characterized with moderate norms of compromise and open systems for decision making
(Sabatier and Weible 2007, 200).
Ultimately, the aforementioned literature is applicable to the rulemaking network to the
greater degree. However, some considerations should be considered, which distinguish between
the structures of the policy network in general and the structures of the specific rulemaking
network. First of these considerations is to what extent the politics of the subsystem affect the
routines and outputs of the rulemaking process. Here the arguments of deck stacking and fire alarm
suggest a link between the politics of the subsystem and the rulemaking process. According to the
deck-stacking argument, the coalition who establishes a bill designs the administrative procedures
in manner that ensures the agencies continue serving the intended constituents after the established
coalition has disbanded. In other words, the dominant coalition and interest groups who lobbied
Congress and its committees to enact a bill do not have to lobby the agencies when the agency
implements that bill and issues administrative rules unless the alarm is sounded. As an implication
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of the public disclosure requirement in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the fire alarm
guarantees that when agencies deviate from serving the intended constituents, the members of the
established coalition will have their chance to lobby the agencies and their political principals such
as congressional committees, President, and the courts so that the intended constituencies would
be served (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; W. West 2005). Here inquiries are raised about
why and under which conditions do agencies deviate from serving the intended constituencies,
which motivates the members of the established coalition to lobby the agencies and their political
principals? Do the punctuating events create circumstances for such behavior?
Another consideration is the effect of the autopilot function provided by the APA.
Accordingly, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast asserted that the rulemaking routine and outputs
may change when the interests and preferences of political principals are altered, which gives more
flexibility to politicians. As new interest groups and constituencies become more favorable, the
principals may tolerate deviation from the original deal that issued the bill or reform (1987, 259–
69). Thus, if, due to highly administrative flexibility or the autopilot function, the original deal that
establishes the bill or reform could not survive after the establishing coalition is disbanded, then
there is no deck that is stacked in administrative procedures, at least for that bill or reform. It
always depends on the dominant interests and preferences at the time of decision regardless to
what the original deal should serve. As a consequence, the autopilot argument implies that the
opposing parties who were lobbying the subsystem at first place will have incentive to continue
lobbying agencies when it comes to the implementation of policy and rulemaking. If this kind of
lobbying effort from subsystem to rulemaking actually happens, the question of timing is raised.
Will it happen simultaneously at both the subsystem and rulemaking levels? Or will it happen
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successively moving from the subsystem to rulemaking? If so, what are the implications of such
shifts in lobbying effort?
The next consideration is the relationship with the political principals. Generally, the
relationship among political principals does differ from the relationship between the political
principals and agencies. The President, Congress, and courts are governed by the principle of
separation of powers, and the check and balance system, which sets different circumstances for
lobbying the policy subsystem from those lobbying the rulemaking. Here the relations among
Congress, President, and courts could be described as equal branches sharing power (Neustadt
1991). Meanwhile, the administration is not an equal branch to those principals. It is best explained
by multiple-principal agent relationship where the agencies receives multiple signals from multiple
principals (Worsham and Gatrell 2005). As they enjoy constitutional and legal authority over the
agencies, the President, Congress, and the courts as well as public opinion could block or facilitate
a specific rule (Kerwin 1999; Yackee 2005). Even in the case of delegation of authority, agencies
do not have absolute discretion. They are still overseen by the political principals. In this context,
Yackee found that as the attention of President, Congress, and courts increases, agencies respond
to these principals. Yet if the attention of principals is low, agencies are free to response to interest
groups (2006). The fact that the involvement of the political principals matters reinforces the idea
that in the rulemaking process, the interactions between the interest groups and the political
principals are as important as the interactions between these interest groups and agencies. So, to
what extent does the involvement of political principals alter the routine and outputs of the
rulemaking process? Under which conditions do the political principals become involved in
rulemaking? What and how do agencies respond when receiving multiple signals from multiple
principals?
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The last consideration is the openness of rulemaking process. As the APA requires, the
rules have to be published and opened to public comments before being finalized and agencies
have to consider these comments when final decisions are made (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast
1987; W. West 2005). However, in the pre-rule stage, the process is less transparent and the parties
who have access to the pre-rule stage enjoy an advantage over others (Yackee 2012). On other
hand, access to the political principals who hold jurisdiction over agencies is not available for
every one, as is the case with the notices and comments stage in the rulemaking process. So to
what degree could the variation in political openness affect the rulemaking process and its outputs?
Finally, these considerations highlight the differences between the policy network
structures and rulemaking structures. Therefore, any network analysis for rulemaking should take
these differences into account; otherwise, the analysis would be misspecified and the final results
would be misleading.

2.6 Conclusion and Literature Gap.
In sum, PET & ACF describe the dynamics of the policy subsystem in which the
administration is an important participant. Particularly, it studies the effect of abrupt stimuli and
changes in the external non-cognitive elements on the dynamics and composition of the policy
subsystem, illustrating how policy monopolies are created or terminated (Baumgartner and Jones
2009; Baumgartner, Jones, and True 2007; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible
2007; Worsham 1997, 1998, 2006). Moreover, the literature shows that the policy monopoly or
policy subsystem may be overcome by spanning several congressional committees or subsystems
in one regime where the agencies may play an important role in the cooperation among overlapping
subsystems (Eisner 2000; Jochim and May 2010; Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner 2003).
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Furthermore, the policy network approach (PNA) extends the analysis to consider the
influence of other actors outside the policy community. Not only are policy outputs determined by
the success of the policy community in establishing the policy monopoly or subsystem, but they
also determine the behavior of other entities within the policy network and the type of relationship
among these entities inside and outside the policy community. In this context, the actions of actors
depend on their connections with each other and the structure of these relations, demonstrating the
importance of the interdependencies among network entities. Significantly, PNA brings attention
to the structures of the policy network and the interdependency relations as important covariates;
otherwise, the results of policy network analysis would be biased (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Cranmer
and Desmarais 2011; Dowding 1995; Galey and Youngs 2014; Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Heclo
1978; Kenis and Schneider 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Raab and Kenis 2007; Salancik 1995;
Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). Likewise, PNA implies that the behavior of agencies, as is the case
with other network participants, is influenced by these variables. Therefore, the analysis of the
rulemaking process should take into account the interdependencies among other actors and the
structures of the policy networks.
On the other hand, the literature of rulemaking describes the process and conditions under
which agencies operate to enact administrative rules. Accordingly, the arguments of police patrol
and fire alarm exhibit the extent of involvement of political principals in the rulemaking process
and various ways they utilize them for political control (Kerwin 1999; McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast 1987; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Rosenbloom 2002; W. West 2005; W. F. West
and Raso 2013; Worsham and Gatrell 2005). The importance of these contributions is to suggest
that studies of rulemaking should be linked to the literature of policy subsystems and networks.
Therefore, it may be more fruitful to study the structure of the rulemaking process as part of a
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wider network where the outcomes of the rulemaking process are determined by the interactions
between agencies and other participants in the network as well as among those participants
themselves.
However, PET, ACF, and PNA provide a comprehensive set of hypotheses that may be
applied to networks of rulemaking. Specifically, these approaches explain the dynamics of the
policy network and illustrate the causes and consequences of connection patterns in social and
political behavior. In addition, they exhibit the forces that drive the formation of coalitions within
the policy subsystems and networks as well as the effect of contextual factors (Galey and Youngs
2014). In this regard, social network analysis (SNA) offers empirical tools to study these
hypotheses and build statistical models for rulemaking and policy networks. As a promising
contribution, PNA and SNA link the quantitative analysis of network structure to the qualitative
analysis of existing public policy theories, which contributes to more dynamic aspects of the
established literature (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Galey and Youngs 2014). Nonetheless, the structure
of the rulemaking process and the relations that connect the participants in rulemaking networks
differ from those who govern the policy network in general. Despite the applicability of PET, ACF,
and PNA’s hypotheses, some considerations should be considered, unveiling the distinction
between the structures of the rulemaking network and the policy networks. These considerations
are related to the effect of the politics of the subsystem, the autopilot function of APA, the relations
with the political principals, and political openness.
In summary, I am trying to address the gap in the public policy literature regarding the
bureaucratic/implementation approach, especially when the policy process moves from the stage
of agenda setting and adaption to the stage of policy implementation. Accordingly, I have reviewed
the relevant literature. On the one hand, PET, ACF, and PNA mostly analyze agenda setting and
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policy adoption while, on the other hand, studies of rulemaking and political control are concerned
with policy implementation. However, that literature suggests a link between the two stages even
though it is not explicitly articulated. Therefore, my aim is to investigate this link by mapping the
dynamics of both policy networks and rulemaking, identifying the related subsystems, coalitions,
and other actors who may affect the rulemaking process. In other words, I compare the two stages
to see if what happens at one stage of the process, agenda setting through adoption, mirrors what
occurs at the other stage — implementation. In light of that comparison, I may be able to determine
to what extent the activities at one level affect the other, especially when the rulemaking and policy
network receive abrupt stimuli. Additionally, I attempt to disclose how far the literature of public
policy is applicable to studies of rulemaking. Although the rulemaking process is located in the
implementation stage, it resembles to some degree the process of policy adaptation. Thus, it is
important to present the similarities and differences between the processes of policy adaptation
and the rulemaking process.
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Chapter 3: The Argument for the Effects of Punctuations and
Methodology of the Study

3.1 Introduction
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section contains the research questions that
address gaps in the literature regarding the effect of punctuating events on the rulemaking process.
In the second section, I argue whether and how the policy subsystem and policy network may
affect the routines and outputs of the rulemaking process, taking into account the dynamics of the
subsystem. In the third section, I state reasons why Social Network Analysis (SNA) and the
Exponential-Family Random Graph Models (ERGM) are suitable for addressing these questions
empirically. In addition, an explanation is given for the logic and application of ERGM and other
SNA techniques that I utilize in this study. In the fourth section, I illuminate the policy domain
and the time frame examined in the following chapters. In general, the purpose of this chapter is
to provide the overall argument for how the punctuations affect the dynamics and outputs of the
rulemaking process, in which I attempt to bridge the gaps in the literature. This argument will be
empirically examined in the following chapters. If the readers are interested in the theoretical
perspective of this dissertation and its contributions, reading this chapter and the conclusion is
sufficient.

3.2 Research Questions
In general, the literature shows how and to what extent political principals influence
agencies and their rulemaking outputs. Also, it demonstrates how punctuating events affect the
policy subsystem including political principals and other actors, especially in the area of agenda

43

setting and policy adoption. However, the effect of punctuations on administrative activities has
not been sufficiently explored. Particularly, whether and how changes in subsystem composition
and belief systems caused by a punctuation could alter rulemaking outputs, and whether the
punctuating impacts happen sequentially or whether they occur simultaneously across the policy
subsystem, rulemaking process, and policy network. In other words, how do punctuations affect
the implementation stage? These inquiries need further investigation. Therefore, I will address
three general research questions in this dissertation:
Q1: How do the dynamics and composition of the policy subsystem and policy network
shape the outputs of rulemaking?
Q2: How do punctuations change the dynamics and composition of the policy network and
its rulemaking outputs?
Q3: What is the temporal sequence for the impacts of a punctuation on the policy subsystem
and network, and in particular the rulemaking outputs?
Particularly, I am interested in tracking the impacts of punctuating events on the policy
network in the oil sector and then observing how changes in dynamics and the composition of the
policy subsystem alter rulemaking outputs. In addition, I intend to examine the temporal sequence
of these changes. In particular, I am looking for changes in the actors involved in the policy
network, the variation in lobbying effort, any shifts in power and resources, the change in the
dynamics undergirding the related policy subsystem, and any alteration in consensus of different
coalitions within and across the subsystem. Furthermore, my aim is to observe these changes over
time so that I can demonstrate when interest groups shift their lobbying effort from congressional
committees to agencies and how such movement affects the rulemaking outputs. In other words, I
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am tracking the effect of punctuations over time, moving from the stage of agenda setting and
policy formulation to the stage of implementation.

3.3 Arguments for the Effects of Punctuations and Rulemaking Dynamics
A primary aim in this study is to investigate who influences the rulemaking process and
how agencies behave in competitive or conflicted environments. To a large extent, it is concerned
with the effect of the punctuations on the policy network, within and across the subsystem, and in
turn their effect on both rulemaking and its time sequence. The importance of studying abrupt
stimuli is that it may provide explanations for the outputs of public policy and rulemaking through
tracking the changes from the prior state of equilibrium to the state of punctuation. It presents the
more dynamic aspects of public policy processes, in contrast to some static aspects that mostly
remain unchanged for longer periods of time such as party affiliations, ideology, and who controls
the branches of the government. Despite many studies that focus on congressional committees and
other political principals, I am looking at these aspects from the angle of administration,
connecting rulemaking outputs to the change in composition of the policy subsystem and network.
Instead of studying the political principals as dependent variables, I consider them as independent
variables that could explain rulemaking outputs. In this context, my aim is to display how abrupt
stimuli might change the dynamics of the policy network and composition of the policy subsystem,
which in turn, might alter rulemaking outputs. In general, the effect of punctuations on the policy
subsystem, especially at the level of political principals such as congressional committees, is well
articulated (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Cairney 2012; Kingdon 2011; Sabatier and JenkinsSmith 1999; Worsham 1997, 1998). Nevertheless, the questions of how the punctuation could
affect the rulemaking process itself, and its outputs, and what the impact of the temporal sequence
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of the punctuation all need further investigation. Here, I argue the effect of abrupt stimuli on
principals differs from its effect on agencies.
As PET articulates, at the time of punctuation, interest groups increase their pressure on
political principals, seizing the moment to get desirable policy outcomes, which may empower a
certain coalition and alter the beneficiaries of rulemaking. Here, timing matters in the rulemaking
process. Accordingly, the impacts of punctuations are likely exhibited when changes over time are
taken into account. Expectedly, the impact on rulemaking outputs may begin during the onset of a
punctuating event as pressures are put on the agencies and the executive in general to take action.
Nonetheless, agencies might be cautious in taking such actions because of the uncertainty that is
associated with the effort of lobbying political principals to make a reform, especially with
congressional committees. However, if some reform measures are passed, interest groups and
political coalitions are expected to shift their lobbying efforts from principals to agencies so that
different interest groups and political coalitions would ensure that agencies comply with the reform
and produce positive outputs after the punctuation. I call this shift in lobbying effort the lagged
movement, which represents changes in the behavior and resources of the actors within the
network, upon redirecting their lobbying effort and resources from the political principals to the
agencies in the post-punctuation period.
Also, I expect these lagged movements to happen even when the reform is blocked because
of the autopilot function that the APA provides. As McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast asserted,
agencies may change their beneficiaries when the political principals change their interests and
preferences, which gives more flexibility to politicians. Subsequently, the principals may tolerate
deviation from the original deal that issued the law or reform if the legislators’ preferences and
interests changed in favor of other interests groups (1987, 259–69). Thus, the original deal that
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establishes the reform may not survive after the establishing coalition is disbanded. Then the
rulemaking outputs will depend to some degree on the dominant interests and preferences at the
time of the decision regardless of whom the original deal is meant to serve, due to the
administrative flexibility of the autopilot function. In this case, whether the reform happens or not,
there will be incentive for the winners and losers to lobby the agencies. For example, if the reform
happens, the previously dominant coalitions are motivated to participate in the rulemaking process
so that they can regain some of what they lost. In contrast, if the reform is blocked, the minority
coalitions may attempt through the rulemaking process to achieve some of their goals that they
failed to pass through Congress. Therefore, lagged movements will occur either way.
To understand the dynamics of the rulemaking process, the activities at both levels of the
principals and the agents should be connected. Herein, the lagged movements offer a perspective
on this connection. As a starting point, it is important to analyze the reaction of the participants in
the policy network to the punctuation, which could result from one of the following abrupt stimuli:
indicators which enlighten the change and the size of the problem as to whether there is a need to
take a specific action or not; focusing events such as natural disasters and economic crises; and
feedback where the successes and failures of the policy performance are evaluated (Kingdon 2011,
90–103). As an important catalyst for change in the routine and outputs of rulemaking over time,
a punctuation generates pressure on agencies to take an action. In addition, it changes the structure
of the policy network of which the agencies are a part.
To exhibit the effect of abrupt stimuli, the behavior of the network and the changes in the
pattern of connections should be analyzed in three phases: the pre-punctuation equilibrium, the
punctuation, and the post-punctuation phases. In this context, Figure 3.1 is a visual example of the
dynamics of the policy network in the three phases. At the beginning, I expect the activities within
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the policy network to be stable and steady at a certain level during equilibrium, where the agencies
issue rules on a regular basis, and a dominant subsystem may well exist. Meanwhile, the
involvement of other principals such as the President and courts may be less visible or entirely
absent. Therefore, the policy network might appear relatively smaller since interest groups are
lobbying fewer agencies by commenting on their rules and lobbying congressional committees by
appearing at their hearings as shown by network 1A of Figure 3.1.
However, when a punctuation occurs, I expect the policy network to be activated as a result
of public and media attention associated with the involvement of the political principals and many
interest groups that were previously inactive. See the network 1B. By comparing network 1A with
network 1B, the differences in the activities of the policy network between the equilibrium and
punctuation times may be displayed as where at the time of the punctuation there are relatively
more interest groups lobbying the principals and agencies than there were in the equilibrium phase.
Yet most activities would be concentrated at the level of the principals, especially congressional
committees. On the other hand, activities regarding rulemaking are expected to be less active as a
result of the uncertainty associated with lobbying efforts to issue new bills or legislation that may
change the beneficiaries of some policy programs.
Whether the interest groups succeed in getting new bills or legislation passed or not, the
patterns of connections within the policy network are expected to change after the punctuation
passes as attempts are made to influence change, whether they are successful or not. I anticipate a
switch in lobbying activities from principals to agents, which creates the lagged movement that is
manifested in the shift from lobbying congressional sub/committees, the President, and/or courts
as the principals, to lobbying agencies as agents. See network 1C of Figure 3.1. In this third
network structure, the attention of political principals gradually fades away, and they become less
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active in association with decreasing public and media attention. Accordingly, the principals in the
network receive fewer ties from interest groups post-punctuation, unlike the situation during the
punctuation. Meanwhile, the agencies become more active moving from agenda setting to the
implementation stage. As a result, there are a relatively larger number of rules with a significant
number of interest group ties connecting them. In order to investigate the lagged movement and
examine the argument for rulemaking dynamics, an analysis of policy networks is presented, and
several empirical hypotheses are set in Chapters 5 and 6.
Figure 3.1

Note: Even though it is at this point a hypothetical example, I used real data for the oil policy network in the period
2009-2011 that encountered a focusing event: The Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010. Here, a
sample of congressional hearings and administrative rules collected during period 2009-2011 and retrieved from
Proquest. Sources: ProQuest Congressional Publications; Regulations.gov.

In light of this dynamics, the effect of the punctuation on the rulemaking outputs appears
through the changes that it causes in the policy network at both the levels of principals and agents.
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Therefore, it is important to determine which interest groups and coalitions dominate the policy
network, if any, and to what extent the balance within the network is altered due to the punctuation,
which in turn could explain the outputs of rulemaking. To display such effects, I determine and
track the beneficiaries of rulemaking under different conditions and over time so that a better
picture of the behavior and responses of agencies can illustrated.
Accordingly, I am looking to ascertain which parties are the recipients of agencies’ actions,
and whether the administrative rules are advantageous to those recipients. After identifying the
participants in rulemaking, I determine, in general terms, what they want from the agencies. In
other words, what are the requests of the interest groups? Then I analyze the final rules to exhibit
the responses of agencies to these requests, whether they are benefiting these participants or not.
Specifically, the beneficiary variable depends on the analysis of request-response actions, as being
a beneficiary of a rule rests on whether the related agency responds to or denies the request(s) of
that participant in the rulemaking. For example, if a participant proposes a specific regulation and
the relevant agency responds by issuing that regulation, then this participant is considered as a
beneficiary of rulemaking. So, by analyzing the request-response actions, I can identify who the
beneficiaries are and then turn to why the agencies respond to some participants while not to others.
Also, by tracking these administrative actions, I can examine the conditions under which the
agencies change their response from one set of participants to another.
In this regard, I argue that the participants or actors that dominate, or at least influence, the
policy subsystem and network are probably the beneficiaries of rulemaking. Therefore, analyzing
the composition of the policy network is important for displaying different actors and coalitions
involved in rulemaking and to what extent they influence it. In view of that, the analysis is focused
on two elements of influence within the policy network. The first is the lobbying effort in which I
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am looking at actors and coalitions involved in the network and to whom they connect. The second
element is one concerning power and resources. These resources could be formal legal authority,
public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, and/or skillful leadership
(Sabatier and Weible 2007, 201–3). Accordingly, the coalition that devotes more effort in lobbying
and possesses more resources is more influential and is more likely to receive a desired response
from agencies.
In addition, the dominance or influence aspects of the policy network are not confined to
lobbying the agencies alone. It incorporates lobbying political principals as well. Since agencies
are obliged to respond to principals such as congressional sub/committees or the President, then
whoever can influence these principals receives desired responses from the agencies. For example,
if a specific coalition asks a particular agency for a regulation, its likelihood of obtaining that
regulation is enhanced if this coalition can influence the sub/committee(s) that have authority over
that particular agency. Consequently, the politics of the policy subsystem become relevant. Thus,
it is important to determine whether the actors that are lobbying the agencies are also lobbying the
related subsystem at the same time, and whether the related policy community enjoys a monopoly
over the issue being considered by agencies, or whether the subsystem is overcome by a policy
regime. Here, I consider both direct and indirect influences between interest groups and agencies.
Therefore, it is central to present the relationships among the participants in the rulemaking and
the related policy subsystem(s) as well as other principals. In other words, the beneficiaries are the
ones that have a higher degree of influence in the entire policy network.
However, while dominating the lobbying effort and resources is a necessary condition, it
is not sufficient. The success of the dominant coalition is conditioned on whether there is consensus
within the lobbying coalition (Nelson and Yackee 2012; Sabatier and Weible 2007, 199–200).
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Thus, an analysis of the dynamics within the network is vital to understanding and explaining the
routines and outputs of rulemaking. In particular, I am trying to figure out if the actors within the
same coalition have the same position toward the rules being considered; as well as having the
same position when they are lobbying the principals. As the actors and coalitions hold a higher
degree of consensus, the likelihood of being the beneficiaries of the rulemaking is increased. In
sum, what matters is not only the size and resources of coalitions that dominate the lobbying effort,
but also the degree of consensus within these coalitions. So, any analysis of the network that
governs rulemaking should focus on lobbying efforts, resources, and the degree of consensus as
elements of influence within the network at both levels of agencies and principals. To examine the
causality between these elements of influence and rulemaking outputs, several hypotheses are put
forward and an empirical analysis is presented in Chapter 7.
Herein, the timing of the punctuation can explain the changes in rulemaking outputs. If the
changes in the structure of the policy network remain during and after the punctuation, then the
possibility of influencing rulemaking outputs is high. If the network returns back to its structure
before the punctuation, the possibility of change is low. Here, the success of minority or newly
formed coalitions in obtaining favorable agency outputs depends in part on the structure of the
policy network after the punctuation; whether the new coalition succeeds in keeping control
through lagged movement, or if the previously dominant coalition regains control over the
subsystem and policy network.
More specifically, the aim is to measure the effect of punctuations on the elements of
dominance/competition within the policy network, presented in lobbying effort, resources, and the
degree of consensus. In turn, I display the impact on the routine and outputs of rulemaking through
measuring the changes in the beneficiaries of rulemaking. Consequently, the anticipation is that
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lobbying efforts may increase during the punctuation time targeting the related subsystem(s) and
other principals within policy network. Then, it shifts to the agencies as the lagged movement
occurs. Meanwhile, resources may be redistributed during and after the punctuations.
In this context, relationships with the political principals are critical. Since they have
political and legal obligations to follow the directives of the political principals, the agencies pay
attention to the preferences of those principals. So, if a coalition succeeds in passing or blocking a
reform during the punctuation period, it is probably able to do so in the rulemaking process postpunctuation. In other worlds, the coalition that enjoy a higher degree of influence within and across
the policy subsystem during the punctuation is likely to enjoy a similar degree of dominance in
lagged movement. In contrast, the policy network may be characterized with a high degree of
competition where several subsystems, and many interest groups, are involved in the policy
network. Consequently, the agencies receive multiple signals that may conflict with each other,
and the preferences of those principals become unclear. In this case, the agencies may be more
responsive to who influences the lagged movement without paying much attention to the wishes
of political principals.
In total, the punctuation may directly affect the process of rulemaking by putting the
agencies under pressure to take actions. Or indirectly, it may affect the politics of the subsystem
and network that dictates the rulemaking. Therefore, I am applying various social network analysis
(SNA) techniques to capture the impact of the punctuation on the structures and characteristics of
the network. Specifically, I study the changes over time in lobbying effort, resources, and
consensus within the policy networks, and then how these changes affect the beneficiaries. In other
words, by focusing on abrupt stimuli, the dynamics of the policy network can be presented at both
the levels of principals and agents, especially when the effect is studied over time.

53

3.4 The Application of Social Network Analysis and the Exponential-Family
Random Graph Models1
In order to examine the arguments of this study, I apply Social Network Analysis (SNA)
utilizing the exponential-family random graph models (ERGM)2 and its time series version
(TERGM) for statistical inferences. As the theories of public policy implicitly and explicitly
indicate, the interdependency among participants of the policymaking process plays an important
role in determining policy outcomes. Therefore, it is vital to capture the effect of such
interdependency which is usually presented in the form of a network that has a set of actors or
nodes linked by ties or edges. For example, if we consider the traditional iron triangle that has
three main actors, a dominant congressional committee, an agency, and a powerful interest group,
then we have a network with three nodes and three edges or ties expressing the relations between
these nodes. In reality, many actors might be involved, with more than one committee, multiple
agencies and many interest groups. If we consider the ties between those actors, a complex network
emerges in which the action of any actor in the network depends on its relationship with other
actors and their reactions toward it. In general, many scholars of policy networks agree that the
interdependencies reflected in the structure of policy networks play an important role in explaining
the behavior of participants in the policymaking process and its outputs in ways that have been
overlooked by other public policy theories (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Dowding 1995; Galey and

1

This section is not meant to discuss the detail and the mathematical computation of these models and how they run.
Rather, it explains the logic behind them and their applications. For more detail, consult (Cranmer and Desmarais
2011; Handcock et al. 2003; Hunter et al. 2008a; Knoke and Yang 2008; Scott 2000; Wasserman 1994).
2

ERGM is the regression version of the network. It is similar to logistic regression.
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Youngs 2014; Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Heclo 1978, 94–105; Kenis and Schneider 1991; Marsh
and Rhodes 1992; McCool 1988; Raab and Kenis 2007; Salancik 1995; Zafonte and Sabatier
1998).
However, the main obstacle that the scholars of policy networks and public policy have
faced is the inability of baseline regressions to model the interdependency between the
observations (or the actors in case of networks). These models are invariably built on the
assumption that the observations are independent of each other. Within phenomena in which the
interested entities behave as in a network, the observations are in fact dependent in each other. In
fact, it is this very relation between the actors that is the subject of modelling rather than the
characteristics of the actors themselves. This failure to model such interdependency and
interactions between the observations or actors will force coefficient estimates of actor
characteristics to be biased. Since they, by design, do not directly analyze interdependences among
observations, baseline regressions are not appropriate models to apply to phenomena that manifest
in a network fashion (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). With the statistical and mathematical
developments in graph theory in the last two decades, statistical inference in network models has
become possible and has attracted many scholars. As a result of these developments and
innovations, the Exponential-Family Random Graph Models (ERGM)3 and other network
statistical models have been introduced, which enables researchers to model the interdependences
and interactions among actors and entities within the networks (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011;
Harris 2013; Hunter et al. 2008b; Knoke and Yang 2008; Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2012;
Wasserman 1994).

3

Graph theory has had ongoing developments for some time. So, it is hard to attribute to a single piece of work or
author as the inventor of ERGM. However, the most important episode is the publication of the statnet package for
R in 2008 (http://statnet.org/index.shtml) when the empirical application of ERGM became available and accessible
to researchers. Since then, ERGM has been incorporated in other statistical software and widely applied.
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Accordingly, ERGMs offer a wide range of possibilities. Different types of network
structures such as the traditional iron triangle, coalitions, and policy communities may be
accounted for. Also, SNA and ERGMs can cleverly handle causality between variables. By
analyzing the connections between the actors or nodes of the network as well as their attributes,
the causal mechanism between dependent and independent variables can be readily specified
(Cranmer and Desmarais 2011; Knoke and Yang 2008; Wasserman 1994). In this regard, ERGMs
have a unique way to deal with such variables. Unlike standard regression that regards Y as a series
of values conditioned on univariate distributions, ERGMs exhibit the likelihood of observing
network Y by considering Y as a single realization from a multivariate probability distribution
where many other realizations are possible. In other words, just like in classical statistical inference
where we assume the sample mean is generated from a normal distribution, ERGMs look at
networks as a set of relational ties each of which could be generated from a hypothetical sampling
distribution. Essentially, this technique compares the observed network with a hypothetical
population of network ties. Also, ERGMs display whether a specific edge exists or is absent,
producing the probability of its existence in a similar way to logistic regression. The parameters,
or their estimated coefficients, for network statistics can be node or dyad covariates that enhance
the probability of observing the network Y or its edges (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011).
Simply, the logic behind ERGM depends on comparing the observed network with what
would happen by random chance. By generating a large sample of random graphs 4 or networks,
the statistics of the observed network are compared with the statistics of the distributions of random
graphs. If they do not significantly differ, the relations between actors could occur by coincidence.
In other words, the observations are independent on each other and the relations presented in the

4

Mathematically, the network is expressed in the form of a matrix or graph; therefore, these terms are used
interchangeably.
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network have no effect on the behavior of actors. However, if the observed network does
significantly differ from the distributions of random graphs, then the observations are dependent
on each other and the relations do affect the behavior of actors. Next is to determine what type of
interdependency or network structures make the observed network different from the random
graph distributions. By repeating the simulation and trying different structural terms, an ERGM
can capture the distinctive statistics of the observed network (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011;
Handcock et al. 2003; Harris 2013; Hunter et al. 2008b).
Herein, ERGMs can model two types of statistics, attributes and structures. Analogous with
logistic regression, the attributes are considered as the usual covariates utilized in logistic models.
These attributes are coded in the network either as node or dyad level covariates. Here, the
independent variables could be related to the nodes of the network such as the types of interest that
actors represent; for example, whether they are business, environmental groups, or scientists. Or
the independent variables could be related to edges of the network such as how many times an
actor contacted a congressional committee. So, the edge is assigned a value equal to the number
of communications. If that actor has several edges with multiple congressional committees, then
each edge is assigned different value depending on the number of communications. For the
structures as the second type of network statistics, SNA offers several configurations that can
capture the interdependencies between actors or the nodes of the network such as degree
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centrality5, betweenness centrality6, reciprocity7, two stars8, triangles9, transitive ties10, clique11,
and other terms. The application of these terms depends on the theoretical purpose and the form
the network takes, such as whether it is a directed or non-directed network, or one mode versus
two modes.
In this context, I run ERGM on a two-mode network, expressed in a bipartite matrix, that
reflects the interactions between different types of nodes such as when actors participate in some
events or have memberships in several organizations. So, the nodes of the network are divided into
two modes. The first mode is the set of actors located in the rows of the network matrix. The
second mode is the event which is located in the columns of the network matrix. Here the edges
appear only between the first and second modes. No edges are allowed within the same mode
(Knoke and Yang 2008; Scott 2000; Wasserman 1994). This form of network is useful in studying
the interactions between the interest groups as the actor mode and public institutions, such as
congressional committee hearings, as the event mode. I utilize the two-mode network to present

5

Degree centrality counts the number of connections for a given node. The actor(s) linked extensively with others
is/are the most important or prominent in the network (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p.63).
6

Betweenness centrality measures the extent that a node is intermediate between other nodes. It is another
measurement for the importance of actors. If the connection between two actors needs to go through an intermediate
actor, then the intermediate actor has some control over the interaction between first two actors (Knoke & Yang,
2008, P.67).
7

In directed network, reciprocity represents mutual edges between two nodes.
Two-star is expressed when a node has two edges.
9
Triangles reflect the links between three nodes regardless of the direction of the edges.
10
Transitive relation or Transitivity is “a property that considers patterns of triples of actors in a network or triples of
nodes in a graph. … A relation is transitive if whenever i chooses j as a friend and j chooses k …, then i chooses k”
(Wasserman 1994, 165). For example, transitive relation could be expressed when a person establishes a friendship
with another person based on common friend. So, the friend of my friend is my friend too. In other words, the relation
between two actors depends on their relations with other actors in the network.
8

A clique is a cohesive subgroup of nodes that are connected by direct relations. In general, cliques’ properties are
“mutuality of ties, reachability of subgroup members, frequency of ties among members, and relative frequency of
ties among subgroup members compared with non-member” (Knoke & Yang, 2008,p.72)
11
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the relationship between the interest groups and the congressional committees in Chapter 5, and
the relationship between the interest groups and agencies in Chapters 6 and 7. To calculate the
Exponential Random Graph Models, I use the ergm package developed by Handcock et al. (2018)
and Hunter et al. (2008b), which is available in the R statistical software system. Also, I use the
xergm package developed by Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais (2018a, 2018b) for Temporal
Exponential Random Graph Models which is an extension of ERGM.
In summation, what the reader should know is that the parameters in ERGM are interpreted
in the same way as the coefficients are interpreted in logistic regression. The main differences is
that ERGM provides additional parameters for the network structures that can capture the nature
of the interdependency between the observations that the baseline regression cannot (Cranmer and
Desmarais 2011; Hunter et al. 2008b). The application of ERGM should be weighted in light of
the nature of the data and phenomena under the study. For example, linear regression is not a good
fit for survey data where the dependent variable holds values of zero or one. Here, logistic
regression is an appropriate model for such data. Likewise, baseline regressions are not a good fit
for a phenomenon that acts in a network fashion. The ERGMs are an appropriate model for
studying these networks.

3.5 The Policy Domain and Time Frame
Because of its important to the US economy, I focus on the oil sector. Primarily, my
attention goes to those policy areas in which the agencies have authority over issuing rules such
as oil production and offshore drilling, pricing and consumption of oil and gasoline, and
environment and safety. I identify the rules that deal with or regulate the oil industry in any of
aforementioned policy areas and then specify the programs under which they perform as well as
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the agencies responsible for carrying it out. By tracking pre/rulemaking activities over time, I can
display which agency is a part of the policy monopoly, if any, and over which oil policy area, as
well as whether there is a shift or intervention from other agencies in that policy area. More
importantly, such time tracking should exhibit the disturbed effect of the punctuations on ongoing
programs. It furthermore may shed light on the origin of the rules and to what extent the
punctuations influence the administrative agenda setting and rulemaking process. By studying the
change in pre/rulemaking activities and the origin of rules, I can demonstrate to what extent the
political principals and interested parties are involved in the agenda setting and implementation of
pre/rulemaking and which policy areas and programs they correspond to. Here, the analysis will
be at two levels. The first is the aggregate level that includes all un/opened rules for comments and
congressional hearings in order to display the involvement of political principals, agencies and
interest groups, as well as their roles in setting up the agenda for pre/rulemaking. The second level
is the analysis of administrative programs, which will shed light on the rulemaking’s outputs in
specific contexts.
For the time frame, the starting point is the year of 1996, which comes before the collapse
of oil prices in 1998, when prices went under 10 dollars/bbl, so that I can compare the structure of
the policy network of oil before that focusing event. On the other end, I track the routine and
outputs of the rulemaking process in the oil sector until 2016, which is the end of Obama
administration and after the collapse of oil prices in 2014. This period covers several important
events: the collapses of oil prices, the unprecedented increases in oil prices, and the Gulf of Mexico
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. These events provide an opportunity to study the rulemaking
process and how its routines and outputs change in response to different types of abrupt stimuli.
Also, this period witnessed a gradual increase in oil prices during the 2000s, which displays the
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pressure of economic indicators on the rulemakers. Besides, there are significant political changes
during this period, including three different administrations, a shift of power in Congress, and
several changes from united to divided governments.
Finally, the policy network has to be constructed in a way that is appropriate for displaying
the impacts of the independent variables. In this regard, I draw the policy network on a yearly basis
comparing the rulemaking outputs with the change in the network for each year. According to this
method, I will display how many final rules have been issued in each year and determine which
ones have been changed and who the beneficiaries are. Then I measure changes in the policy
network for each year, comparing these changes with the outputs of rulemaking for the same period
along with its lagged values.
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Chapter 4: Data Description

4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to provide a description of the data collection process displaying
the sources and construction of the data sets. Since the analysis has multiple dimensions, I gather
information from different databases and then combine them into a number of conventional
rectangular datasets, or what R and python, the software utilized here, call data frames. From one
perspective, I collect information regarding the Congress in general, and selected congressional
committees and their hearings in particular. From a different angle, I gather data regarding the
rulemaking process. Thus, I can exhibit the oil policy network and track behavior of the different
actors in this network through different stages of public policy. Giving the large size of the data
sets, I present the software and computer code I developed to automate the process of downloading
and organizing the data12. This chapter helps the readers to better understand the process of
network construction presented in the following chapters. The data collection problems for this
research are complex, and researchers who might be interested in replicated or conducting similar
studies should be able to understand the process of data collection and construction of the network
in detail and be familiar with the challenges and difficulties they may face.

4.2 Data Sources Regarding the Congress
To obtain the congressional hearings concerned with oil policy, I relied on the ProQuest
Congressional database (http://congressional.proquest.com). On May 21, 2017, I ran the following

12

The data is exceptionally large; therefore, it was impossible to manually download and organize all of it. This
approach selects and downloads the appropriate records within the larger collection.
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search terms; Petroleum and petroleum industry; Oil shales; Petroleum and natural gas in
submerged lands; and Tar sands. Then, I excluded the nonrelated subjects from these search
results, which are: Accounting and auditing; Administrative law and procedure; Arms control and
disarmament; Computers; Congressional committee markup sessions; Corruption and bribery;
Department of State; Federal aid to education; Food assistance; Outdoor recreation; Terrorism;
and Transportation research. As a result, I ended up with 654 hearings for the period between
1996 and 2016. However, the search terms may now produce slightly different results since
ProQuest Congressional keeps updating its database. Some options that were available at the time
of this collection may no longer be available. Or there might be more options than the ones were
available at that time. Furthermore, ProQuest periodically adds more hearings to its database even
for older years. For example, in April 2014, I ran the same search terms and the total number of
congressional hearings concerned with oil policy was 21 for year 2011. Since then, the ProQuest
has added more hearings for that year. On May 21, 2017, I ran the search terms again and I got 66
hearings for the year 2011. It seems there is often a significant time delay for the hearings to be
classified and reported in ProQuest. Thus, I could not keep updating my data set and changing my
analysis results each time ProQuest added more hearings; therefore, I had to stop at some definitive
point in time, which means my last search results are from May 21, 2017. Accordingly, it is wise
to take into account that the analysis of congressional hearings regarding the most recent years
probably are less reliable since there may be more hearings to be reported.
Next, I read through the abstracts of these congressional hearings to determine which ones
are actually related to oil policy and which ones are not. Out of the total 654 hearings that I found,
60 hearings were not related, reducing to 594 hearings. In the context of this dissertation, I am
interested in collecting two types of information. First is the network of interest groups that connect
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the congressional committees, which can be ascertained from lists of affiliated organizations of
witnesses in the hearings they appear. To constitute the network of congressional hearings, two
sets of actors must be differentiated, congressional committees and witnesses. Accordingly, I
construct this network in the form of a two-mode edgelist matrix in which each set of actors is put
in separate column. For more clarification, Table 4.1 is an example for the data set that identifies
the edgelist matrix of congressional hearings where the committees are in one column and the
witnesses before the committee is put in another column. See columns C and E. Also, there are
three hearings in that table. Each hearing is given a reference number. So, hearings are
distinguished by whether or not they are held by the same committees. Each actor, whether it is a
committee or a witness, is given a unique abbreviation or identifier so that the computer software
can identify them. See columns D and F. In this context, some witnesses may represent more than
one organization. Since I am interested in their affiliated organizations more than the witnesses
themselves, I code them as separate testimonies. Each testimony is presented by a different
organization. Consequently, I collected over 4000 testimonies. In the end, column G expresses the
ties between the congressional committees and witnesses. Since this matrix represents an
unweighted network, all ties have a value of one. In doing so, computer software can count how
many times a specific witness appears before a particular committee.
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Table 4.1: An Example of the Edgelist Data Set of Congressional Hearings

The second type of information are the actor attributes or characteristics. Since I deal with
two different sets of actors, congressional committees and witnesses, and each type of actors has
its own attributes or characteristics, I created two separate data sets. For the congressional
committees, I gathered the following information: Title of the hearing, Hearings ID/CIS number,
committee(s) holding the hearing, Chamber, date of the hearings, and page length. As is manifest
in Table 4.2, this information is presented in columns A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Furthermore, I
extracted additional information by reading and analyzing the abstract of the hearings. I
determined the tone of the hearings, whether it is positive (1), neutral (0), or negative (-1). See
column H in Table 4.2. Also, I distinguished between hearings that discussed the oil industry in
general and those hearings that discussed a specific rule or regulation affecting the oil industry,
assigning a code of (1) for rule-related hearings and otherwise (0). See column I. Moreover, I
classified the hearings according the policy area of oil industry, whether it is discussing the
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production phase, coded (1), the consumption phase, coded (2), environmental issues, coded (3),
international aspects of the oil industry, coded (4), or economic growth, coded (5), with other
issues coded (6) as appears in column J. However, some hearings could discuss two or more policy
areas. Therefore, I created a dummy variable for each policy area to account for this overlapping.
See columns K, L, M, N, O, and P. For more clarification, see rows 13 and 17. Each hearing in
these rows discusses two policy area of the oil industry. In row 13, the hearing is classified as
discussing the environment highlighted with orange and the economy highlighted with blue. So,
both dummy variables were given a value 1. Nonetheless, this hearing is concern with the
environment more does it with economy, Thus, it was classified as an environmental hearing in
the nominal variable in column J. Also, the same could be said for the hearing in row 17 with
economy is the dominant policy area in nominal variable.
As for the actor attributes of the witnesses, I looked at the affiliated organization of the
witnesses and classified them according to the type of interests they represent or the activities they
perform. In general, I found this information through looking at websites of these organizations or
within their testimonies where the witnesses frequently explain nature of the organizations they
represent. Some cases, I searched in external databases. Here, I identified several types of interests
based on their regular appearances in the congressional hearings. These are the oil industry, coded
(1); environmentalists, coded (2); scientists and experts, coded (3); federal administrations and
agencies, coded (4.1); congressmen, coded (4.2); state and local governments, coded (4.3); the
biofuels industry, coded (5); the auto & motor vehicle industry, coded (6); agriculture, coded (7);
other energy industries, coded (8); individuals or anonymous, coded (11); and others, coded (10).
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Table 4.2: An Example of the Data Set of Congressional Hearing Attributes
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Table 4.3: An Example of the Data Set of Actor Attributes

To illustrate what the data set of interest groups and other organization looks like, Table
4.3 shows the names of the actors in column B and their codes in columns C. Also, each actor has
given a unique abbreviation or identifier to distinguished it from other actors. However, these
abbreviations have to be carefully assigned since the names of these actors are not always
consistent in the text of hearings. For example, the British Petroleum Company might be written
as “BP America”, “bp capital”, or “British petroleum”. So, it must have the exact abbreviation
(BP) each time it is entered in data set.
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However, going through all congressional hearings is exhausting and time-consuming
process. Because of the size of database and the effort need to collect the aforementioned
information, I developed Python computer code to automate the process. This method depends on
cracking down the HTML code in which the ProQuest website is written and extracting the
information that is posted on the congressional hearing pages. This procedure is known as web
scraping. For that purpose, I used several packages in the Python software version (3.6.3) to write
a script for such task. Most importantly, these are the Requests (2.18.4) and Beautiful Soup (4.6.0)
packages for obtaining and decodifying HTML script, and the Regular Expression (2.2.1) package
for searching for patterns within text. Without diving into the details, anything that appears in a
web page has to be put between two HTML tags such as <p> and </p> for paragraphs, <ul> and
</ul> for lists, or <div> and </div> for blocks. By identifying the right pairs of tags, the desired
information can be extracted and presented in spreadsheets. As an example, Figure 4.1 shows
general information about a congressional hearing as it appears in the ProQuest page of that
hearing. Meanwhile, Figure 4.2 shows the HTML code in which the hearing page is written in
order to display Figure 4.1. Notice that the information for the hearing title is in the red box, the
CIS number is in the green box, and the committee in the blue box, all located between the paired
block tags, <div class="segColR"> in the beginning and </div> in the end. In addition, Figures 4.3
and 4.4 display the identifying information for the witnesses for the same hearing. Nonetheless, it
is located within slightly different block tags, <div class="segColR docView FieldWidthWide"> and
</div>. For who may be interested, the code for web scraping is provided in the end of this section
with more explanation. See Appendix 2.
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Figure 4.1: Example 1 of How the Information Appears in the Website

Figure 4.2: Example 1 of How the Information is Written in HTML Code
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Figure 4.3: Example 2 of How the Information Appears in the Website

Figure 4.4: Example 2 of How the Information is Written in HTML Code
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4.3 Data Sources Regarding the Administrative Rules
The information regarding administrative rules and their comments is collected from
several governmental sources. These websites provide the necessary data to establish the ties, or
edges, between interest groups and agencies, which constitute the rulemaking network. However,
the process of collecting and coding the rulemaking network and its attributes is more complicated
than the network of congressional hearings.

Primarily, it required working with three

governmental websites. None of them had the complete data that I required. So, I had to get part
of the information from one source and then complete it from another. The first source is the
Federal Register website, www.federalregister.gov which has a comprehensive archive of rules
and has a good search engine. Nevertheless, it does not have the comments on the rules, nor does
it have any way to match proposed rules to their final versions. The second website is
www.regulations.gov which provides an online opportunity for the public to comment on rules
and publishes all comments for any rule whether they are received online or not. Importantly, it
has the ability to connect the proposed rules to their final versions by using the Docket
Identification Number. However, it has a poor search engine which is less reliable in identifying
which rules are concerned with the oil sector. Moreover, it does not have comments for older rules
that were issued in the 1990s and almost the first half of the 2000s. The third website is
www.reginfo.gov, providing the RIN number as another way to connect the proposed rules to their
final versions, especially for older rules. However, it does not provide the comments of the rules
as well.
In general, I had to go through the three websites in order to fill in the missing information.
I started by looking at the Federal Register website to identify rules regulating the oil industry
since it has a comprehensive archive. I adopted a broader approach by running the following terms
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through the Federal Register search engine: oil and gas exploration, oil pollution, oil and gas
reserves, oil imports, gasoline, petroleum, petroleum allocation, oil exports, fuel additives, and
fuel economy. I got more than 8000 rules from this search. By applying a string searching algorithm
(regular expression package in Python), I searched the abstracts of rules for the words oil or
petroleum. Assuming that an abstract that has neither of these words is probably not relevant, I
was able to reduce number of rules to 1302. Then, I read carefully through the abstracts of the
remaining rules to determine the policy areas and other information that needs to be analyzed in
similar way to match what I have done with congressional hearings.
Next, I connected the proposed rules to their final versions by searching in Regulations.gov.
For this purpose, I had to figure out how many out of the 1302 rules collected from the Federal
Register exist in the Regulations.gov database. In general, most rules that were enacted after the
online comments service was provided are available on the Regulations.gov. However, some older
rules are updated in its database. By using the Docket number, I found each rule with its proposed
and final versions along with its comments. Unfortunately, not all rules are packed in pairs of
proposed/final sets based on Docket number. In some cases, there is more than one proposed and/or
final rule for each Docket. In other cases, there is only one version of the rule, proposed or final.
This required manually looking at each rule, identifying the proposed and final rules, and adding
the missing rules that the search engine of the Federal Register did not identify. In the end, I was
able to collect 638 out of the 1302 rules that are packed in 194 sets of proposed/final rules. Most
of them are from mid 2000s to the newest years.
For the older rules that do not exist in Regulations.gov, the RIN number that reginfo.gov
provides is used to pack the rules in proposed/final sets. However, since comments of these older
rules are not available on Regulations.gov nor any other official website, the viability of collecting
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and matching these rules is questionable. So, at this point I decided to restrict the analysis to these
638 rules. Nevertheless, reginfo.gov could be important for future research on networks that
involve the President and Office of Management and Budget (OMB). It contains records for the
meetings that interest groups had with OMB regarding these rules.
However, the main part of the rulemaking network are the connections between interest
groups and agencies that are manifested in comments of interest groups in each set of
proposed/final rules. Therefore, I needed to gather the necessary information about all rules, then
convert the rules in each set to be one node in the network. As described earlier, the data for the
rules is primarily collected from the website of the Federal Register and Regulations.gov.
Fortunately, both websites provide an application programming interface (API) which enables the
computer code to interact with the database or website by sending requests and receiving
responses. So, developers or users can automate the process of data collection. In order to access
the API of Regulations.gov, I had to sign up for the API Key and wait for authorization by
Regulations.gov staff. On the other hand, the API for the Federal Register is open access. The data
in these websites are presented in JSON format. Consequently, I wrote a computer program in
Python using the Requests, Beautiful Soup, and Regular Expression packages to decodify the
JSON files and collect information on the rules. For more details, see Appendix 2.
In short, the data in JSON files is stored in two formats, lists and dictionaries. In lists, the
information is presented between two Square brackets such as [value_1, value_2, value_3, …
value_i]. The values in these lists are separated by commas (,). These values could be one of the
three basic types of data: string, integer, or float13. Here the order of the values is important to
locate the information. So, the computer code is programed to collect information in specific

13

String is a series of characters that could present as text. Integers are whole numbers without decimal point such
1, 2, and 3. A Float is a number with decimal point such as 2.43, 4.84, and 1.54.
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location in the list. The other format is the dictionary, where each type of information is given a
key and each key is followed by its value. The dictionaries are defined by curly brackets and
key/value pairs are divided by comma such as {key_1: value_1, key_2: value_2, key_3: value_3,
… key_i: value_i}. Accordingly, the information needed may be found by its key regardless to its
order in the dictionary. What matters here is the key of the value, not the order. So, the computer
code is written to collect information that match a specific key in spite of its location in the
dictionary. Usually, the lists and dictionaries are found nested within each other in JSON files.
For more clarification, Figure 4.5 is an example for a rule displayed in JSON format,
retrieved from the Federal Register (https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents/201529820.json). It starts with an open curly bracket14, which indicates the information is presented in
a dictionary. As it appears, the first key is abstract and its value is the string displaying the text of
abstract. The next key is action, and its value is the string indicating it is proposed rule. However,
the following key, (agencies), is different. The value of the agencies key is a list that contains two
dictionaries, and each dictionary has its own keys and values. In other words, it is a dictionary
nested in a list that is nested in a dictionary. For instance, to get to the name of the agency that is
in the red box in Figure 4.5, the computer code has to be instructed to go to the agencies key which
has a list. Next, it goes to the second item in the list which is a dictionary, then collecting the value
of the name key. For more clarification, Appendix 3 contains the program I wrote to request and
collect JSON files from the websites of the Federal Register and Regulations.gov, creating the
data set for all rule attributes.

14

The opening curly bracket appears only in Figure 4.5 because the JSON file is too long to include all keys and
their values. To view the closing curly bracket, open ( https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents/201529820.json), and it can be seen in the end of the file.
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Figure 4.5: An Example of a Rule Displayed in JSON Format

After manually identifying each set of rules, I ran the computer code to collect the rule
attributes, creating the data set that appears in Table 4. 4, where each color presents a different set
of rules. As is seen, not all sets are consistent for proposed/final pairs of rules. Some sets have
multiple rules whereas others have only one rule. In general, the data collected through the
regulations.gov API and the Federal Register are the titles of the rules, type of rules whether
proposed or final, agency names, abstract, publication date, effective date, closing date of
comments, page length, comments count, and whether the rule is significant or not. In addition, I
included the reference numbers of the three databases: document number in the Federal Register,
RIN for Reginfo.gov, and Docket IDs and Rule IDs for Regulations.gov, see the columns E, J, K,
and L. Here the most important reference number is the Docket ID, which enables me to identify
each set of rules. These numbers are central to ensure that data collected from two or more sources
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belongs to the same rule. Finally, after reading the abstracts, I classified them according to the type
of policy in the same way I did with congressional hearings, as it appears in last column of Table
4.4.
The next step is to convert each set of rules from multiple lines as in Table 4.4 to one line
as in Table 4.5. This determines that each set of rules appears as one node in the rulemaking
network. By tracking the same colors between Tables 4.4 and 4.5, you can see how the information
for each rule set is converted to one line. Some of the information is straightforwardly collected
from Table 4.4 such as docket IDs in column A, agency name in column B, comments count in
column F, and the number of rules in each set in column H. The other information collected
requires some type of manipulation. For the duration or time span of rule sets which is in column
E, I measured the period between the start date in column C or the publication date of first rule in
the set, and end date in column E, which is the later of the last rule publication date or the effective
date in Table 4.4. Meanwhile, the significance variable in column G of the Table 4.5 indicates that
at least one of the rules in the set is significant according to Executive Order 12866. It does not
have to be that all rules in the set are significant. Just one is enough. Finally, I included the policy
area in column I as a nominal variable. Nonetheless, some sets of rules could be classified in more
the one policy area. For example, all the rules but one, in the first set in Table 4.4 colored yellow
are classified as related to oil production policy, code (1). However, one rule is classified as other
policy, code (6).
In another example, both rules in rows 11 and 12 in Table 4.4 colored by light green
regulate two policy areas, production (1) and environment (3), at the same time. To account for
overlapping policies, I assigned the most relevant policy to the nominal variable for policy area in
column I and then created the dummy variables for each type of policy in columns J to O in Table
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4.5. So, if any set of rules is classified in more than one policy, these additional policies appear in
the dummy variables. This is apparent in the given examples where the yellow set assigned ones
for the dummy variables for production and other policies, and the light green set was assigned
ones for the dummy variables for production and environmental policies. In order to merge the
cells in Table 4.4 to the ones in Table 4.5, I developed computer code to automate the process. For
more information, see Appendix 4.
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Table 4.4: An Example of the Data Set of the Collected Rules
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Table 4.5: An Example of the Data set of the Aggregated Sets of Rules
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To build the rulemaking network, two types of nodes have to be specified. The first type is
the aforementioned sets of rules. The second type is the interest group and other actors who are
concerned with the rules being enacted, who can be identified by their comments on the rules. For
this reason, I needed to download the comments and other related documents for each set of rules
from the API database of Regulations.gov. In some cases, interest groups and individuals preferred
to upload files rather than commenting directly on the website. I obtained these for the analysis of
rules later. Therefore, I designed computer code to produce a data set for all comments and create
a separate folder for each set of rules, containing its comments with their attachments and other
documents. This allowed the necessary information of each set of rules to be easily located. For
more details, Appendix 5 has the computer code for collection of the comments, written in Python.
After downloading all comments, I was able to construct the rulemaking network in the form of
an edgelist matrix, as shown in Table 4.6. The most important columns in the table are column B
for dockets that define the sets of rules and column D for the interest groups and other actors who
comment on the rules. Herein, the color in the table reflects each set of rules and its comments.
For example, the first set in yellow received one comment whereas the second set of rules in green
received seven comments.
In general, the edgelist matrix of comments on rules in Table 4.6 is similar to the edgelist
matrix of witnesses in the congressional hearings in Table 4.1. Moreover, the interest groups and
other actors that appear before a congressional committee may comment on the rule as well. In
fact, the second mode of actors in both matrices, the commenters, are the same type, and any
additional actor identified in the rulemaking network is added to Table 4.3 which contains the list
of witnesses in congressional hearings. So, the only difference between these two matrixes is in
the first mode where it is congressional hearings in the witness network and it is sets of rules in
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the rulemaking networks. However, the rulemaking network is an open access network where
anyone can comment on rules. There are no restrictions as long as the rule is open for comments.
Some rules might be subject to public campaigns. As a result, thousands of comments could be
received, which required a huge effort to analyzing such a magnitude of content. Therefore, I
distinguished between comments submitted by interest groups, companies, and other institutions,
and comments submitted by individuals (also known as the collective form comments). I focus on
the interest groups’ comments since they have more influence and generally provide more
meaningful comments. After removing the individuals’ comments, I ended up with 8435
comments submitted by interest groups and other organizations. Meanwhile, the comments
submitted by individuals consist of the vast majority of the comments which reflect public opinion
more than lobbying effort. My approach for these comments was to take a sample to analyze them,
whether they are pro- or anti-regulation. Then I added them to the rule as an attribute for public
support.
After cleaning up the edgelist matrix for rulemaking, I ensured that the actors with multiple
comments and/or appearing several times in congressional hearings have consistent abbreviations
or identifiers. For instance, each time British Petroleum comments on a rule or appears in a hearing
it has be assigned (BP) as its abbreviation in order for the computer program to recognize it as the
same actor. For this propose, I developed search code written in Python to search the data sets of
the rulemaking and congressional hearing networks simultaneously to find rules and hearings in
which an actor has appeared and giving it an exact abbreviation or identifier. For more details, the
Appendix 6 provides the search code.
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Table 4.6: An Example of the Edgelist Matrix of the Rulemaking Network

4.4 Conclusion
In the end, there are several issues worth mentioning here. First, the description in this
section is about the raw data of the policy network on both congressional and administrative sides.
It was constructed in several data sets configured along their basic structure so that further data
manipulation can be allowed. For example, I can change the node of first mode of the network of
congressional hearings from hearings to committees. Or the data sets can be combined together to
create a collective network such as combining the rulemaking and congressional hearing networks
to observe the changes in structure from one level to another.
Second, the accuracy of the data is a notable concern. As it was explained, the sources of
the data keep updating their databases. Since the research design of this study depends on mapping
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all congressional hearings and administrative rules related to oil policy, I had to include newly
posted hearings and rules each time these sources update their databases, which creates kind of a
loop. To deal with this situation and prevent being in a constant loop of data collection, I had to
stop at some point even if new data gets posted. However, such action could compromise accuracy
and reliability of the data. The main concern is that the newly posted hearings and rules that have
not been included in my data might be systematically different from those included. Besides, the
period where the delay in posting the hearings and rules occurs is important to determine which
years are more accurate than others. For the ProQuest Congressional data, there is delay between
the time when hearings occur and time they are reported in its database. So, the older years are
more accurate than the recent ones. Meanwhile, Regulations.gov database does not have older
rules. It keeps updating them periodically. Consequently, the recent years are more accurate than
the older years. As a result, the most reliable data of network is neither in the beginning nor in the
end of the period of the study. It is mostly in the middle.
Third, the process of data collection is not fully automatic. It needs human involvement in
some stages. It is not simply writing the computer code and running the program. To ensure
accuracy and reduce the inconsistency, I had to monitor the process from the beginning to the end.
Many tasks were done manually. So, it is best described as a semi-automatic process where the
computer code is not the primary element. It is generally an assisting component for the process
of data collection. Nevertheless, writing and running the code were not easy tasks. I faced several
challenges. For example, Regulations.gov has a limit of 1000 requests per hour. Not only did I
have to deal with large number of comments (63,000), I needed to send multiple requests for each
comment. Generally, interest groups and people prefer to upload files rather than comment on the
website. So, I needed to download these files as well, which significantly increase the number of
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requests I had to send to the host. In addition, the problem of code errors consumed much time in
order to be fixed. Sometimes, the format of JSON files are inconsistent. In other times, the host
blocked me if I sent too many requests in a short period of time. So, I had to supervise the process
most the time. It is an example of big data. For instance, the size of a folder that contains one rule
with its comment is about 1GB. As a result, it took a lot of work, time, and effort. However, the
return was very significant in that I would not have been able to finish gathering the network data
if I had had to collect it all manually.
Finally, description of the process of the data collection is central to understanding the
analysis of the rulemaking network. By exhibiting the sources and formats of the raw data, the
structure of the network and the variables attached to it can be more readily comprehended.
Importantly, this section has two purposes. The first is to present the technical issues and the
challenges that faced the process of data collection. The second is to explain how and why the data
sets are assembled in the aforementioned formats, which are in turn readable for network packages
in R, the main software utilized in SNA. In other words, I use Python to create the date frames
since it is handy in collecting data from the internet, and then I apply R to produce the network
analysis. See Appendix 7 for further data preparation in R. That being said, the coding of some
variables was described just to illustrate the process, but it does not go beyond that. In further
detailed description, the justifications and explanations of coding the variables are presented in the
chapters of the study along with their effects. In the other words, this section would be helpful for
readers who are interested on achieving deep understanding for the structures of the rulemaking
network.
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Chapter 5: Mapping the Oil Subsystem and Policy Network (19962016)

5.1 Introduction
To achieve a better understanding of the process of rulemaking, it is important to study the
policy subsystem as the main political principal that may exert influence over the administration
and agencies. The aim of this chapter is to describe and track the dynamics of the oil subsystem
and its policy network. Starting with an overview of the oil market and deliberation of the
circumstances affecting the oil sector, I identify potential punctuations that may have influenced
the oil policy network and its participants. I examine the extent to which these punctuations alter
agenda setting within Congress and the issues being discussed in congressional hearings. Next, I
analyze the composition of the policy network, developing criteria to distinguish the more
permanent participants who form the oil subsystem from those best considered outsiders. I focus
on the three corners of the policy subsystem triangle: congressional committees, public
administrations and agencies, and interest groups. By exploring congressional hearings and bill
referrals, the permanent committees are selected. As for both the interest groups and the public
agencies involved in the policy network, I analyze the affiliations of witnesses appearing before
the committees by constructing the network of the congressional hearings and measure the degree
centralities of its participants.
In this context, the discussion here is not specifically concerned with the content of oil
policy as much as with the policy dynamics and the classification of subsystem and network. I
seek to describe and explain a process that is largely independent of policy specifics. I therefore
provide general categories for types of issues being debated in congressional hearings without
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going into the details of bills and laws. However, a considerable portion of this chapter is devoted
to tracking and classifying the oil subsystem and policy network from 1996 to 2016. The goal is
to offer description of policy, punctuations, and factors that might influence the subsystem and the
network, and in turn, the rulemaking process. Despite the absence of conventional statistical
inference in standard social network analysis, issues and factors deliberated in this chapter will be
utilized as variables for the more advanced network statistical models in coming chapters that
study the routines and behaviors of the rulemaking process.

5.2 The Oil Market and Potential Punctuations
To understand oil policy in the United States, it is important to look at the oil market and
those circumstances which affected the behavior of the actors concerned with oil policy. Herein
the most influential elements of the oil market are the supply, the demand, and prices. However, I
focus on oil prices since it is a function of both supply and demand. In other words, prices reflect
both. It will be easier for readers to comprehend changes in the oil market by focusing on oil prices
rather than discussing the details of supply and demand. In addition, prices can be considered as
indicative of punctuations in the oil market and its policy subsystem.
As it appears in Figure 5.1, the nominal oil price15 in 1996 and the first half of 1997 were
in the low twenties. However, prices collapsed in 1998 to reach bottom in the fourth quarter with
an average of $10.85 per barrel. Afterward, the price regained its losses in 2000 and stayed in the
high twenties. Following the terrorist attack in 9/11/2001, the price went down to an average of
$16.94/bbl in the fourth quarter of 2001. Then it gradually increased through the 2000s to reach

15

The nominal price refers to the price at the moment of the transaction without adjusting for inflation (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld 2013, 12).
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its historic high in the second quarter of 2008 with an average of $115.85/bbl. The financial crisis
in 2009, however, caused prices to suddenly drop to $40.48 in the first quarter of 2009. In a similar
pattern with what happened after 9/11/2001, prices increased again and kept their high levels
around $100 throughout the first half of the 2010s. The prices lost about 30% of its value by the
end of 2014 as a result of the price war that OPEC members waged in response to the increase in
competition from the fracking industry. Consequently, prices continued dropping in the following
years to reach their lowest level in the first quarter of 2016 with an average of $28.85 per barrel.
Traditionally, a decrease in oil prices has a total positive effect on the overall United States
economy since it is the biggest consumer of oil in the world and most of its consumed oil was
imported during the period under study. Consequently, any reduction in oil prices means cheaper
energy and more gains for the economy. Meanwhile, the negative effects of low oil prices are
concentrated on the oil industry since the local production of oil in United States is relatively small
compared to its oil consumption. As a result, the larger positive effects overshadow the somewhat
smaller negative ones (Andrew Beattie n.d.; Barrell, Delannoy, and Holland 2011; Labonte 2007).
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Figure 5.1: Nominal Oil Prices (1996-2018) on a Quarterly Basis
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Nonetheless, the impacts of the price collapse on four occasions, 1998, 2001, 2009, and
2014, are not equal. In parrticular, the collapse in 2014 generated a different reaction from the
other occasions. At first, the relative balance between supply and demand in the United States
changed by 2014. For example, in 2009, U.S oil production was 5.36 million barrels per day, which
constituted 29.02% of total consumption in the United States. However, in 2014, U.S oil
production had risen to 7.53 million barrels per day, constituting 45.7% of total consumption
(OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011 2011; OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2018 2018).
Most of the increase in U.S production comes from unconventional oil, or the fracking industry,
which is more costly than the production of conventional oil. As a result, the fracking industry was
disproportionally affected, which magnified the negative effect of the price collapse to an extent
that had not been experienced before (Andrew Beattie n.d.; Frondel, Horvath, and Vance 2018;
Plumer 2014).
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By the same logic and context as the decrease in oil prices, the increase in oil prices has a
overall negative effect, where most of the economic sectors endure high energy costs while only
the oil sector has much to gain (Andrew Beattie n.d.; Barrell, Delannoy, and Holland 2011;
Labonte 2007). As it appears in Figure 5.1, prices were at highest levels in the year of 2008, 2011,
2012, and 2013. To comprehend the impact of oil prices in these years, the real price of oil should
be considered, as it reflects the oil prices after being adjusted for inflation (Pindyck and Rubinfeld
2013, 12). In addition, real prices are a better indicator than nominal prices in evaluating economic
impacts. Sometimes nominal prices can be misleading. For example, the $30 price in 1980 is equal
to ≈ $100 in 2019 (CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS n.d.).
A comparison of nominal prices and real prices for 1968-2018 in Figure 5.2 shows that real
oil prices in the years 2008, 2011, 2012, and 2013 were approximately the same as the real prices
in the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s at the height of the economic crisis in western countries.
However, that does not necessarily indicate that oil prices had the same impact as they did in the
1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, they still exert considerable pressure on the U.S economy. One
factor that alleviates the effect of high oil prices is the increase in the local production of oil since
gains achieved by the oil industry could relatively compensate some of the losses in other sectors
of the economy (Andrew Beattie n.d.; Barrell, Delannoy, and Holland 2011; Labonte 2007).
Furthermore, the oil market may react to the dramatic or precipitous changes in oil prices.
Not only does the actual value of prices have an impact on the oil sector, but so too does the rate
at which prices change. Overall, the oil market prefers stability. As the prices stay at high levels,
or low levels, for a long time, the market adapts to that situation and supply and demand gets
balanced. It is normal to have the prices fluctuated up and down in a reasonable range; however,
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the focus here is on occasions where prices have drastically increased or decreased relatively
quickly. Therefore, these years could be considered as potential punctuations for prices.

Figure 5.2: Comparison between Nominal and Real Prices of Oil (1968-2018) on a Yearly
Basis
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As appears in Figure 5.3, the nominal oil price dropped by 34.72% in 1998, and then
increased by 43.08% the next year. Also, in 2001 the price of oil dropped by 20.67% in response
to the 9/11 terrorist attack, and in 2008 and 2009, the prices were significantly punctuated by a
37.77% increase to a 36.22% decrease respectively. Moreover, in 2015, oil prices dropped a
substantial 48.3%. To distinguish between the effects of values and change rates of oil prices, the
year 2009 provides a good example. If the nominal price is looked at for that year, it could be seen
that oil prices decreased from $92.57 in 2008 to $59.04, which is a considerable reduction.
Nonetheless, $59.04 per barrel in itself is not significantly different from price levels in the years
before 2008. As a result, analyzing the change rates of oil prices yields two additional years, 1999
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and 2009, that could be possible punctuations, which were not captured by observing the values
of nominal and real prices alone.

Figure 5.3: Percentage Change Rates of Nominal Oil Prices (1996-2016)
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Another important element that can highlight punctuations and policy dynamics is media
coverage as an indicator of the public’s attention regarding the oil issues. Since high oil prices
negatively impact most economic sectors, the higher the prices, the more public attention is
focused on oil policy. By looking at Figure 5.4 which displays the number of journals and other
published materials covering oil issues during the period (1996-2016), there are two observations
that can be made. First, media coverage follows the price level in general. The coverage was low
when the prices were low in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, and it increased when prices
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rose in 2008 and the first half of the 2010s. Secondly, the media/public attention regarding the
collapse of oil prices does not differ significantly from the attention paid to high prices. In other
words, the media seems interested in price collapses as much as in price increases. During the
years 1998, 2001, 2009, and 2014 when sudden collapses in prices occurred, media coverage
remained at levels similar to the years before and after. For more details, see Appendix 8 which
includes the code for oil price, tables of quarterly and yearly prices, and graphs.
Figure 5.4: Media Coverage (1996-2016)
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

0

Source: http://search.proquest.com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/index?accountid=2837

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 could be a potential
punctuation since it is the most important single focusing event during the period between 19962016. On April 20, 2010, the BP sponsored drilling rig operation in the Gulf of Mexico exploded
causing a deep-water well to release about 5 million barrels of oil into marine waters, the worst in
the history of the oil industry. Finally, after three months of leaking, the well was sealed on
September 19, 2010 (BP leak the world’s worst accidental oil spill 2010; Obama, in Gulf, pledges
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to push on stopping leak - USATODAY.com n.d.; On Scene Coordinator Report on Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill 2011; Robertson and Krauss 2010). Such an unprecedented environmental
disaster attracted a significant amount of attention from the media. Even though 2010 is not one
of the years where oil prices significantly increased or decreased, the level of media attention was
similar to those years. It is important therefore to track the extent and effect of this focusing event
on the oil subsystem and its policy dynamics in general.
The overall look at the oil sector during the period between 1996-2016 points out two types
of punctuations. First are the indicator type of punctuations that manifest in oil prices. The other
type of punctuations are focusing events, such as the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. However,
there are reasonable degrees of overlap between the two types of the punctuations. For example,
the collapse of the oil prices in 2014 could be considered as an indicator type of punctuations. At
the same time, it could be a focusing event since the collapse in prices was the result of the price
war between conventional oil producers and the fracking industry. Moreover, the focusing events
of the terrorist attack on 9/11/2001 and the financial crisis in 2009 have influenced oil prices,
causing significant decreases in prices even though they are not directly related to the oil sector.
Herein, it is vital to distinguish between the effects of these focusing events. Not all punctuations
generate the same dynamics. For example, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 and the collapse
of oil prices in 2014 brought more attention to the issues and attracted more outsiders to become
involved in the oil subsystem. Meanwhile, the terrorist attack on 9/11/2001 and the 2009 financial
crisis took attention away from the oil sector, leaving insiders with more control. Finally, these
focusing events should be seen as potential punctuations and the reaction of the oil subsystem
should be examined to determine which ones generate the punctuated equilibrium pattern.
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5.3 Congressional Committees as the Keystone of Policy Subsystems:
As the literature on public policy indicates, congressional committees are the anchor of the
policy subsystem (Worsham 1997). Therefore, identifying which committee(s) are controlling the
subsystem is the first step in distinguishing the policy community from outsiders. However, before
doing so, looking at congressional attention in general is important in understanding the dynamics
of the policy subsystem and network. The two contextual variables which played a pivotal role in
shaping the agenda of the Congress are oil prices and the media coverage. Here I counted the
number of congressional hearings held by House, Joint, Select, and Senate committees in each
year as an indicator for the agenda and the attention of Congress towards oil policy. Then I
compared the number of congressional hearings with oil prices and media coverage as presented
in Figure 5.5. More details about selection criteria and the coding process of congressional
hearings are explained in Chapter 4 section 4.1.
To a great extent, the attention of Congress follows oil prices in an almost perfect manner.
The number of hearings was low when the oil prices were low in the 1990s and the first half of the
2000s, and when the prices were high, the number of hearings increased, especially in 2008, 2011,
and 2012. However, the one exception to this pattern is the year of 2015 where the number of
hearings increased despite the fall in oil prices. Out of all occasions, the collapsed oil prices at the
end of 2014 and 2015 seemed to attract the attention of Congress, which could be a response to
the devastating impact that the fracking industry produced at that time. This occasion could
therefore be classified as a punctuation. On the other hand, media coverage seems to have less
effect on congressional attention. The number of congressional hearings appears to be less
responsive to pressure coming from the media. Nevertheless, the overall impression produced by

95

Figure 5.5 shows that media coverage tends to increase over time as well as does congressional
attention.
Figure 5.5: Congressional Hearings, Oil Prices, and Media Coverage (1996-2016)

Note: The media coverage number is adjusted to fit the graphs. It was divided by 1000, and then added 60.
The Oil prices is based on Nominal values
Sources:
http://search.proquest.com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/index?accountid=2837
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/
http://congressional.proquest.com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/

In addition, it seems that congressional attention was affected by the other focusing events
discussed above. However, the effect of these punctuating events varies as they have different
natures. While the 9/11 attack and financial crisis in 2009 took away congressional attention from
oil policy, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 brought the attention of Congress to oil policy.
This can be observed through the drop in the number of congressional hearings in 2002 after the
9/11 attack, and in 2009, the year of the financial crisis. Meanwhile, hearings significantly
increased because of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Herein, the timing of the terrorist attack
on 9/11/2001 and the oil price collapse in 2014 happened at the end of these years, and some of
96

their effect continued over to the next year. Therefore, overlapping across the years should be
considered when the impacts of these punctuations are evaluated. In the meantime, the timing of
the Deepwater horizon oil spill in 2010 is more ideal from a measurement perspective. It began
and ended in the middle of the year, from April 20 to September 19, 2010. As a result, the different
pattern of congressional attention is more obvious in this event.
Figure 5.6: Tone of Congressional Hearings Toward the Oil Industry (1996-2016)
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Source: http://congressional.proquest.com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/

As for the tone of the Congressional hearings, I performed a content analysis of the
summary published by the Congressional ProQuest database for all hearings held by House, Joint,
Select, and Senate committees, and then classified them into three types: whether the hearings are
negative toward the oil industry, neutral, or positive toward the oil industry. As appears in Figure
5.6, the hearings were mostly positive toward the oil industry in the 1990s. Specifically, in 2001
the tone was disproportionately positive. Afterwards, the congressional hearings were more
negative, particularly the period between 2006-2008 associated with the increase in oil prices. The
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most issues discussed in the hearings during these years were the increase in oil prices and
dependence on foreign oil.
The tone became more balanced in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis and the significant
drop in oil prices. In 2010, the tone dramatically shifted against the oil industry where almost all
hearings were negative in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Accordingly, the environment and oil production were the most discussed issues in congressional
hearings during that year. However, Congress seems to become more positive towards the oil
industry in the following years despite the high level of oil prices. During the period 2011-2016,
Congress was mostly concerned with the increase in domestic production from oil shale and
conventional oil and gas, which was seen as a way to reduce dependence on foreign oil.
When the congressional hearings are distinguished based on which house conducts them,
different patterns emerge. By comparing Figures 5.7 and 5.8, it appears that the timing and
composition of the hearings vary between the House of Representatives and the Senate. In the
1990s, the Senate was more active than the House in conducting hearings whereas in the first half
of 2000s the case flipped; the vast majority of the hearings were conducted by the House.
Moreover, in the period 2014-2016, the House held more hearings than the Senate did.
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Figure 5.7: House Hearings by Committees
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Figure 5.8: Senate Hearings by Committees
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One reason for this difference in pattern might be the shift in the partisan control between
chambers, whether one party controls both houses or not. However, providing an explanation for
99

this pattern is beyond the scope of this study. What is important is to analyze the composition of
the congressional hearings and identify the committee(s) that could be the anchor of the oil policy
subsystem. In this regard, I measure the engagement of the congressional committees based on the
number of hearings each committee holds during each period of the study. A general look at the
graphs show that there are three committees that have a permanent and sizable presence throughout
the duration of the study; the House Committee of Natural Resources, the House Committee of
Energy and Commerce, and the Senate Committee of Energy and Natural Resources. Nevertheless,
the other committees occasionally participate in the oil subsystem, especially when public attention
is high, as was the case with the oil spill crisis in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. In contrast, when
attention is low, fewer committees are involved. Sometimes, it is difficult to make a clear cut
between the permanent committees that could reflect the policy subsystem and other committees
that are part of a broader policy network. Some committees may be active at a particular time but
not at others. Nonetheless, these committees could exert considerable impact on the policy
subsystem and provide a venue shift for the policy changes. Therefore, they should be considered
when the policy network is analyzed.
To distinguish between these committees, I measured the hearing average of the
committees to see which committees significantly depart from the others. Presenting the summary
of congressional hearing distribution, there are 41 committees involved in oil policy with a median
of 6 hearings, a mean of 14.46 hearings, and a standard deviation of 23.03. Accordingly,
congressional committees could be divided into three tiers. The first tier includes the permanent
committees, which are the top 95% in holding hearings. These committees are statistically and
significantly different from the means with a one-tailed test. On the House side, it appears that the
most permanent committees are the Natural Resources Committee with 103 hearings and the
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Energy and Commerce Committee with 71 hearings. Both committees constitute 48.6% of all
hearings held by the House during the period 1996-2016. On the Senate side, the committee on
Energy and Natural Resources appears to be the most permanent with 91 hearings and 40.81% of
all Senate hearings that occur during the same period. Potentially these committees could establish
the bulk of the oil subsystem since their activity is significantly different from the other
committees. See Appendix 9 for more details about the classification of congressional committees
and analysis of congressional hearings.
The second tier of congressional committees are the ones who exhibit considerable interest
in oil policy but have not made the threshold of the top 95%. Even though they are not statistically
different from the rest of the committees, they may exercise considerable influence over the policy
subsystem and network. To identify them, I selected the committees that scored in the fourth
quartile of the hearing distribution, excluding the ones that made it to the top 95%. In other words,
they are between 75% and 95%. The analysis shows that eight committees could be identified
within the second tier. Five of them are in the House; Transportation and Infrastructure, Oversight
and Government Reform, Small Business, Science and Technology, and the Foreign Affairs
committee. They held 130 hearings, constituting 36.31% of all hearings in the House. Meanwhile,
two committees are in the Senate - Environment and Public Works committee, and Commerce,
Science, and Transportation committee - holding 47 hearings with 21.08% of all oil policy hearings
in the Senate. In addition, there is one select committee which is the Committee on Energy
Independence and Global Warming, holding 14 hearings.
The last tier includes periphery committees, which are ones that did not make it into either
the first or the second tiers. There are 30 committees which displayed minimum interest in oil
policy and occasional involvement. Generally, they are presumed to be ineffective or at least have
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marginal impact on the subsystem and the network. Usually, their involvement comes as a
response to an increase in public attention. Yet the case against or for excluding these committees
lies in the Heclo argument for issue networks that is discussed in the second chapter (Heclo 1978,
102). Therefore, it would be vital to empirically examine the extent to which these committees are
influential, if at all.
The other indicator for committee dominance is the number of bill referrals. This indicator
is usually coupled with congressional hearings showing the extent to which the committees
dominate agenda setting and policy adoption. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 present the number of bills
referred to the House of Representative and Senate by committees from 1997 to 2016. It appears
that House and Senate committees continuously receive bill referrals even in years where they are
inactive in conducting hearings at all, such as the period 1996-1998 for the House and the period
2000-2004 for the Senate. However, the main observation that can be drawn from the graphs is
that bill referral is considerably influenced by the election cycle, where the number of bills
significantly increases after an election and then drops in election years. Because of this
fluctuation, the effect of punctuated events becomes less obvious, and it is hard to visually observe
a specific pattern as well as distinguish the House from the Senate. Thus, looking to see to what
extent congressional committees depart from their average is a more appropriate analysis.
Following the method applied to the congressional hearings, there were 1587 bills16 referred to 37
committees during the period (1997-2016) with a median of 28 bill referrals, mean of 40.64, and
Standard deviation of 44.74. For more information the classification of bill referrals, see Appendix
10.

16

The original number of bill referrals is 978. Many of them were referred to more than one committee. To make a
fair comparison between committees, I counted each committee as a separate bill referral. So if, for example, a bill is
referred to three committees, I count them as three bill referrals. Accordingly, the total number of bill referrals becomes
1587 with 965 bills referred to the House and 539 bills referred to the Senate.
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Figure 5.9: House Bill Referrals by Committees
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Figure 5.10: Senate Bill Referrals by Committees
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By adopting the same criteria utilized in the congressional hearing classification, I found
that the first tier of bill referrals contains three committees: the House Committee on Natural
Resources with 172 bill referrals and 17.82% of bills referred to the House; the House Committee
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on Appropriations with 119 bill referrals and 12.33% of bills referred to the House; and the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources with 166 bill referrals and 30.8% of bills referred to
the Senate. Meanwhile, the second tier consists of seven committees. On the House side, five
committees appear to receive 41.14% of total house bill referrals: the Energy and Commerce
committee with 108 bill referrals; Transportation and Infrastructure with 94 bill referrals; Ways
and Means with 82 bill referrals; Foreign Affairs with 64 bill referrals; and the Science and
Technology committee with 49 bill referrals. On the Senate side, there are two committees
receiving 29.13% of total Senate bill referrals: the Appropriations committee with 104 bill
referrals; and Commerce, Science, and Transportation with 53 bill referrals. Finally, the third tier
is comprised of 27 peripheral committees.
There are some notable differences between the analyses of congressional hearings and bill
referrals. First, the Appropriations committees in the House and Senate ranked high in the bill
referral analysis whereas they did not even make it out to the third tier regarding the conduct of
congressional hearings. Given that both committees have an almost constant yearly presence with
little fluctuation, it is likely they receive routine bill referrals for fiscal reasons, but are not active
in conducting hearings. So, it is debatable whether to consider them among the permanent
committees in the oil policy network. They should be excluded from the first and second tiers.
Secondly, the House committee on Energy and Commerce did not make it into the first tier
regarding bill referrals; nonetheless, it came very close, just seven referrals short of joining the
first tier. Giving its jurisdiction and the large number of hearings it held, Energy and Commerce
committee should still be considered among the first tier. Thirdly, several committees that
appeared in the second tier regarding the congressional hearings could not make the cut regarding
bill referrals. The missing committees are the House committees on Transportation and
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Infrastructure, Oversight and Government Reform, and Small Business, the Senate committee on
Environment and Public Works, and Select committee on Energy Independence and Global
Warming. In the meantime, the House committee on Ways and Means was the only addition that
appeared in the bill referral second tier, but not in the congressional hearings second tier.
Several issues were discussed during the period of study from the content of congressional
hearings. From analyzing the summaries of the hearings published on the Congressional ProQuest
database, the most frequent issues presented and argued are the increase in oil prices, dependence
on foreign oil, environmental concerns such as the Keystone XL oil pipeline and the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and oil shale and oil fracking production. Additionally,
the congressional committees less frequently discussed other issues depending on the events or
concerns raised at the time. However, the manner in which these issues are framed differ over time
and among actors. To create a constant measurement, I classified the congressional hearings
according to the issues being presented into six categories or policy areas. First is policy concerned
with oil production, including issues such as on/offshore drilling, offshore leasing, production for
reserves, and supply in general. Second is oil prices and consumption policy which comprises
issues such as the demand on oil and gasoline, reducing dependence on foreign oil, reserves in
general, and the balance between demand and supply. Third is environment and safety policy that
examines issues such as oil pipeline safety and oil spills. Fourth is international policy which
discussed international aspects of the oil industry such as the global oil market, OPEC, and
international cooperation and sanctions. Fifth is economic policy that is concerned with the impact
of the oil market and other aspects of the oil industry on the growth of the economy. The final
category is a general or other policy category which contains the issues that cannot be classified
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within any of the previous categories. For more details about the data description collection
process, see Chapter 4 section 4.1 and Appendixes 2 and 9 for data description.
Figure 5.11: House Hearings by Policy Area
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Figure 5.12: Senate Hearings by Policy Area
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To some degree, these policy areas may overlap, and some of the congressional hearings
might be classified into more than one category. The treatment of such cases is discussed in more
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detail in Chapter 4, section 4.2. By looking at the distribution of policy area in both chambers as
displayed in Figures 5.11 and 5.12, the production, consumption, and environmental policies are
the most deliberated policies during the period of the study, whereas the economic and
international policies are debated the least. On the House side, production policy seizes the most
attention with 39.02% of House hearings, especially from 2010 to 2016. It is followed by
environmental policy with 21.71% and consumption policy with 16.54%, while economic and
international policies have the least with 9.3% and 6.7% successively. Meanwhile, on the Senate
side, consumption policy comes in first with 32.5% of the Senate hearings, followed by production
and environmental policies with 24.58% and 22.5% respectively. Likewise, economic and
international policies receive the least attention from the Senate with 12.5% and 4.58%
respectively. Yet, one anomaly appears in the year 2010, where few environmental hearings were
held at the time of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the most devastating
environmental disaster in the history of oil industry. One explanation for this inconsistency could
be a result of the overlap in the issue between policies. Since the disaster was caused by a defect
in the production operation in deep water that led to an environmental catastrophe, many related
hearings might be summarized as production issues in the Congressional ProQuest database, and
then coded as production policy. Also, it could be a result of the relative power of the committees
in which the committee that oversees production policy grabs control of the hearing process, as it
is probably, in general, the more influential and dominant committee.

5.4 The Oil Policy Network and the Classification of Its Actors’ Affiliations
In this section, I analyze the network of congressional hearings and classify the affiliations
of witnesses appearing before the congressional committees. The importance of such analysis is
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that it displays the interest groups and public officials who might be a part of the policy community
or dominant coalition, if any. Since access to congressional hearings is limited, preventing interest
groups from participating whenever they want, interest groups have to develop or already have an
existing relationship with the congressional committees that hold the hearings. Therefore, the
affiliations of the witnesses and their frequent appearances could be an important indicator that
can be used to identify and classify the participants in the oil subsystem and its policy networks.
Generally, the oil policy network is constructed as a bipartite, or two-mode, network that
has two types of nodes, the actors and events. Accordingly, the first set of nodes, the actors, is
comprised of the affiliations of the witnesses appearing in congressional hearings. Herein, I am
not interested in tracking the witnesses themselves, but I am looking at their affiliations or the
types of interest groups they belong to. For example, if two different witnesses represent the same
company, such as British Petroleum (BP), in two different congressional hearings, they are counted
as one actor appearing in two hearings. The logic of this coding is that these witnesses do not
represent themselves. In fact, they represent the company or the organization that sent them. It is
more accurate therefore to cite the organization itself, not its representatives. The second mode,
the events, are the congressional hearings. From analyzing the summaries of hearings published in
the Congressional ProQuest database during 1996-2016, I identified all hearings concerned with
oil policy. I examined the individuals appearing in these hearings, representing the witnesses with
the same affiliation as one actor appeared in multiple hearings. In viewing the relations within the
network, the edges are drawn based on appearances in the hearings. Since the edges, or
connections, in bipartite networks are only allowed between the two modes, no edge is permitted
within the same mode. So, there are no links between actors themselves or between the hearings.
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Relational ties, or edges, only appear between actors and hearings. For more details, see the data
description section 4.1 in Chapter 4.
The actors in the network are classified according to the type of interests they reflect or the
activities they perform. For oil policy, the two most important groups that we should expect to be
involved in the oil subsystem and its policy network are the oil industry and environmentalists.
Usually those two parties are located on opposite sides of the policy continuum. If one of them is
a challenger of the status quo, the other probably is a defender of the status quo, depending on the
issue(s) being deliberated at the time. However, there are other actors and groups who show
considerable interest in oil policy and play an important role in the oil policymaking process.
Interestingly, certain public officials have almost a permanent presence in congressional hearings.
This category includes the federal agencies and administrations, members of Congress, and state
and local governments. In addition, certain experts and scientists are another category.
Universities, research centers, and think tanks are vital members of the policy community and the
other groups usually depend on them in advocating policy positions.
The involved parties, however, cannot be limited to these categories. There is a set of other
industries that might be affected by oil policy and exhibit substantial involvement in the oil
network but are not necessarily allied with the oil industry or environmentalists. Their interests
may overlap with one group at one time and the other at a different time. These groups that
substantially and regularly participate in the network are added as separate categories.
Accordingly, two additional groups were included, the biofuel industry and the energy industry in
general. The biofuel industry is distinct from the oil industry. It is concerned with producing
ethanol from organic materials and mixing it with refined fossil fuels. It is therefore located
somewhere between the oil industry and agriculture. Meanwhile, the energy category contains the
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industries that produce other sources of energy such as coal, hydroelectric energy, nuclear, and
renewable energy, as well as utility companies. While this category is widespread, nevertheless,
these industries are often affected by what happens in the oil sector and have displayed extensive
involvement. The final category is comprised of the other groups which include the actors and
organizations who do not show regular nor sizeable engagement in the policy network, or who
could not be classified in any of the aforementioned categories. As a result, seven categories are
identified - the oil industry, environment, officials, scientists, biofuel industry, energy, and other
category.
To visualize the oil policy network, I measure the degree of centrality of the actors in the
first mode which counts the number of connections for a given node. Accordingly, the actors who
are linked extensively with others are the most prominent in the network (Knoke and Yang 2008,
63). I used their scores to plot the size of the actors’ nodes in the network. The ones with larger
nodes are the most important and permanent. To clarify the network, I did not take the degree
centrality of the second mode which is the congressional hearings since it was already covered in
the previous section and I do not think the results are different from what is already discussed.
Additionally, I removed the isolates, or trivial actors, who only appeared once before the
congressional committees. Those actors crowded the network and made it difficult to notice any
pattern. By removing the trivial actors, the network size significantly dropped from 2326 nodes to
1108 nodes.
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Figure 5.13: Network of Witness Affiliations Appearing before Congressional Hearings
(1996-2016)

In spite of the noisy image produced by visualizing this large network, we can see some
important features of the network. As seen in Figure 5.13, the actors with larger node sizes either
belong to the oil industry or are public officials, followed by environmentalists and scientists to a
lesser degree. To visualize the animated network, the Appendix 14 includes a video for the
dynamic network of the congressional hearings on oil policy (1996-2016). In order to have a better
picture, I classified the actors based on their degree centralities into three tiers, applying the same
method utilized to classify the congressional committees. After removing the trivial actors, the
total number of nodes in the first mode is 531 actors, and the statistical summary of their degree
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centralities is 3.00 for the median, 5.33 for mean, and 8.22 for the standard deviation. The result
of the compositions of each tier is displayed in Figure 5.14. I chose to provide this data
visualization, as the corresponding colors and size of the chart segments corresponds to the use of
node size and color in the network diagrams.
Figure 5.14: The Classification and Composition of the Actors in the Oil Network
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The first tier shows that public officials and the oil industry are the most permanent actors
with 50% and 40.9% respectively. For more details, Appendix 1 provides the names of the actors
and their types of interest in each tier. There are 11 public official actors within this tier. All of
them belong to federal agencies and administrations led by the U.S. Department of Energy and
Energy Information Administration. There are no state and local governments nor congressmen.
Meanwhile, there are 9 actors belonging to the oil industry, led by the American Petroleum
Institute (API). Seven actors out of the nine oil actors are coalitions or associations that represent
many oil and gas companies. On the other hand, the environmental groups and scientist institutions
were presented by one organization each, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Center
for American Progress, consisting of less than 10% of total degree centrality in the first tier.
With regards to the size of the tiers, the number of actors increased significantly moving
down from the first to the last tier with 22 actors for the first, 132 for the second, and 377 for the
third tier. Nonetheless, the composition of the first tier differs considerably from the others.
Meanwhile, the second and third tiers are very similar as can be seen in Figure 5.14. In general,
public officials remain the most permanent actors with nearly 30% of second and third tiers.
However, some state and local actors appear in the second tier and considerably more are present
in the third tier, while federal agencies and administrations become less frequent moving down the
tiers. As for the oil industry, it maintained a sizable presence in the second and third tiers as well,
with 19.7% and 18.8% respectively. Also, the scientists amplified their participation to a
reasonable degree in lower tiers with 18.9% for the second tier and 11.4% for the third. Meanwhile,
the environmental groups show uneven appearances as their activities and are more present in the
second tier, but not the others. Finally, the energy, biofuel, and other categories emerge and appear
to increase their participation from the second to the third tier. Herein, the biofuel industry seems

114

to have a marginal appearance, which might be better to be combined with the other category.
However, the decision to create a separate category for the biofuel industry was made based on its
size in the policy network before removing the trivial actors. Once these actors were removed, few
biofuel actors remained in the network. For more details about the construction and visualization
of congressional hearing network, see Chapter 4 section 4.1 and Appendix 11.
In summation, the analysis of the witnesses’ affiliation yields two important results. First,
it displays to what extent the actors are permanent in the network based on their degree centrality,
distinguishing between the top tier that probably forms the oil subsystem from the other
participants in the policy network. Secondly, it exhibits the compositions of interest groups and
public administration officials that are assumed to constitute the subsystem compared to the rest
of the policy network. In general, by looking at the size of the interest group nodes, it can be
observed that the oil subsystem, or the first tier, is dominated largely by the oil industry especially
in comparison to its presumed rival, the environmental groups. Even when considering the lower
tiers, the oil industry is disproportionately more involved in the policy network than the
environmentalists. On the side of the agencies, there are nine public administrations and agencies
that participated in the subsystem, which indicates the interest and widespread engagement of
federal agencies in the oil subsystem.

5.5 Conclusion
A general look at the oil subsystem and policy network shows that it was influenced by
several events and factors. Most importantly, oil prices seem to have a significant impact in that
congressional attention almost mirrors the movement of prices. In addition, some punctuation
events have shaped the public’s attention and congressional agenda setting. Yet, their effects vary
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in different aspects. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico generated considerable
attention from the Congress where the tone of congressional hearings was overwhelmingly
negative toward the oil industry. Meanwhile, the collapse of oil prices in the end of 2014 appears
to be the only occasion to generate congressional attention and generate a positive tone out of all
the other times where prices collapsed. Congress at that time was more supportive of the oil
industry. On the other hand, both the 9/11 terrorist attack and the financial crisis in 2009 took away
the attention of the Congress from the oil sector even though both crises only indirectly affected
the oil industry. When studying the rulemaking process, the impacts of these punctuation events
should be observed, displaying if/how public administrations and agencies react to such events.
As for the matters being debated, the Congress was most concerned with issues regarding oil
production, consumption, and environment. The issues related to the economy and international
received less attention. The discussion in this chapter did not go into the details of the bills and
laws nor describe how the issues were framed. Rather, it focused on classifying the issues to more
comparable categories that can be utilized in different models and over time.
Regarding lobbying of Congress, the analysis of congressional hearings can demonstrate
the power structure within the policy network. Since interest groups have limited access to the
congressional committees, which requires developing relationships with these committees,
studying that relationship is aided by displaying the members of the oil subsystem and
differentiating them from other participants in the policy network. By investigating the actors
present in congressional hearings, I have been able to point out and visualize the relationships
between the three corners of the policy subsystem - congressional committees, public
administrations and agencies, and interest groups. The analysis sets the criteria to distinguish the
most permanent actors that establish the oil subsystem as well as the composition of those
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participants. Accordingly, there are three congressional committees that are the most permanent,
holding a larger number of hearings and receiving a considerable number of bill referrals. On the
agency side of the triangle, there are nine federal departments and agencies that are regularly
present in congressional oil policy hearings. Meanwhile, the interest groups were predominantly
represented by eleven organizations and companies that frequently appear before the committees.
Nine of them belong to the oil industry.
Here the analysis is pointing out to the most permanent actors in the oil policy subsystem,
which does not necessarily indicate whether they are dominant. These actors appear statistically
significantly more than others. However, the information produced by this analysis cannot
determine the type of policy subsystem, whether it is dominant, transitory, or competitive
coalitions (Worsham 1997, 18). In fact, the interest groups angle of the subsystem is the only one
that is dominated by one type of interest, the oil industry, whereas the other two angles involve
multiple committees and agencies, so, it is unlikely to be the dominant type of policy subsystem.
Also, oil policymaking could be influenced by the other actors who are part of the policy network
but not part of the subsystem. Those actors were classified to additional levels, or tiers. As a result,
the analysis reveals three levels of participants in the policy network: the permanent actors who
are likely to form the policy subsystem; interested actors who regularly participate in the network,
but they are not part of the subsystem; and periphery actors who marginally participate in the oil
network.
Nonetheless, displaying the extent of permanence in the policy network based solely on
hearing participation does not convey the type of relationship among them, whether it is conflict
or cooperation, nor can it exhibit which actors are in the majority coalition and which ones in the
minority coalition. Also, the classification of the actors based on their kinds of interests does not
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reflect the actual behavior of these actors. For example, it is possible to find an interest group that
is coded as an environmentalist while it allies itself and lobbies with the oil industry. Some
environmental organizations may be created by oil companies or are willing to provide
consultations to the industry. To figure out the actual behavior, a deeper analysis is required. Since
the focus in this study is on the rulemaking process, I am not concerned in this chapter with such
analysis. Nonetheless, a more thorough analysis is performed in the upcoming chapters that study
that part of the process of rulemaking. The analysis in this chapter has been intended to be
descriptive in nature, presenting potential punctuations in the dynamics of oil policy, and the
composition of the oil subsystem and its policy network. This provides readers with a better
understanding of the policy dynamics and agenda setting at the level of political principals. As will
be seen, many of the issues discussed in this chapter are used as variables in the statistical models
when the rulemaking process is analyzed in the sixth and seventh chapters.
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Chapter 6: The Dynamics of the Rulemaking Process and Lobbying
Behavior

6.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe and analyze the administrative agenda setting and
rulemaking process, providing explanation for the actions and reactions of interest groups. To start,
a general description of administrative activities is given, including the types of policies being
regulated, the dominant agencies, and patterns in proposed and final rules. Then, the behavior of
interest groups is analyzed in depth, exploring different scenarios of possible reactions to the
involvement of political principals. Furthermore, the routines of the rulemaking process are studied
taking into account the effect of abrupt stimuli, pointing out patterns that the political principals
and agencies exhibit in response to these punctuations. Next, the network of rulemaking is
constructed and visualized, displaying the extent of the activities and the types of interests within
the network. Finally, a temporal exponential random graph model (TERGM) is applied in order to
infer relationships within this policy network. By positing several hypotheses, the theory and
arguments that explain the routines and dynamics of the rulemaking network can be empirically
examined.

6.2 Administrative Agenda Setting in Light of the Punctuations
As the rulemaking process is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
(APA), all public administrations and agencies are required to announce their intentions in advance
before adopting any regulations. This public disclosure requirement is designed to prevent private
arrangements that may work against the interests of elected officials. Accordingly, the process
starts by posting proposed rules that are open for the public and interested parties to comment on,
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and then the rules can be finalized after the public comment period is closed (McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast 1987, 258–69). To a great degree, proposed rules reflect the administrative agenda
setting for the departments and agencies. Meanwhile, the process of finalizing the proposed rules
may be subject to different considerations. Once the proposed rule is published, interest groups
and concerned parties start lobbying the relevant agencies. In addition, political principals such as
Congress, the President, and the courts, may become involved which can alter the timing and
content of the final rules. In other words, administrative agencies may be put under pressure during
the process of rule finalization that differs from the stage of proposing new rules. Therefore, the
analysis should distinguish between the timing and pattern of proposed and final rules.
In regard to oil policy, Figure 6.1 shows the total number of proposed and final rules during
the period (1996-2018)17. Generally, the Obama administration appears to have been more active
in regulating the oil sector than the Bush and Clinton administrations. On average, the Obama
administration enacted 52.13 rules each year, whereas the Bush and Clinton administrations
enacted 21.13 and 3.6 rules respectively. Also, the number of significant rules enacted by the
Obama administration was much higher than the Bush and Clinton administrations, as appears in
Figure 6.2. On average, the Obama administration issued 17.13 significant rules while Bush and
Clinton administrations enacted 6.63 and 1.2 significant rules respectively. Not only was the
Obama administration active in regulating the oil sector, but it also made more profound changes
in oil policy. However, there are reasons to doubt the accuracy of the electronic databases that
document the rules, especially in the 1990s, and especially the Federal Register and Regulations.gov.
Some rules may not have been included in these databases and the number of rules may also be a

17

For propose of producing better visualization, the graphs included two years outside time frame of the study,
2017 and 2018. So, the readers can see the different between Obama and next administrations.
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little higher. The data collection, coding process, and accuracy of the database is discussed with
more detail in Chapter 4 section 4.2. Yet, I believe the difference in the number of rules between
the Obama and Bush administrations is higher than the error in the databases. Furthermore, the
increase in rulemaking activity during the Obama administration coincided with high oil prices
while the rulemaking activity decreased when the prices were lower during the Clinton and Bush
administrations. Hence, the impact of oil prices on the rulemaking process should also not be ruled
out.
Figure 6.1: The Proposed and Final Rules
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

Proposed

121

Final

Others

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

0

Figure 6.2: The Significant Rules
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As for the agencies and departments, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and United States Coast Guard (USCG) are the most active agencies in rulemaking in all
areas of oil policy, as demonstrated in Figure 6.3. They represent the largest contributors to
rulemaking activities for the top 10 agencies. Out of all rules enacted during the period of the
study, EPA, and USCG decreed 52.88% and 14.38% respectively. The rest of the agencies are
within single digits. However, six out of the top 10 agencies actively participate in the oil
subsystem and its policy network, appearing in the first tier. Meanwhile, three agencies appear in
the second tier and one agency in the periphery tier18. In the meantime, the content and rulemaking
activities were mostly concentrated on the environmental and production aspects of the oil sector
with 47.6% and 32.77% respectively, while consumption, the economy, and international aspects

18

The agencies that belong to first tier are United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); United States Coast
Guard (USCG); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); Bureau of Land Management (BLM);
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), Previously known as Minerals
Management Service (MMS); and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). Meanwhile,
second tier includes Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM); Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE); and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Finally, the periphery tier includes Office of Natural
Resources Revenue (ONRR).
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were in single digits. By looking at Figure 6.4, there was constant interest in regulating
environmental and production policies during the period of the study.
Figure 6.3: The Rules by Agencies
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The abbreviations and names of the agencies are United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); United States
Coast Guard (USCG); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); Bureau of Land Management
(BLM); Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), Previously known as
Minerals Management Service (MMS); Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM); Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE); Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS); and Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR).

Figure 6.4: The Rules by Policy
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When distinguishing between proposed and final rules, a lag period between the date of
issuing the rules and the date of finalizing them may be expected. Accordingly, the curve of the
final rules should follow the proposed rules with the lag time. Nevertheless, from looking at Figure
6.5, there seems to be more than just a lag period. Both the timing and patterns of proposed and
final rules vary. The final rules seem to generate a pattern of “midnight rulemaking” in which the
current administration tries to finalize a large number of rules in its last year before the new
administration takes office (Carey 2012). In examining the last years of each administration, the
number of final rules in 2000, 2008, and 2016 significantly increased compared to previous years.
On the other hand, the proposed rules do not follow the same pattern. In fact, they are much lower
in the last years of each administration, which indicates that these administrations are more focused
on adopting and implementing the current policy than advancing new policy in the last year.
Furthermore, timing and patterns of proposed and final rules vary in response to the
focusing events. As for those punctuations that divert public attention away from oil policy, the
numbers of proposed and final rules decreased during the financial crisis in 2009, which was
expected, given that a new administration just arrived. Meanwhile, the behavior of the
administration after the terrorist attack in 9/11/2001 seems to go in the other directions where the
number of rules slightly increased. Considering the issue of databases’ accuracy, I won’t draw any
conclusions out of this focusing event, especially as the increase in the number of rules is relatively
small. Nonetheless, the focusing event of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 generates inverse
impacts on proposed and final rules. The number of final rules significantly rose from 21 in 2009
to 40 in 2010 while the proposed rules barely changed. However, in the following year, the
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proposed and final rules went in reverse directions. As the proposed rules increased from 13 in
2010 to 26 in 2011, the final rules decreased from 40 to 18 for the same years.
Figure 6.5: The Proposed and Final Rules (1996-2018)

This inversion between the initiation of proposed and final rules might be explained by
considering two tendencies. First is the urge to take an action in response to the focusing event.
Second, there is the uncertainty inherent variability generated by changes in the attention and
possibility of political principals’ involvement. On the one hand, the agencies may be reluctant to
initiate new rules when there is the possibility for major policy change happening due to an
increase in the activities of political principals, especially at congressional committees. Not
knowing whether the changes will pass or get blocked, it is counterproductive to spend time and
resources in advancing new rules that may be overturned by a new law when/if it passes. On the
other hand, under the pressure of the media and public opinion, the agencies may feel the need to
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take immediate and direct actions to address the consequences of the focusing event. In response
to such circumstances, the administration seems to finalize current proposed rules and/or enact
final rules that have an immediate effect in accordance with existing laws and policies. In other
words, the approach of the administration in dealing with a punctuating event is to engage less in
advancing new rules and to continue implementing the current policy.
However, the case may change post-punctuation. Importantly, situational uncertainty is
alleviated. It becomes apparent whether new laws and policies have been adopted or the window
for policy changes has closed. In addition, public pressure tends to be less intense after the crisis
has passed. Thus, the administration enjoys more room to advance new policies, which explains
the increase in the number of proposed rules in 2011, in the post Deepwater Horizon oil spill crisis
period. So, the timing of proposed and final rules appears to vary between the punctuation and
post-punctuation times, creating an alternating pattern between the proposed and final rules due to
the changes in both uncertainty and public pressure.
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill as a focusing event type of punctuations seems to be a
good case for this alternating pattern between proposed and final rules. It happened in the middle
of 2010 with clear dates for the start and end of the crisis. The behavior of the administration could
be clearly observed across both the punctuation and post-punctuation periods. Meanwhile, the
impact of oil prices as the indicator type of punctuations may differ from the impact of focusing
events. For one reason, it is difficult to point to specific dates for the start and end of the
punctuation. Oil prices may gradually/rapidly increase (or decrease), which makes it more of a
continuous event. The other reason is that the effect of oil prices might overlap with other
punctuations since it continues for a longer period of time. Still the alternating pattern between the
proposed and final rules may be observed to a lesser degree. In 2008, when the prices reached their
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historical high, the number of final rules significantly increased while the proposed rules remained
relatively lower. Nevertheless, the increase in oil prices in 2008 overlapped with the effects of
midnight rulemaking. Herein, the administration’s actions could be a result of either of the
variables. For the period from 2011 to the middle of 2014 where the prices remained high, it was
difficult to observe this alternating pattern because of the continuous pressure that stayed for a
longer time, which could smooth out the effects of uncertainty and public attention, and overcome
the lag time between the proposed and final rules.
In the meantime, the collapse of oil prices at the end of 2014 seems to partially generate
this alternating pattern on the side of the proposed rules. It appears that the number of proposed
rules decreased in 2014 and then increased again in 2015. Nonetheless, the final rules do not show
this pattern in those years. The timing of the oil price collapse in 2014 is problematic. It started at
the end of 2014 and continued throughout 2015. So, the alternating pattern may be captured if the
time period is adjusted to specify the months or quarters where the punctuation and postpunctuation are appropriately pointed. In order to apply the Temporal Exponential Random Graph
Models (TERGM) to test these ideas, constant time periods shall be created. However, an indicator
for the punctuation is developed to capture the continuous effect of oil prices and overcome the
issue of overlapping. This indicator is explained later with more details in section 6.5 of this
chapter and Appendices 8 and 12.
In summation, the proposed and final rules reflect administrative agenda setting and the
adaptation of executive regulations, which may be affected by the public and media pressure, and
the degree of un/certainty at the level of political principals. However, tracking the number of rules
by itself may not be sufficient to come up with concrete conclusions. It is possible that the agencies
may enact few rules that regulate many issues related to the oil sector. In contrast, the agencies
127

could propose many rules that are marginal for the oil industry. What matters is the content of the
rules and the public reaction. Therefore, the analysis of the rulemaking process should go beyond
just tracking the rules to examine the dynamics and timing of the comments submitted by interest
groups and concerned parties, which may exhibit the extent and effect of public pressure. In
addition, the study of rulemaking should consider the impact of the activities at the politicalprincipal level. Accordingly, more empirical examination is needed, which the following sections
provide.

6.3 Interest Group Lobbying and the Shift from Principals to Agents.
As the APA requires, the rules should be open for notices and comments, which provides
a venue for interest groups and concerned parties to lobby the agencies. Nevertheless, there are
several implications that make the agencies consider these comments and notices with great
attention. On one account, the public comments provide the agencies with valuable information
about the related parties, and their benefits and costs. Participation in the administrative procedures
can be considered a measurement for political debate and interested concern regarding
controversial course of actions. On the other hand, interest groups may provide evidence that
debates the rules, taking advantage of the evidentiary standard requirement that indicates that the
agencies’ decisions have to be built upon strong evidence that can stand before courts. Moreover,
the interest groups could trigger the alarm for the political principal to become involved. The public
disclosure requirement identifies whether the rules serve the intended constituents. By allowing
the relevant parties to know about the intention of agencies before constituencies are mobilized or
policies are changed, agencies are disadvantaged in a manner that enables the political principals
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and other relevant parties to intervene early in the administrative policy-making process
(McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 244–69; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166).
With regards to the lobbying behavior of interest groups toward the agencies and the
rulemaking dynamics, the literature does not provide sufficient explanation. Do the activities at
the level of rulemaking mirror the activities at the level of the policy subsystem? How do
punctuating events affect the rulemaking process? In general, the distinct literatures of policy
subsystems, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), and
Multiple Streams Theory all describe the agenda setting and policy dynamics at the level of
political principals. This could explain the lobbying behavior of interest groups and other actors
involved in the policy subsystem and network (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Jones
2009; Baumgartner, Jones, and True 2007; Kingdon 2011; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999;
Sabatier and Weible 2007). Yet, the literature does not clarify such behavior when it comes to
policy implementation and adoption of executive regulations. Few studies have analyzed the
rulemaking process and the accompanying lobbying dynamics toward administrations and
agencies.
Despite the lack of such comprehensive studies, the literature on political control offers
insights into lobbying behavior regarding rulemaking19. Generally, when a political coalition
succeeds in enacting laws and entrusts an existing agency or creates a new one to implement them,
the main concern is to guarantee that the deal continues, and that favorite constituents are
enfranchised after that coalition is dissolved. Thus, institutional structure is therefore created, and
sanctions are put in place to ensure that administrative decisions and rules are consistent with the

19

For more explanation, the literature of political control and rulemaking was discussed in more detail in the
second chapter of this dissertation.
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agendas and goals of the political coalition without the need for the principals to be directly
involved and actively guide the agencies. To ensure that administrative outputs are not random
and preclude secret arrangements, the APA places some requirements such as the public disclosure
requirements, evidentiary standard requirements, and placing the burden of proof on the
administrations and agencies. In other words, it stacks the deck in the agencies’ process of decision
making, or what is known as the “deck-stacking” argument (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987,
255).
Nonetheless, the APA provides room for flexibility. According to McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast, administrations can perform an autopilot function which allows them to react to the
changes in political interests and the surrounding environment. As the preferences of political
principals and their favorite constituents may alter over time, administrations may respond to new
demands and interests without the need to enact new laws (1987, 269–71). In this context, Brehm
and Gates provided evidence that agencies may respond directly to their clients’ complaints and
correct their behavior without involvement from Congress or other principals (1999). Furthermore,
Balla examined the political control measures facilitated by the APA and found that the process of
comments and notices does not serve as a tool for political control - in contrast to what the deckstacking argument suggests. Despite the expectations, the program he studied did not serve the
legislators’ favored constituents (Balla 1998, 669–70), suggesting that the deck-stacking measures
did not hold after the establishing coalition was dissolved. The alternative conjecture is that it
probably worked in an autopilot manner.
Herein, the political control literature suggests two conflicting patterns. By one account,
the lobbying entities in the rulemaking process do not matter because the deck is stacked, and
agencies are compelled to finalize the rules in the way that laws are intended. Consequently, there
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is no incentive to lobbying the agencies since the final outcomes are predetermined. Therefore, the
process of commenting on the rules should not bear significant importance, and interest groups are
not motivated to spend time, effort, and resources lobbying the agencies. On the other account, the
autopilot function seems, at least theoretically, to work in the opposite direction to the deckstacking assumption. As the interests and preferences of legislators change in favor of different
constituents, they tolerate deviation from the original deal that established the program, which
contradicts the deck-staking argument. If the original deal could not survive after the establishing
coalition was disbanded due to high administrative flexibility or the autopilot function, then there
is no deck that is stacked in administrative procedures. It always depends on the dominant interests
and preferences at the time of making the decision regardless of what the original deal should
serve. Therefore, interest groups have an incentive to lobby the agencies since there is room to
achieve some gains.
To illustrate what the lobbying behavior would be under each account, Figures 6.6 and 6.7
describe the logical outcomes of reactions of interest groups toward rulemaking. For the sake of
simplicity, let’s assume that there are two types of interest groups. One group is comprised of the
status quo defenders while the other group consists of the challengers of the status quo (or majority
and minority coalitions). Also, the only factor that matters here is the decision of the interest groups
whether to lobby the agencies or not. Meanwhile, all other variables remain consistent. Under the
first account where the deck is stacked, the end result is already determined, and the agencies won’t
change their rules. Thus, from the interest groups’ viewpoint, it does not matter whether to lobby
or not, nothing will change. It is counterproductive to spend time and effort, knowing it cannot
achieve any gains in return. The battle is already concluded at the political principals’ level.
Therefore, both parties, the defenders and challengers, are most likely to decide not to lobby the

131

agencies, as it appears in the green box in Figure 6.6. On the other hand, under the second account,
the autopilot, where the agencies have a great deal of flexibility and are responsive to the lobbying
effort, interest groups have an incentive to lobby the agencies. Since they may achieve some gains,
it is worth it to spend time and effort. The final outcome depends on the reaction of the opposite
party. If, for example, the defenders choose not to lobby and the challengers choose to lobby, the
defenders are quite likely to lose. The other way around is true as well. If both parties choose to
lobby, they will cancel each other out and no changes will occur. The best-case scenario therefore
is to engage in lobbying, whether to achieve gains or no change in the rule, depending on the
opposite party reaction. Meanwhile, if a party chooses not to lobby, the outcome is either no change
in final rules or the opposite party achieves gains, as it appears in the green box in Figure 6.7. In
sum, under the deck-stacking account, the most likely scenario is that the interest groups do not
engage in lobbying, while under autopilot account, they probably do engage in lobbying the
agencies. They are completely opposite outcomes. However, there is one circumstance when
unbalanced lobbying may occur under the autopilot account, where one party does not engage in
lobbying but the other does. That is if that party is severely disorganized and/or lacks the necessary
resources.
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Figure 6.6: Lobbying Behavior Under Deck-Stacking Scenario

Figure 6.7: Lobbying Behavior Under Autopilot Scenario
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It is not likely either just one account or the other. Both scenarios are extreme theoretical
cases. There are merits for each argument so that they should be neither completely accepted nor
rejected. For example, despite Balla’s finding that deck-stacking did not work in the health
program that he studied, deck-stacking measures could work in other programs. Besides,
administrative flexibility could intentionally be given by the principals to deal with complex
issues, avoid the blame, or other reasons. Also, having administrative flexibility or an autopilot
function is not necessarily granting absolute discretion. The political principals can still exert
considerable influence. In some cases, administrative procedures are effective in disciplining the
agencies (Balla 1998; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
Therefore, it could be assumed that administrative agencies enjoy some flexibility under some
degree of restriction. Instead of being contradictory, both accounts could be considered as extreme
ends of a spectrum. Accordingly, the degree and intensity of lobbying effort depends on the
location of rules on that spectrum, as in which end is closer to the rules. Given the number of rules
enacted every year, one should expect to observe a reasonable amount of variation in lobbying
activities.
Nonetheless, the literature of political control does not deal with changes in rulemaking
over time nor display the consequences of punctuations on that process. To have better insight into
lobbying behavior toward agencies, it is important to consider the parallel activities at the level of
political principals, especially the policy subsystem. As PET, ACF, Multiple Stream Theory, and
the Policy Network Approach (PNA) all articulate, at the time of a punctuation, public and media
attention increase, leading to the involvement of more actors who previously were not engaged in
the policy subsystem and network. As a result, the balance within the policy subsystem and
network may be altered and more policy venues become available, opening a window for policy
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changes. However, this window will close after some time and the policy subsystem will likely
return to the previous state of equilibrium or partial equilibrium (Adam and Kriesi 2007;
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Baumgartner, Jones, and True 2007;
Blanco, Lowndes, and Pratchett 2011; Kingdon 2011; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier
and Weible 2007). At the same time, administrative agencies are pressured by media and public
pressure to take action, on one hand, and by increasing uncertainty raised by the involvement of
political principals, on the other. In response, the agencies may produce fewer proposed rules and
more final rules, as was discussed above.
While undergoing actions by both levels of principals and agents, interest groups are
expected to prioritize lobbying the political principals over the agencies. When the window for
making a major policy change is opened, interest groups are expected to seize the moment and
devote more time and resources to lobbying efforts directed at political principals in order to get
desirable laws and policies. In the meantime, less effort and fewer resources are expected to be
devoted to lobbying the agencies. It may not be productive to use valuable resources to change the
content of rules that may simply be overturned by new law(s). However, if a law or reform is
passed, interest groups and political coalitions are expected to shift their lobbying effort from
principals to agents. As the administrations and agencies enjoy flexibility with some degree of
restriction, according to deck-stacking and autopilot arguments, the winning and losing coalitions
have an incentive to lobby the agencies. For the winning coalition, it is vital to ensure that agencies
comply with the new reform and produce positive outputs after the punctuation has passed,
whereas the losing coalition tries to gain some of what it lost at the level of political principals. I
call this shift in lobbying effort lagged movement, which represents changes in behavior and
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resources of actors within the network, as they redirect their lobbying efforts and resources from
the political principals to the agencies in post-punctuation time.
Also, these lagged movements are expected to happen even when the reform is blocked
because of the autopilot function. Since agencies could change their beneficiaries when the
political principals change their interests and preferences, the principals may tolerate deviation
from the original deal that issued the law or reform if the legislators’ preferences and interests
changed in favor of other interests groups (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 259–69). Then
the rulemaking outputs will depend to some degree on the dominant interests and preferences at
the time of the decision regardless of whom the original deal is meant to serve. In this case, the
challengers and defenders of status quo have an incentive to lobby the agencies as well. For
example, the challengers may attempt through the rulemaking process to achieve some of their
goals that they failed to pass through Congress. In contrast, the status quo defenders seek to ensure
that the current policy be continuously implemented. In conclusion, whether the reform happens
or not, this lagged movement will occur either way.
Herein, with focusing event types of punctuations, such as the oil spill in 2010, this lagged
movement or shift in lobbying from targeting political principals to targeting the agencies is
expected to be more apparent since focusing events generate the patterns of punctuated
equilibrium. So, the shift in the activities between the time of a punctuation and its postpunctuation period could be simply observed in the activity by visualization, as well as by other
means. However, with the indicator type of punctuation, like oil prices, the lagged movement may
be less apparent because of the continuous effect of such indictors. The pressure resulting from
high oil prices could continue for longer time than the focusing events do. Thus, interest groups

136

might balance their lobbying effort between the principals and agents after a while. Thus, more
advance analysis is required to capture such a shift in the interest groups’ behavior.

6.4 Oil Policy and the Rulemaking Network.
Regarding oil policy, the lobbying behavior of interest groups can be manifested in the
notices and comments submitted in open rules. Accordingly, the rulemaking network may be
constructed. Similar to the congressional hearing network, the rulemaking network is a bipartite
network where the first mode consists of the actors and second mode is comprised of the rules. As
with the congressional hearing network, the actors are classified into seven categories: public
officials, the oil industry, environmentalists, scientists, energy, biofuel, along with the others
category. Many of those actors who comment on the rules appear before the congressional
committees at one point in time or another, which offers an opportunity to compare the
congressional hearing network with the rulemaking network which allows tracking of the parallel
activities of those actors at both levels of the principals and the agents.
As for the second mode, the rules are gathered in sets according to the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), which codifies the published rules into subjects or issues (Code of Federal
Regulations n.d.). When a rule is published in Regulations.gov20, it is given CFR citation(s) and
assigned a docket number which includes other rules that regulate the CFR citation(s), if any. In
some cases, a specific CFR subject has been regulated several times and over different
administrations. Therefore, docket numbers are used to identify the sets of rules that may stretch

20

Regulations.gov is the official government website created to facilitate processing of the electronic submission of
notices and comments for the public. Also, more information about the rulemaking process can be found in the Federal
Register website (www.federalregister.gov) and the website (www.reginfo.gov) administrated by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA).
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for years. The advantage of utilizing this CFR sets of rules as the nodes in the second mode is that
these nodes are assumed to continue to exist during the entire period of the study, even if they are
not active in some years. This is more suitable for Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models
(TERGM) as both modes, the actors and the rule sets, remain extant from one period to another,
and the dimensions in all the time-series networks are consistent (Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais
2018a, 15–26).
The edges in the rulemaking network are constructed based on comments on the rules
submitted, which links the actors in the first mode to the rule sets in the second mode. No edges
or ties are allowed within the same mode. Furthermore, to reduce the size of the network and
alleviate the computational burden, trivial actors were removed. They were identified as any actor
that submitted only one comment during the entire period of the study. All other actors have at
least two edges. Accordingly, the size of the rulemaking network is significantly reduced to less
than a half, from 3751 nodes to 1581 nodes in both modes. As for the time frame of the rulemaking
network, the information on comments in the years before 2001 was not completely available, and
if parts of the earlier data were available, they were probably not reliable. Therefore, the time frame
starts in 2001 and ends in 2016 with a caveat that some rules may be missed in the beginning of
the period. The issue of data accuracy is discussed with more details in Chapter 4 section 4.2. In
addition, the degree centralities of actors are measured to display who are the most active in
lobbying the agencies and what types of interest they belong to. The results are plotted in Figure
6.8 which presents the aggregated rulemaking network during the period 2001-2016 and Figure
6.9 which presents the rulemaking network in each year during the same period. For the purpose
of visualization, the degree centralities of the second mode, the rule sets, are not included in the
graphs, giving them the same size. Moreover, the isolated nodes in Figure 6.9 are removed to
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exhibit only active actors. However, they are still included in the TERGM estimates. Further
information about the data collection, coding process, data manipulation, visualization, and
software programing is explained in more detail in Chapter 4 section 4.2, and Appendix 12.
Figure 6.8: The Aggregated Rulemaking Network of Oil Policy (2001-2016)

The sizes of the nodes reflect to what extent they are central to the network. As it appears
from the graphs, the oil industry and environmental groups are the most active actors in lobbying
the agencies. Meanwhile, other interests are somewhat less engaged in the rulemaking network.
However, the environmental groups were not particularly active in the first half of the 2000s as
Figure 6.9 shows. Given the issue of data accuracy in these years, probably little conclusion should
be drawn, but it is still important to observe such behavior. Interestingly, the environmental groups
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seem relatively able to match the lobbying effort of the oil industry unlike the case in the
congressional hearing network where they were disadvantaged in the first tier of actors, see Figures
5.13 and 5.14 in Chapter 5. Because of the rulemaking is an open access process, any group can
submit comments and engage in lobbying the agencies so far as it has time, organization, and
resources. In contrast, an appearance before a congressional committee is not an open access
process. The interest groups have to develop, or already have, an existing relationship to engage
in lobbying the committees. Therefore, the process of classifying the actors into tiers and
distinguishing the insiders from the outsiders offers importance in understanding the congressional
network more than it does with rulemaking network. The degree centrality scores demonstrate the
extent of involvement in rulemaking, but not necessarily indicating whether the actors are a part
of the subsystem or not. To visualize the animated network, the Appendix 15 includes a video for
the dynamic network of rulemaking on oil policy (2001-2016).
Figure 6.9: The Rulemaking Networks of Oil Policy on a Yearly Basis (2001-2016)
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Additionally, some actors exhibit different behaviors based on their nature. For example,
the vast majority of comments submitted by public officials came either from members of
Congress or state and local actors. Out of the 10,084 comments received during the period 20012016, there were only 68 comments submitted by federal agencies, which indicates that the
comment process does not reveal the lines of communications among the federal agencies
themselves. In other words, the comments are good at revealing the communications and lobbying
effort between the agencies and the actors outside the administration, but not interagency
communication. Also, scientists were significantly less engaged in the rulemaking network than
they were in the congressional hearing network. There were only 186 out of the 10,084 comments
received by actors classified as scientists in the entire period of the study. It appears that scientists
are more passive actors in which they mostly respond to invitations to appear before Congress to
debate the policy; nevertheless, they do not show much lobbying behavior, especially regarding
the rulemaking process.
To visualize the parallel lobbying efforts of interest groups at both levels of principals and
agents, a comparison between the sizes of the congressional hearing network and the rulemaking
network during the period 2001-2016 is presented in Figure 6.10. It includes only the active nodes
that have at least one edge. The isolated nodes are removed for the purpose of visualization. The
network sizes are used here to exhibit the extent of the activities and attention in both networks.
To make an appropriate comparison, a normalizing equation is applied to the data, transforming
their scores to range between 1 to 100; see Appendix 12.
Generally, when the activities in Congress are high, the rulemaking networks tend to be
less active. For example, when the oil prices became increasingly high from 2005 to 2008, the
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congressional hearing networks were very active, whereas the activities regarding rulemaking
networks were lower. However, in 2009, the situation reversed. Once attention was driven away
from oil policy due to the financial crisis, the size of congressional hearing networks dropped
considerably while the size of the rulemaking network significantly increased, indicating a shift in
lobbying efforts from principals to agents. Also, this pattern is repeated in 2010 during and after
the oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. At the time of the punctuation, the congressional hearing
network was substantially more active; meanwhile, activity in the rulemaking network was low,
as the interest groups prioritized lobbying Congress over agencies. In the post-punctuation period,
the rulemaking network was activated again. Nevertheless, the activities in the congressional
hearing network remained high due to another punctuation, which was the drastic increase in oil
prices in 2011. The effects of oil prices as an indicator type of punctuation stayed for a longer
time than the oil spill, which may have made the interest groups balance their lobbying efforts
between the Congress and the administration. Also, it may have overlapped with other events.
Accordingly, the shift in lobbying efforts from the principals to the agents, this lagged movement,
might be difficult to observe by visualization alone. Therefore, models for statistical inference
should be applied to assess the arguments presented in this chapter.
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Figure 6.10: The Size of the Congressional Hearing and Rulemaking Networks (2001-2016)

6.5 Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models
To examine the impact of a punctuation on the rulemaking network and its dynamics, I
apply a time series version of exponential random graph models (TERGM) developed by Leifeld,
Cranmer, and Desmarais (2018a, 2018b), as an extension to the exponential random graph models
(ERGM) developed by Handcock et al. (2018) and Hunter et al. (2008b). As an indicator for
lobbying the agencies, the comments submitted by interest groups construct the edges in the
rulemaking network, which are coded in a binary manner. If an interest group submitted a
comment, it is coded 1. Otherwise, it is 0. Here, the TERGM is interpreted in the same fashion as
logistic regression where the dependent variable, the comments, is measured by the probability of
the comments’ existence. If the independent variables produce positive/negative coefficients, it
means that the chance of interest groups submitting a comment increases/decrease. Also, it may
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be interpreted as influencing the probability of observing the whole network and its distinctive
structures.
In general, TERGM and other ERGMs have two types of statistics, attributes and
structures. Analogous with logistic regression, the attributes are considered as usual covariates
utilized in the logistic models. These attributes are coded in the network either as node or dyad
level covariates. Since the rulemaking network is a bipartite network, nodal attributes are divided
into two sets of variables. Some variables are related to the first mode, the actors, while the other
are related to the rule sets as the second mode. Meanwhile, the dyad level covariates are attached
to the edges or the ties between the actors and the rule sets. In addition, TERGMs provide a way
to model attributes related to the whole network by assigning the same value to all edges in the
network. This way of coding is especially useful over time where the values of the attribute
changes from one time period to another. Therefore, the network in each period has different
values. On the other hand, the structural type of network statistics can capture interdependence
among the observations, which is the main departure from baseline regressions that assume the
observations are independent on each other. Configurations such as “two stars” and “geometrically
weighted degree” can estimate the effect of the connections between actors and events in the
network, correcting for bias in the model that may result from such interdependence.
To empirically analyze the theory and arguments presented in this chapter, seven
hypotheses are offered, illustrating the relationship between the explanatory variables and
lobbying behavior as manifested in the rulemaking network. Starting with the interest groups’
decision to lobby or not to lobby the agencies, the two scenarios presented in Figures 6.6 and 6.7
indicate that the challengers to, and defenders of, the status quo would make the same decision
regardless of whether the deck-staking arguments or autopilot arguments is true. Among the seven
144

categories of interest groups, the oil industry and environmentalists are the most involved in the
rulemaking process for oil policy and are usually at odds with each other. Therefore, they can be
considered the challengers and defenders of the status quo, depending on their positions toward
the rules being published. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are offered:
Hypothesis 6-1: The oil industry and environmental groups, as the challengers and
defenders of status quo, make similar decisions, whether to lobby or not to lobby the
agencies in rulemaking.
Hypothesis 6-2: Based on the autopilot argument, the oil industry and environmental
groups are most likely to engage in lobbying efforts if the agencies enjoy a high degree of
discretion in the rulemaking.
Hypothesis 6-3: Based on the deck-stacking argument, the oil industry and environmental
groups are not likely to engage in lobbying efforts if the agencies have limited discretion
in the rulemaking.
The oil industry and the environmentalists are coded as categorical variables and attached
to the nodes in first mode, the actors. Meanwhile, the other five categories become the base or the
reference group for the comparison. Therefore, the directions of the vertex attribute coefficients
estimated indicate whether Hypothesis 6-2 or 6-3 is not to be rejected. If the coefficients of both
interest groups are positive, Hypothesis 6-2 is not rejected while Hypothesis 6-3 is rejected. If the
coefficients are negative, then it is the other way around. However, the direction of the coefficients
is not important as much as the consistency between the signs of coefficients. The oil industry and
environmentalists are most likely to make the same decision about whether to lobby or not lobby
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according to the scenarios in Figures 6.6 and 6.7. So, both coefficients should have the same sign,
either both positive or negative. Otherwise, Hypotheses 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 are rejected.
The next hypothesis addresses the shift from lobbying the political principals to lobbing
the agencies, or the lagged movement. As the main political principals, the congressional hearing
network is analyzed, displaying the most active actors in lobbying Congress and whether they shift
their activities toward the rulemaking network. An association between the lobbying efforts of the
actors in both levels of the networks is expected if the interest groups are concerned about policy
implementation and want to ensure the agencies carry out the program after the coalition that
established the law is disbanded. These interest groups should then appear active in the rulemaking
network as well. Even so, the interest groups that failed to pass a new law or reform in Congress
still have an incentive to engage in the rulemaking process so that they may gain some of what
they could not achieve through lobbying Congress. Therefore, the actors who are increasingly
active in the congressional hearing network are expected to be increasingly active in the
rulemaking networks as well. Otherwise, the assumption of the lobbying shift or the lagged
movement does not hold. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is stated:
Hypothesis 6-4: Actors who increasingly lobby Congress are most likely to lobby the
agencies in the rulemaking process more than the actors who do not lobby Congress.
Lobbying activities toward congressional committees are measured by taking the square
root of degree centrality of the actors in congressional hearing networks, then attaching these
transformed degrees to the rulemaking networks as node attributes for the first mode, the actors.
Thus, the actors with higher degree centralities in the congressional hearing networks are highly
likely to submit comments on the rule and, in turn, increase the chance of observing the edges in
the rulemaking network comparing to those who have low or no degree centrality in the
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congressional network. In addition, if this relation turns out to be positive and significant, it
supports the argument in Hypothesis 6-2 that the agencies enjoy a degree of flexibility according
to the autopilot scenario. The shift in lobbying from political principals to agencies would not
happen unless the interest groups believed the agencies have the necessary discretion to change
the rule in their favor. However, this hypothesis does not address the timing and intensity of
lobbying shifts. It examines whether a shift or lagged movement happens or not. To account for
the timing and intensity of the lobbying effort, variables such as congressional attention,
punctuations, and media coverage should be considered, which are addressed in the following
hypotheses.
In this context, congressional attention is one of the variables that influences the timing
and intensity of the lobbying effort regarding the rulemaking process. As activities increase at the
congressional level, interest groups may prioritize the Congress over the administration since a
limited window for passing a reform might be open. Therefore, they are expected to direct their
time, effort, and resources toward lobbying the congressional committees. By the same logic, when
congressional attention decreases, the interest groups are expected to direct more time and
resources toward lobbying the agencies since there is low chance of passing a reform through
Congress. Hence, they try to get what they want through the rulemaking process. It is an inverse
relationship. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is offered:
Hypothesis 6-5: When congressional attention increases, interest groups are less likely to
devote time and resources to lobbying the agencies and engage in the rulemaking process.
Congressional attention is measured in the total number of hearings regarding oil policy
held in each year. Then it is attached as a network attribute. Here, all edges in the network for a
particular year are given a value equivalent to the number of hearings for that year. Consequently,
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we can track the effect of the change in congressional attention over time. The expectation is to
have a negative correlation between the number of congressional hearings and the probability of
observing edges in the rulemaking network.
Furthermore, the oil price punctuations are another variable effecting the rulemaking
dynamics in a similar way. In general, there is a range where oil prices may increase or decrease
without harming the economy and creating panic. Otherwise, prices could have negative impacts.
Therefore, the focus is on the instances where oil prices dramatically increase or decrease. In fact,
this variable is linked to congressional attention. As discussed in the previous chapter, when oil
prices increase, congressional attention seems to increase as well, creating a situation of
uncertainty that reforms or new laws might pass. Thus, the agencies become more reluctant to
advance new policies and proposed rules. Also, interest groups are most likely to direct their time
and resources toward lobbying Congress. So, activities involved in the rulemaking process
decrease. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is provided:
Hypothesis 6-6: When oil prices dramatically increase or decrease creating punctuated
effects, activities in the rulemaking process are most likely to decrease.
In order to create an indicator for the punctuations in oil prices, the degree to which the
prices went up or down beyond the normal level should be measured. Therefore, this indicator is
determined by counting the number of times prices went beyond the 90% confidence interval of
the price distribution. It is expected that prices would have punctuated effects if located in either
the lower or higher 5% of the overall distribution21. This indicator is built on a quarterly basis. By
considering a two-tailed test, the analysis would produce a score from 0 to 4, which reflects the

21

Also, a range of 95% was applied with 2.5% in both sides of oil prices distribution. It produced less variation and
did not perform well in TERGM.
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number of quarters where the prices fall outside the 90% confidence interval in each year. Then
this two-tailed test is applied on each of the nominal price, the real price, and change rates since
these measurements present different aspects of oil price effects. Next, the scores of the three
measurements are summed up yielding aggregating scores of the punctuated prices. These scores
are attached as network attributes in the same manner as the congressional hearing attributes. For
more details, see Appendix 8. According to the argument discussed above, when the punctuation
happens, most of the attention goes to the Congress while the agencies receive less attention.
Therefore, the expectation is that the oil price punctuations have a negative correlation with the
probability of observing lobbying activity as indicated by the edges in the rulemaking network.
Moreover, this punctuated prices indicator partially captures the impact of other focusing
events, specifically the financial crisis in 2009, the oil spill in 2010, and the collapse of oil prices
in 2015. These events affected the oil market and oil prices changed dramatically during these
years. Still, these events have their unique characteristics that should not mix with the impact of
the prices. The main difference is that these focusing events have a shorter time span whereas the
punctuated oil prices tend to remain for a longer time. Therefore, it is harder to observe the shift
in lobbying or the lagged movement with such continuous effect, especially by visualization. Here,
TERGM should produce a conclusive result that either supports or rejects the argument of this
study.
The final variable that explains the dynamics of the rulemaking process is public and media
attention. Based on the argument presented in this chapter, the public and media attention should
have a positive effect on the lobbying effort toward the rulemaking process. As public attention
increases due to the punctuations, the agencies are put under pressure and more actors tend to be
involved in the rulemaking process conditioned on the activities at the congressional level.
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Therefore, the chance of observing the network ties increases. Here public attention is gauged in
terms of media coverage by counting the number of articles published regarding oil issues in each
year divided by a thousand, and then attaching them as network attributes. Accordingly, the
following hypothesis is conjectured:
Hypothesis 6-7: An increase in public and media attention are most likely to increase
activities in the rulemaking process.
In addition to these explanatory variables, there are set of control terms that are included
in the TERG model to control for alternative explanations and the effects of other variables. First
is the square root of the degree centralities of actors in the first mode of the network. It controls
for the effects of inactive or highly active actors in the network. It may be expected that actors
with higher degree centralities increase the chance of observing an edge. A second control variable
is the policy area being regulated by the rules. It is a nominal/categorical variable attached to the
network as a node attribute. Two policies were included in the TERGM, production policy and
environmental policy whereas the other policy areas (consumption, the economy, international,
and others) were left as the reference group. A third variable is whether it is a significant rule. This
is a dummy variable attached to the second mode of the network, the rule sets. It reflects whether
the rule is significant and therefore it is subject to OMB review. This variable essentially counts
for the effect of the president. When the OMB gets involved, interest groups are expected to lobby
the agencies less than usual. It follows the same logic as the case with Congress. When the political
principals get involved, the agencies receive less attention.
A fourth control factor is whether there are lagged observations (t-1). This is a memory
term reflecting the lagged network. The "stability" option is applied which takes into account the
existence or non-existence of the edges in (t-1). It may indicate that some subjects are being
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regulated repeatedly for a long time. It is expected to be a positive correlation. If an actor is
interested in a specific issue, it probably will submit a comment if that issue is being reviewed
again. Also, if it is not interested, it probably will not submit a comment. As a result, the past
behavior may indicate future actions.
Finally, two network structures are added to the model, the “two stars” term for the
presence of the second mode and as well as “geometrically weighted degree” for second mode.
They are included to capture interdependence within the network. These two terms may be
considered as similar to autocorrelation in regression. Mainly, they are included in the model to
control for some effect that would otherwise bias the results. These structural terms do not bear
theoretical importance relevant to arguments discussed in this chapter. Yet they are necessary from
a methodological point of view. For more information about the coding and models, see Appendix
12.

151

Table 6.1: The Two-Mode TERGM

Type of Statistics

Coefficients

Edges

Structure term

-28.34

Oil Industry

1st-mode attribute

0.22

[ -0.34;

0.59]

Environmentalists

1st-mode attribute

0.13

[ -0.24;

0.46]

Lobbying Congress

1st-mode attribute

0.80

[

1.20] *

Congressional Attention

Edge attribute

-0.11

Actor Centralities

1st-mode attribute

0.98

Oil Price Punctuation

Edge attribute

-6.07

Media Coverage

Edge attribute

2.23

[

Production Policy

2nd-mode attribute

0.42

[ -0.89;

0.70]

Environment Policy

2nd-mode attribute

0.29

[ -0.52;

0.79]

Significant Rules

2nd-mode attribute

-0.53

[ -1.37;

t-1

Structure term
2nd-mode structure
term
2nd-mode structure
term

0.58

The Variables

2-STAR OF THE RULE
GEOMETRICALLY WEIGHTED
DEGREE OF RULES

Num. obs.

confidence interval
[-28.46; -27.33] *

0.57;

[ -0.90;

2.34]

[

0.80;

1.17] *

[-13.36;

-2.93] *

[

0.83;

0.39;

-0.02

[ -0.04;

-2.80

[ -3.29;

2.78] *

-0.16] *
0.88] *
0.00]

-2.07] *

2488260

* 0 outside the confidence interval

The results of the TERGM are presented in Table 6.1. The first term, Edges, is equivalent
to the constant in logistic regression. For Oil Industry and Environmentalists as the challengers
and defenders of status quo, the coefficients of both groups are positive but not significant. Since
their coefficients are in the same direction, Hypothesis 6-1 could not be rejected. Both groups have
made similar decisions, which is to lobby the agencies since the coefficients are positive, indicating
that agencies enjoy at least some degree of discretion. Accordingly, Hypothesis 6-3 is rejected.
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Having positive signs suggest that the deck-stacking argument does not hold, and the rulemaking
process probably behaves in an autopilot manner. However, Hypothesis 6-2 cannot be accepted
either because the coefficients are not significant. So, being members of the oil industry or
environmentalists does not significantly affect the probability of observing a tie in the network.
Also, it could be interpreted as the lobbying behavior of both groups does not differ from that of
other actors nor from each other. So, the other groups engage in lobbying the agencies like oil
industry and environmentalists. Therefore, they do not differ significantly from each other, which
explain the inconclusive results. In addition, it could mean that because there is wide range of
rules, agencies may enjoy discretion in some rules while not in others, which may contribute to
inconclusive results as well. However, since the coefficients are positive, the situation seems to
lean toward the autopilot argument that agencies have at least some degree of discretion that
motivates interest groups to lobby.
As for lobbying the Congress, the model shows a significant and positive coefficient,
indicating that the interest groups that increasingly lobby Congress are most likely to submit
comments on the rulemaking process. In other word, interest groups shift their lobbying effort
from the congressional committees to the agencies. Therefore, Hypothesis 6-4 is not rejected. It
provides evidence for the concept of the lagged movements that actors who lobby congressional
committees, whether challengers or defenders of the status quo, or majority and minority
coalitions, are motivated to lobby the administration. This is to ensure that the agencies carry out
the policy that the political principals adopted or else to gain some of what they failed to achieve
at the principal level. Also, this finding reinforces the argument for the autopilot. The lobbying
shift or lagged movement would not occur unless the interest groups believe that the agencies
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possess reasonable degree of discretion. Otherwise, there is no incentive to lobby the agencies.
Thus, Hypothesis 6-2 cannot be rejected as well.
For the variables that influence the routines and timing of the rulemaking process,
congressional attention appears to have a negative effect on the probability of observing a tie
within the network, but it is not statistically significant. Despite the coefficient being in the
expected direction, Hypothesis 6-5 is rejected since the results are not conclusive. Meanwhile, oil
price punctuations have a significant and negative effect, as we expected. The result supports the
assumption that when punctuations happen, most of the attention goes to the Congress while the
agencies receive less attention. Therefore, Hypothesis 6-6 is not rejected. On the other hand, media
coverage has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of observing the tie in
the network. As public attention increase, the agencies are put under pressure and more actors tend
to become involved in rulemaking process. Thus, Hypothesis 6-7 is not rejected. Although the
effect of congressional attention is not statistically significant, the impacts of oil price punctuations
and media coverage reinforce the perspective that the routines of the rulemaking process and
lobbying dynamics are affected by two opposite tendencies, the public and media pressure, and
the degree of un/certainty at the level of political principals.
Additionally, the control variables show some interesting results. As for the degree
centralities of actors, the model produced a positive and statistically significant coefficient,
indicating that the actors with higher degree centralities increase their chance of observing the
edge. In the meantime, the type of policy being regulated seems to have no effect on the probability
of observing a tie in the network since the coefficients of oil production and environment policies
are not significant. In contrast, rules considered significant generate a negative and statistically
significant impact. Accordingly, the OMB review reflects the involvement of the President as a
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political principal to which interest groups can direct their lobbying effort. Although this study did
not specifically analyze the role of the president in rulemaking, the finding here supports the
overall argument about the relations between the activities at the principal and agent levels.
Finally, the lag in observations (t-1) shows a positive and statistically significant effect as
anticipated.

6.6 The Conclusion: Premises and Limitations.
The aim in this chapter has been to shed light on administrative agenda setting and the
dynamics of the rulemaking process, exhibiting selected characteristics of the lobbying behavior
of interest groups in response to abrupt stimuli. The main contribution is that it establishes the link
between the activities at the political principal level, especially the policy subsystem, with the
activities at the level of the agencies. As a result, the rulemaking process can be understood in a
broader context. Here, network analysis has provided tools to examine the relationships between
actors at both the principals’ and agents’ levels as well as the actions and reactions of competing
parties in the process of rulemaking. Although the focus has been on the activities of the
congressional committees as the main principal in the rulemaking process, the analysis could be
extended to include the roles of the President and the courts, displaying how multiple principals
influence the routines and outcomes of the rulemaking process. That analysis is beyond the scope
of this dissertation and is reserved for future research.
However, the analysis has faced several limitations. Mainly, social network analysis (SNA)
and exponential-family random graph models (ERGM) currently cannot handle a network with
more than two types of nodes. Meanwhile, the analysis here deals with three types of nodes:
congressional hearings, rules, and interest groups. A network model with three modes or higher
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has not been developed yet. Since a network with only two modes can currently be constructed,
the analysis has to be divided into two networks; one includes the congressional hearings and
interest groups as discussed in Chapter 5, and the other includes the rule sets and interest groups
as presented in this chapter. Consequently, the information has to be extracted from the
congressional hearing network and then attached to the rulemaking networks. This may not be the
best solution, but it is the only one available. There are several structural configurations that could
produce theoretical importance if congressional hearings and rulemaking networks could be
combined into a three-mode network. Until then, the approach used here remains the best way to
handle such complexity. For TERGM diagnoses and the goodness of fit, see Appendix 12.
Moreover, the TERGM was not able to model three important events/punctuations, the
financial crisis in 2009, the Deepwater horizon oil spill in 2010, and the price war of OPEC leading
to bankruptcy within the fracking industry in 2014. When dummy variables for these events are
added to the model, TERGM produces errors that the model suffers from collinearity. A simple
linear regression model with 16 time points and 3 dummy variables would suffer the same problem.
Fortunately, the effects of these focusing events have been partially captured through the oil price
punctuations. Also, these focusing events were visually presented and discussed; therefore, the
viewers can observe the change in rulemaking dynamics at the time of punctuations and postpunctuations even if empirical estimation is currently beyond the limitations of the modeling tools.
Finally, the TERGM depends on simulating random networks and comparing the observed
network with the distribution of these randomly generated networks, displaying whether the
observed network and its statistics differ significantly from what would happen by random chance.
Therefore, the results of TERGM are confined to the networks being studied. Other networks
concerning different policies may exhibit distinctive structures, which limit the ability to make
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broad generalizations based on the case being studied here. Thus, a comparative method may be
more suitable. By comparing the behavior of several networks in different policy sectors,
generalizations about the rulemaking process and role of political principals might be offered.
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Chapter 7: Rulemaking Outputs and the Beneficiaries of
Administrative Actions

7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the dynamics of the rulemaking process was studied, providing
explanations for the initiation and finalization of rules, and examining lobbying patterns toward
agencies. Yet, it does not explain the outputs of rulemaking. Who are the beneficiaries of agencies’
actions? Why do agencies respond to some interest groups over others? How does the relationship
between interest groups and political principals influence the agencies’ decisions? In an attempt to
answer these questions, I discuss the determinants of rulemaking outputs, providing an argument
for how these determinants work. Then, as the dependent variable, an explanation is provided for
how the beneficiaries of rulemaking are ascertained, alongside a description of the coding process
used to reveal this explanation. Next, I describe the method for constructing the network that
presents the interactions between the interest groups and the agencies. In order to exhibit the
responses of agencies as to what interest groups demand, a two-mode network with a structural
zeros format is constructed, providing examples and allowing visualization of such networks.
Subsequently, I conjecture several hypotheses in order to examine the argument in this chapter,
emphasizing the causal relationship between the agencies’ responses and rulemaking
determinants. Having done that, I then run a two-mode ERGM with structural zeros and ascertain
the validity, or lack thereof, of the argument presented in here. Finally, a conclusion and discussion
with interpretations and limitations of the model are given.
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7.2 The Elements of Influence as a Determinant of Rulemaking Outputs.
To display the outputs of the rulemaking process and the factors that dictate administrative
actions, the analysis of the beneficiaries of rulemaking bears importance. By tracking who the
beneficiaries are and under which conditions interest groups succeed in changing the content of
rules, a better picture of the behavior and the responses of agencies may be portrayed. Therefore,
I am looking to ascertain which parties are the recipients of agencies’ actions, and whether the
administrative rules are advantageous to those recipients. After identifying the participants in
rulemaking, I determine what they want from the agencies. In other words, what are the requests
of the interest groups? Then I analyze the final rules to exhibit the responses of the agencies to
these requests, whether they benefit from these participants or not. Specifically, the beneficiary
variable depends on the analysis of request-response actions, as being a beneficiary of a rule rests
on whether the related agency responds to or denies the request(s) of that participant in rulemaking.
For example, if a participant proposes a specific regulation and the relevant agency responds by
issuing that regulation, then this participant is considered as a beneficiary of rulemaking. So, by
analyzing the request-response actions, the beneficiaries may be identified and then it is possible
to turn to why the agencies respond to some participants while not to others. Also, by tracking the
administrative actions, the conditions under which the agencies change their response from one
set of participants to another can be measured.
In this regard, I argue that the participants or actors that influence the policy subsystem and
network are probably the beneficiaries of rulemaking. Therefore, analyzing the composition of the
policy network is important for displaying different actors and coalitions involved in rulemaking
and to what extent they influence it. In view of that, three elements of influence within the policy
network are offered that need to be considered; the lobbying effort, power and resources, and
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degree of consensus. For lobbying effort, I am looking at actors and coalitions involved in the
network and to whom they connect. Power and resources, as another element of influence, is
manifest in formal legal authority, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial
resources, and/or skillful leadership (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 201–3). Accordingly, the coalition
that devotes more effort to lobbying and possesses more resources is more influential and is more
likely to receive an optimal response from agencies.
In addition, influence in the policy network is not confined to lobbying the agencies alone.
It incorporates lobbying political principals as well. Since agencies are somehow obliged to
respond to principals such as congressional sub/committees or the President, then we expect that
whoever can influence these principals will receive desired responses from the agencies. For
example, if a specific coalition asks a particular agency for a regulation, its likelihood of obtaining
that regulation is enhanced if this coalition can influence the sub/committee(s) that have authority
over that particular agency. Thus, it is important to determine whether the actors that are lobbying
the agencies are also lobbying the related congressional committees at the same time.
As a way to influence administrative policy and the outputs of rulemaking, interest groups
engage in coalition building and lobbying where the interest groups in fact lobby each other,
forming coalitions that can affect agencies’ policy decisions. Coalition lobbying is perceived to be
among the influential tactics that interest groups rely on (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner
and Leech 1998; Heinz, Laumann, and Nelson 1993; Hula 1999; Loomis 1986). By building a
coalition, the uniformity of the message sent to policymakers is increased. The larger the
coalitions, the more effective they are (Nelson and Yackee 2012). Here, both direct and indirect
influence between interest groups and agencies is considered. Therefore, it is central to be able to
present the relationships among the participants in the rulemaking network and the congressional
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network as well as other principals. In other words, the beneficiaries are the ones that have a higher
degree of influence or connection in both levels of policy networks.
However, while both influencing the lobbying effort and possession of resources are
necessary conditions, they are not sufficient. As Nelson and Yackee (2012) and Sabatier and
Weible (2007, 199–200) have pointed out, the success of the dominant coalition is conditioned on
whether there is consensus within the lobbying coalition (Nelson and Yackee 2012; Sabatier and
Weible 2007, 199–200). Thus, the analysis of the content of the rules along with the comments of
interest groups is vital to understanding and explaining the outputs of the rulemaking process.
Particularly, I seek to determine if the actors within the same coalition have the same position
toward the rules being considered. As the actors and their coalitions hold a higher degree of
consensus, the likelihood of being the beneficiaries of rulemaking is increased. In sum, what
matters is not only the size and resources of the coalitions that influence the lobbying effort, but
also the degree of consensus within these coalitions. So, any analysis of the network that governs
rulemaking should focus on lobbying efforts, resources, and the degree of consensus as three key
elements of influence within the network at the levels of both agencies and principals. These
elements can determine the outputs of the rulemaking process.

7.3 The Beneficiaries of the Agencies’ Responses as the Dependent Variable
To determine the agencies’ actions, the administrative rules are studied as the main units
of analysis. Since the dependent variable is the output of the rulemaking process as manifested by
the beneficiaries, the content of the administrative rules is analyzed, comparing the proposed
versions of the rules with their final versions. In particular, the aim is to demonstrate whether the
agencies finalize their rules as they were originally proposed or if there are changes; and if the
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change occurs, determining in which direction (more or less regulation). Additionally, prerulemaking activities in the analysis are included if they were published. As some students of
rulemaking indicate, pre-rulemaking activities play an important role in the agenda setting of the
rulemaking process, and the parties that participate early in the pre-rulemaking activities influence
the content of the proposed rules and are well-positioned during the rulemaking process (Naughton
et al. 2009; Yackee 2012). In this case, the pre-rule (the Advance Notice of Proposed Rules) is
considered as the initial version and the proposed rule as the final version, and then the same
proposed rule once again is analyzed as the initial version and its final version as the final rule.
Specifically, the focus is on rules that were open for public comments so that the influence
of interest groups’ lobbying can be observed. Nonetheless, not all rules are open for public
comments, in which case it was not possible to identify the requests of interest groups and whether
they succeeded in influencing the content of those rules. In contrast, there are some instances where
a final rule that was open for public comments is issued without a prior notice or a proposed
version, only to have another final rule be issued modifying the content of the previous rule in
response to the demands received from commenters on the first rule. In this case, the first final rule
is treated as the proposed version of the rule and the second as the final version of the rule. As for
the data, the rules are primarily collected from the official website of regulations
(www.regulation.gov) and the federal register website (https://www.federalregister.gov/) where rules

and their comments are published. For more details, see Chapter 4 section 4.2.
The aim here is to exhibit the agencies’ responses to interest group lobbying, as to who
gets the desired response. Therefore, the two-mode network or bipartite matrix is applied where
the interest groups or actors are in one set while the agencies are in the other. Like the network of
rulemaking lobbying dynamics discussed in the previous chapter, the only ties allowed in the two-
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mode network are from one set of nodes to the other, but no tie exists within the same set of nodes.
So, the interest groups can contact the agencies requesting a specific action, and the agencies may
respond back to the requests of these groups. Because of data limitations, this model of the network
structure doesn’t allow for interest groups contacting each other, and likewise for the agencies.
Generally, the method of the tie building and coding process is similar to what Yackee has
described in several articles (McKay and Yackee 2007; Nelson and Yackee 2012; Yackee 2006).
Subsequently, the interest groups are classified according to their positions: anti-regulation or proregulation. In order to accomplish this, the comments on the rules are analyzed, determining who
requests less regulation at one end of the continuum and who requests more regulation at the other
end. In the middle of the continuum are the comments that agree with the content of the rule and
request no changes. In view of that determination, the code for these requests is (-1) for less
regulation, (0) for no change, and (1) for more regulation. The direction of these requests is
important in determining the responses of agencies.
In this context, the interest groups may request more than one action regarding the same
rule depending on how many issues are being regulated, and these requests do not necessarily have
the same directions. They may ask for more regulation regarding one issue, and less regulation on
another issue within the same rule. In this situation, each regulated issue and its related requests is
treated as a separate unit of analysis regardless of being in the same rule. These requests
hypothetically construct direct ties between interest groups and agencies in the network, where the
interest groups are the senders and the agencies are the receivers. So, a binary two-mode network
is constructed based on whether the interest groups requested an action or not. In any given rule,
an interest group has no more than one tie for each regulated issue, but it may have several
edges/ties in the same rule according to the number of issued being addressed in the rule.
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To construct the ties or the edges sent back from agencies to interest groups, I analyze
agencies’ responses regarding each regulated issue. By tracking the changes in the content of the
rules from the proposed to the final versions, I can examine whether the agencies respond with
less regulation, more regulation, or no change, giving them similar coding (-1 = a less regulatory
response, 0 = no change, or 1 = more regulation). Then codes of the interest groups’ requests are
compared with the coding of the agencies’ responses in each regulated issue. If there is a match
between what interest groups requested in the proposed rule and how the agencies responded in
the final rule, a tie exists; otherwise, the tie is absent. For example, if an interest group requested
more regulation in its comment on a proposed rule and the related agency responded with more
regulation in the final rule, then there is a match, and the tie sent back from the agency to that
interest group would be coded. If there is no matching between requests and responses, then there
is no tie. Hence, there are three cases where request-response match would occur:
-

If an interest group demands less regulation (-1) and the agencies respond with less
regulation (-1), the reciprocated tie exists.

-

If an interest group demands no change (0) and the agencies respond with no change
(0), the reciprocated tie exists.

-

If an interest group demands more regulation (1) and the agencies respond with more
regulation (1), the reciprocated tie exists.

-

Otherwise, the tie does not exist.

However, the tie that expresses “no change” may appear controversial, especially when the
request for “no change” met with the “no change” action. It may be argued that since there is
nothing happened, then why this tie exists. In order to achieve a better understanding of this, a
distinction should be made between lobbying to change the status quo, in general, and lobbying to
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change a specific section within a rule from the proposed to the final version. Interest groups may
put pressure on an agency to change the status quo and issue a rule. Once the proposed rule is
issued, it indicates that an attempt to change the status quo is made. In this case, the reaction of
interest groups will differ according to their positions. The defenders of the status quo will ask for
repealing the proposed changes or at least they will ask for less regulation, which I code as (-1).
In contrast, the challengers of the status quo will support the proposed changes and ask to finalize
the rule as it is proposed without further changes, which is coded (0) since “no changes” were
requested to be made in the final version of the rule. So, the application of “no changes” ties is
limited to this phase of rulemaking. In this case, nevertheless, the code (0) for “no change,” is in
fact a code for supporting the change of status quo originally proposed by the agency as it satisfies
the causes of the challengers to the status quo. On another case, the challengers may not be happy
with what is being proposed and ask for further changes, which I code as (1) as more regulations
were requested. In sum, this code is applied specifically to the changes that occur between the
proposed and final version of the rules, and the existence of the tie depends on the action of the
related agency, to which requests it responds. So, I treated “no change” requests as any other
request that is delivered by interest groups and may receive a desired response. Thus, the
interpretation of the “no change” tie should not extend outside that phase of rulemaking.
In view of the ties created by complementary requests and responses, the beneficiaries of
the rules are displayed by who gets reciprocal ties from the agencies. In other words, this
reciprocity represents the requests from interest groups and the responses back from agencies in
final rules. For a visual illustration, Figure 7.1 demonstrates a hypothetical example for how the
beneficiary network looks. In this network, there are three interest groups (IG1, IG2, and IG3)
lobbying an agency (AG). Two of them, IG1 and IG2, requested more regulation (1) while the
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third group, IG3, asked for less regulation (-1). Accordingly, the blue lines or ties represent the
requests sent from the interest groups to the agency, and the numbers on these ties reflect the
directions of requests for more or less regulation. On the other hand, the agency responded with
more regulation (1). Since there was a match between the requests of IG1 and IG2, and the
response of the agency AG, the red lines show the reciprocal ties from AG to IG1 and IG2, and
the numbers on these ties reflect the direction of the responses. Meanwhile, the request of IG3 was
denied; therefore, the reciprocal tie does not appear. In sum, the reciprocity exhibits the
beneficiaries of rules.
Figure 7.1: An Example for the Beneficiaries of Rulemaking

7.4 The Construction of the Request-Response (RR) Network with Structural Zeros.
However, portraying the request-response (RR) network in the way the Figure 7.1 depicted
is not possible under the current software packages that run exponential random graph models
(ERGM) with two-mode networks, especially the “ergm” package developed by Handcock et al.
(2018) and Hunter et al. (2008b). For one reason, the RR network is a directed two-mode network
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where the requests are sent from interest groups to agencies, and the responses are sent back from
the agencies to interest groups. Meanwhile, the existing packages can only run ERGM on nondirected two-mode networks which do not recognize this reciprocity. The other reason is that
ERGM, like the other types of regressions, is designed to model one dependent variable or
dependent relation in the network; whereas the RR network embodies two types of relations,
request relations and response relations. Therefore, the RR network should be divided to two
networks. One represents the request ties while the other represents the response ties, and then run
the request network as an independent network with the response network as the dependent.
Fortunately, ERGM can run a matrix with a structural zeros format that can be utilized to combine
the two relations of requests and responses in one network. Accordingly, the dependent network
is constrained by the independent network where the possible ties in the dependent network do not
exceed the actual count of ties in the independent network. For more details about ERGM with
structural zeros, see Heaney and Leifeld (2018). Since the agencies have only two choices about
whether to respond to a request, so the tie exists, or to deny a request, so the tie is absent, the total
number of responses cannot surpass the actual number of requests; otherwise, the agencies would
respond to non-existing requests.
To illustrate the application of ERGM with structural zeros, Figures 7.2 and 7.3 present a
hypothetical example for how the structural-zeros matrix is constructed. Here we have two-mode
network reflecting a rule that regulated four issues (Issue 1, Issue 2, Issue 3, and Issue 4) and
received requests from six interest groups (IG1, IG2, IG3, IG4, IG5, and IG6). So, the green cells
represent the requests submitted by the interest groups regarding each regulated issue as it appears
in Figure 7.2. For example, Issue 1 received requests from four interest groups IG1, IG2, IG3, and

167

IG4. Meanwhile, interest groups IG5 and IG6 submitted nothing regarding Issue 1; therefore, they
are given zeros as it appears in the gray cells.
When it comes to responses, the sponsored agency has two choices whether to respond to
or deny the demands of the four interest groups, IG1, IG2, IG3, and IG4, who submitted requests.
Meanwhile, interest groups, IG5 and IG6, are not relevant since they have not submitted any
requests as they appear in the gray cells with NA (not applicable) in Figure 7.3. Herein, the interest
groups that received the desired responses are given a code of (1) while the ones who did not are
given a code of (0). In other words, the network and in turn an ERGM is instructed to exclude the
gray cells with NA from the computation so that we ensure that total number of responses does
not exceed the number of requests when simulation is run. Otherwise, the sponsored agency would
be allowed to respond to non-existing requests.

Figure 7.2: A Hypothetical Example for a Structural-Zeros Request Matrix
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Figure 7.3: A Hypothetical Example for a Structural-Zeros Response Matrix

Since we have a two-mode independent network with 4 nodes of regulated issues (V = 4)
and 6 nodes of interest groups (U = 6), then the total number of possible ties are (𝑉 × 𝑈) =
4 × 6 = 24, which in this example represents the maximum possible number of request ties from
the interest groups to the agencies. Since agencies received 11 request ties (E=11) reflected by the
𝐸

11

total number of green cells in Figure 7.2, the request network yields a density of 𝑉×𝑈 = 24 = 0.46.
Meanwhile, the agency has responded to 6 requests out of 11. Hence, the response network in
Figure 7.3 has 6 ties (𝐸′= 6) with a density of

𝐸′
𝐸

=

6
11

= 0.55. Despite both networks having

the same number of nodes, the possible response ties in the dependent network cannot exceed the
count of the actual request ties in the independent network. In other words, the agencies respond
to 6 requests out of 11; therefore, the denominator in the density equation of responses network is
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11, not the maximum number of request ties 24. Here, the ERGM simulation is not about how
many possible request ties there are. It is about the number of possible response ties.
This coding process is applied on the selected rules. It would be ideal if the 638 rules that
regulate the oil sector could be included. However, such inclusion requires performing content
analysis of thousands of pages of the rules and tens of thousands of comments submitted by interest
groups so that the requests and responses could be matched. Given that interest groups usually
submit several requests for each rule, the number of regulated issues to be analyzed increases
exponentially. Consequently, coding this by hand is beyond the ability of any single individual to
accomplish. It would require a research team to analyze the content of the huge number of rules
and their comments and/or utilizing text analysis software. Therefore, a limited number of rules
were selected considering the time and resources available for this work.
As a starting point, the rules initiated in period 2009-2012 are identified because this period
encompasses the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 as one of the focusing
events that significantly affects the oil sector. This allows the changes in the RR network in the
equilibrium, punctuation, and post-punctuation periods to be observed. Then the focus shifts to
rules promulgated within administrative programs that were consistently present during the 20092012 period. Thus, the agencies’ responses regarding the same type of issues or policy could be
tracked. Accordingly, two EPA programs are identified: The Renewable Fuel Program (RFP) that
attracts interest groups from all over the country, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) that targets different geographic sites to be designated as
Superfund sites. Subsequently, the NCP attracts local interest groups from the targeted areas.
After excluding the EPA rules that do not belong to the two selected programs and the rules
enacted by other agencies as well, 13 rules and their comments are identified. Five of them
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promulgated under the RFP while the others are under the NCP. Next, the content of selected rules
and their comments is analyzed, specifying 72 regulated issues and 280 actors submitted 422
requests. Those actors include a wide range of interests from the oil industry and environmentalists
to the biofuels industry. Also, trivial actors such as individuals and anonymous commenters were
not excluded since the network size is manageable. Meanwhile, the EPA responded to 274 requests
out of 422.
Figure 7.4: The Request-Response (RR) Network with Structural Zeros

However, there is a time overlap where the rules were open for comments in one year and
finalized in the next years. Therefore, all requests and responses are combined or collapsed into
one network. This is more suitable for running a two-mode ERGM with structural zeros.
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Nonetheless, the changes over time will be modeled by attaching the values of the variables that
change over time as edge attributes. The details of how to code these variables is explained later
in section 7.5 of this chapter. Consequently, the RR network is constructed as bipartite network
where the first mode has 280 actors and the second mode has 72 regulated issues, with a density
equals to

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑠

274

= 422 = 0.65. For the purpose of visualization, the RR network is plotted in

Figure 7.4. For more details the coding process and visualization, see the Appendix 13.

7.5 The Examination of the Elements of Influence as the Independent Variables.
As was discussed above, the beneficiaries are ascertained by who receives the desired
responses and there are three determinants that presumably increase the probability of receiving
response ties. The first determinant is lobbying effort, which considers the activities that go beyond
just sending requests to the agencies. The aim is to gauge two aspects of lobbying effort, lobbying
the principals and coalition lobbying. For lobbying the principals, I am looking at whether the
interest groups have appeared before the congressional hearings at the time the requests were
submitted to the agencies. This assumes that groups that have access to Congress would use their
relationships to influence the agencies’ decisions. The second aspect of lobbying effort is coalition
lobbying in which the interest groups lobby each other to build coalitions that could put pressure
on the agencies and influence the rulemaking outputs. Accordingly, two hypotheses are stated:
Hypothesis 7-1: Actors who increasingly lobby Congress are more likely to receive their
desired responses from agencies than actors who do not lobby Congress.
Hypothesis 7-2: Actors who engage in coalition lobbying are more likely to receive their
desired responses from agencies than actors who do not lobby with coalitions.
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To measure lobbying effort toward Congress, I focus on the activities of actors in a
congressional hearing network previously presented in Chapter 5, gauging the normalized degree
centralities of actors in the years they submitted requests. Since the RR network covers four years
from 2009 to 2012, each actor has four different degree centrality scores, and it is not feasible to
attach them as the actors’ attributes because all requests and responses of any actor are collapsed
on one network regardless of the years they were submitted. Therefore, it is appropriate to assign
the normalized degree centralities of the actors as edge/ties attributes. So, we could have one node
with four scores that are distributed over its ties based on the years when the requests happened.
In this way, changes over time is taken into account even though they are present in a single
network.
As for coalition lobbying, I look at whether the actor or interest group submitted joint
comment(s) with other organizations as an indicator of coalition lobbying. It is not the only
indicator as several interest groups may also form a coalition and each one submits separate a
comment that has the same request as the other members in the coalition. To capture that behavior,
other studies have run surveys asking the interest groups to identify their coalition members
(Heaney and Leifeld 2018; Nelson and Yackee 2012). Such surveys are more reliable when the
information about coalitions is collected at, or near, the time of the actions. However, doing so
retrospectively for coalitions that formed in the past is less reliable. However, the joint comments
do provide a chronological record of coalition lobbying. Since the actors may engage in coalition
lobbying regarding one rule, but not in another, joint comments are attached as edge attributes to
the requests of all participants of these joint comments. If the actor submits a joint comment, it is
coded (1). Otherwise, it is zero.

173

The second determinant is the element of power. One of the important elements of power
available for interest groups in the rulemaking process is information. The APA sets its evidentiary
standard to require agencies to establish cause-effect relationships and build administrative
decisions upon strong evidence that could stand before the courts. Interest groups can take
advantage of such requirements and provide information that either supports or challenges the
cause-effect relationship, depending on their position regarding the status quo. Therefore, agencies
are expected to look with great consideration at the information provided in comments before
finalizing the rules. Accordingly, I analyze the content of these comments regarding each regulated
issue in order to see whether the interest groups provided information such as new facts, articles
or research, analytic and scientific explanation, and/or surveys. In other word, the information
variable is concerned with any materials that could establish or challenge the cause-effect
relationship. So, if a comment is associated with information, it is coded (1) and attached as an
edge attribute to the tie between the interest groups and agencies. Otherwise, a zero is attached to
the tie. Thus, the following hypothesis is stated:
Hypothesis 7-3: Actors who provide information in their comments have a higher
probability of receiving desired responses from agencies than actors who do not provide
information.
The third determinant is the degree of consensus. As Nelson & Yackee (2012) and Sabatier
& Weible (2007, 199–200) indicated, the success of dominant actors or coalitions is conditional
upon their degree of consensus. If a coalition or a specific type of interest group can dominate the
comment process, they are most likely to receive an desired response from the agency that
regulates the issue concerned. It is common to face counter-lobbying, which may reduce the
effectiveness of actors and coalitions in influencing administrative decisions. Agencies would be
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under more pressure if the interest groups are united than if they compete with each other. Also,
the size of the coalitions matters. If a large number of interest groups take the same position in
lobbying the agencies, they are expected to be more effective than if there were a smaller number
lobbying the agencies. Accordingly, I state the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7-4: Agencies are more likely to respond to actors and coalitions who exhibit
a higher degree of consensus than the actors and coalitions who do not.
Hypothesis 7-5: The larger the size of the consensus, the more effective the lobbyists are
in influencing the agencies’ decisions.
To measure the degree of consensus among different types of actors in the network as well
as among actors within the same type of interest groups, the positions of actors should be
determined. As a start, I gauge how many actors requested less regulation, no change, and more
regulation regarding each regulated issue. Then I look at the percentage of each type of requests
to total number of requests, and then attached these percentages to their corresponding edges. For
example, if there are 10 actors, and seven of them submit requests for more regulation, two for no
change and one for more regulation, then their percentages are 70%, 20%, and 10% respectively.
Next, I assign the proportions of each type of request as edge attributes. Accordingly, a score of
0.7 is attached to the request ties of the seven actors who requested more regulation, 0.2 is attached
to the request ties of the two actors who request no change, and 0.1 attached to the actor who
requested less regulation. Consequently, the probability of the seven actors receiving their desired
response is expected to be higher than the others. However, if we have 100 actors instead of 10 in
the same example, more pressure is put on the agencies. So, it is expected that the probability of
70 actors requesting more regulation to receive their desired responses is higher than the
probability of 7 actors doing so. In sum, the effectiveness of the consensus variable is conditioned
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on the number of total requests. To capture this effect, I create a multiplicative term between the
proportions of consensus and number of requests regarding each regulated issued, and its
coefficient is expected to be positive.
In addition, several control and contextual variables are added to the analysis to account
for alternative explanations and improve the specification of the model. I included the two types
of interest groups that are generally considered to be the defenders and challengers of the status
quo, the oil industry and environmentalists. They are included as a nominal variable in the first
mode, the actors, while all other groups are set to be the base for comparison. Also, a dummy
variable for whether the rule is significant or not is assigned to the second mode to account for the
involvement of the President through the OMB review process. To consider the effects of the
punctuation and post-punctuation, I add a dummy variable for the ties of requests that occurred
during the 2010 oil spill disaster in Gulf of Mexico and another dummy variable for ties that
happened after the disaster. Furthermore, the two stars term for the first mode and the
geometrically weighted degree coefficient for the second mode are added to the model to capture
the interdependence within the network and produce a better model specification. Like the model
in Chapter 6, those structural terms do not bear theoretical importance relevant to arguments here.
Nevertheless, they are necessary from a methodological point of view. For more information about
the coding procedures, visualization, model and goodness of fit, see Appendix 13.
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Table 7.1: The Two-mode ERGM with Structural Zeros for the RR Network
THE VARIABLES
TYPE OF
COEFFICIENTS
STD. ERROR
STATISTICS
0.62
(0.91)
Edges
Structure term
11.04
(0.34) ***
Lobbying Congress
Edge attribute
-0.95
(0.47) *
Coalition lobbying
Edge attribute
-1.25
(0.28) ***
Information
Edge attribute
4.42
(0.83) ***
Consensus
Edge attribute
-0.00
(0.01)
Edge attribute
Consensus x number of
requests
-2.29
(0.60) ***
Oil industry
1st-mode attribute
-0.01
(0.56)
Environmentalists
1st-mode attribute
1.26
(0.39) **
Significant rules
2nd-mode attribute
-2.54
(0.68) ***
Punctuation
Edge attribute
-1.56
(0.74) *
Post-punctuation
Edge attribute
0.16
(0.08) *
2-star of the actors
1st-mode structure
term
(0.55) ***
Geometrically weighted
2nd-mode structure -4.06
degree of the issues/rules
term
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

7.6 The Results of the Two-mode ERGM with Structural Zeros
Table 7.1 shows the results of the two-mode ERGM with structural zeros. As for the effect
of lobbying efforts, the model demonstrates that the interest groups that have access to Congress
and actively lobbying the congressional committees are most likely to receive their desired
responses as the coefficient is positive and significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 7-1 is supported.
This finding displays how the involvement of political principals can influence agencies decisions.
On the other hand, the coefficient of coalition lobbying is significant and negative, which is in the
opposite direction to what is expected. Thus, the Hypothesis 7-2 is rejected. This is puzzling. Other
empirical studies, as well, found negative causal relations between coalition lobbying and policy
changes. At best, they failed to establish such causal relation, indicating there are no tangible
benefits from coalition lobbying (Gray and Lowery 1998; Haider-Markel 2006; Heinz, Laumann,
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and Nelson 1993). In contrast, Nelson and Yackee (2012) were notably able to specify some
conditions under which coalition lobbying affect rulemaking outputs. Yet, they failed to account
for the interdependencies among the actors, which return us to the reason for applying social
network analysis and ERGM in the first place. In general, there is still debate about the effect of
coalition lobbying, and more study is needed to sort out this issue.
As for information as an element of power, the coefficient turns out to be significant and
negative in contrast to what is expected. Interest groups that associate data and information with
their comments seems to reduce their chances of receiving the response they desire. Accordingly,
Hypothesis 7-3 is rejected. Like coalition lobbying, the effect of information might be conditioned
on other variables. At this point, I do not have a plausible explanation for this unexpected result.
In the meantime, the degree of consensus appears to have a positive and significant effect that if
the actors agree on a unified position in their requests regarding a regulated issue, the agencies are
more likely to grant them their desired responses. Hence, Hypothesis 7-4 is supported.
Nonetheless, the multiplicative term between the degree of consensus and the number of requests
seems to be insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 7-5 is rejected suggesting that the size of the
group consensus does not additionally influence the agencies’ decisions.
In summation, the analysis of the three determinants of rulemaking outputs - lobbying
effort, the element of power, and consensus - shows mix results in that some aspects of these
arguments are supported while other are not. Importantly, lobbying Congress as one aspect of
lobbying effort displays the role of political principals in shaping the rulemaking outputs and to
what extent activities at both the principal and agent levels are connected. Meanwhile, coalition
lobbying as the other aspect of lobbying effort, and information content as an element of power
appear to be counterproductive in reducing the chances of interest groups receiving desired
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responses. As for the third determinant, the results of the analysis illustrate the degree to which the
consensus is influential. However, when it comes to the size of consensus, the result is not
conclusive. Even though not all determinants of the rulemaking were confirmed as expected, two
important elements, lobbying Congress and degree of consensus, appeared to be significant and in
the right direction. Therefore, the overall argument of the study is at least partially supported.
Not only are actors who have higher degree of influence in rulemaking process likely to be
the beneficiaries of agencies’ actions, but also are actors who enjoy higher degree of influence at
principal level, especially congressional committees. Thus, separating the activities at the
congressional level, as they are only related to the stage of agenda setting, from the activities at
the rulemaking process, as they are only related to the stage of policy implementation, is not
accurate anymore. The rulemaking outputs could be explained by considering the parallel activities
at levels of both principals and agents. This finding is the main contribution of this dissertation to
the literature of policy subsystem and public policy in general.
Furthermore, the control variables uncover some additional aspects of agencies’ behavior.
For the type of interests, agencies seem to be systematically denying the requests of the oil industry
compared to other types of interest groups as the significant negative coefficient demonstrates.
Meanwhile, the responses of agencies toward the environmental groups do not statistically differ
from the responses toward other types of interests as that coefficient is insignificant. Here the
context of where and when the administrative decisions were made should be considered. The
agencies made their decisions under the Obama administration, which may be seen as less friendly
toward the oil industry. Also, both programs, the RFP and the NCP, are sponsored by EPA. So,
this behavior might be related to the nature of the agency itself. EPA may well be more hostile
toward the oil industry as one of the industries causing pollution. Other agencies may exhibit
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different behavior. Moreover, timing may play role here since most of agencies’ decisions were
made during and after the oil spill in 2010 where the pressure and tone of public opinion and media
coverage were against the oil industry. It could well be the mix of all of the above factors, which
explains the negative reactions toward the oil industry, while not necessarily favoring the
environmental groups.
Also, the coefficient for significant rules that are subject to OMB review is positive and
statistically significant, indicating that the actors have a higher probability of receiving their
desired responses for rules under OMB review in general, but it does not explain who has more
influence over others. One way to answer this is to analyze the meetings that OMB holds with
interest groups regulating the proposed rules reported in reginfo.gov. Unfortunately, for the years
before 2014, the reginfo.gov database just reports the parties who were involved in the meetings
without specifying which rules are the subject of discussion. Thus, any connection between interest
groups lobbying OMB and their influence over the agencies’ decisions cannot be established in
the period 2009-2012 since these meetings could be for any rules, even ones that are not related to
oil policy. For the effects of the punctuation and the post-punctuation period, the model shows that
the agencies are less responsive to actors’ requests during and after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon
oil spill as the coefficients of both regressors are negative and significant. Finally, the model’s
structural terms, two stars and geometrically weighted degree, appears to be significant, which is
important to account for the interdependency within the network. Failing to account for network
interdependency when it exists may be seen as analogous to failing to correct for a statistical
problem in a regression model, such as autocorrelation.
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7.7 Conclusion and Discussion.
Herein, several considerations should be taking into account in interpreting the model
results. Most importantly, demonstrating the effect of the punctuations on the rulemaking outputs
is problematic to some extent. Because of the relatively long period between the initiation and
finalization of the rules, the causal relationship between punctuations and changes in agencies’
decisions is difficult to display. On average, the agencies took 231.6 days, about seven and half
months, to finalize the 13 rules that were analyzed in this chapter. Hypothetically, that is enough
time to absorb the pressure generated by such a punctuation. As was discussed in Chapter 6, the
initiation of proposed rules and the lobbying dynamics of interest groups are to great extent
influenced by such punctuations and post-punctuation periods. Meanwhile, the finalization of rules
exhibits a different pattern that is affected by other factors such the change in structures and
balance within the oil policy network at the level of political principals.
Herein, Yackee (2006) provides an explanation for how the activities at the principal level
could affect the rulemaking outputs and in turn how the effects of punctuations could be inferred.
When the attention of Congress and President increases, agencies are obliged to respond to their
wishes over those of the interest groups. Therefore, agencies were less responsive to the interest
groups’ requests during the punctuation of oil spill in 2010 as the attention of principals was high
at that time. Also, the principals’ attention continues be high in 2011 and 2012 as a result of
dramatic increases in oil prices, which explains the negative coefficient of the post-punctuation
period of the oil spill. Here, the advantageous interest groups are the ones who have access to
political principals since they can use their access to congressional committees to influence the
agencies’ decisions which was empirically demonstrated as the coefficient for lobbying Congress
was positive and significant. Since the punctuation disturbs the balance and redistributes power
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and resources within the policy subsystem and networks, determining the direction of the effect
and the type of interests that benefit from such disturbance is not easy task. Despite being the
dominant groups in the congressional network, requests submitted by the oil industry were
systematically denied by the EPA, which implies that the oil industry lost their control during and
after the oil spill punctuation. However, environmentalists are not necessarily the beneficiaries of
such change. The agencies’ responses toward environmental groups were not significantly
different from other groups as Table 7.1 shows.
In addition, lagged movement offers another mechanism for how the effect of the
punctuation manifests. Whether or not the interest groups succeed in passing a reform through
Congress at the time of the punctuation, the competing groups shift their lobbying effort toward
agencies; therefore, the degree of consensus is expected to be low. As Table 7.1 shows, agencies
are less responsive to interest groups’ requests when there is a low degree of consensus. Hence,
both the direct and indirect effects of the punctuation should be considered. However, a
punctuation by itself does not guarantee changes in rulemaking outputs. It is similar to the case
with policy subsystems when a punctuation alters the distribution of power and resources opening
an opportunity for change, but such change is not certain. The reform efforts could be blocked. So,
the effect of a punctuation should be understood through the alterations in the relationships among
political principals, agencies, and interest groups, on one hand, and the changes in degree of
consensus among interest groups who lobbying the agencies, on the other hand. Eventually, it
depends on the structure of the network at both levels of principals and agents, whether the
previously dominant coalition can regain control over the network in punctuation and postpunctuation periods, which will determine the beneficiary of rulemaking outputs.
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Furthermore, the interpretation of ERGM differs from a baseline regression. By depending
on simulation, ERGM creates a distribution of generated random graphs or networks, and then
compares the statistics of the observed network with that distribution. So, if the network statistics,
attributes, or structures appear significant in the model, it means that these statistics differ
significantly from what randomly would happen. This is the means by which social networks may
be examined with inferential statistics. In other words, if an association appears between ties of
responses as the dependent variable and any of the independent variables, it is highly probably that
it is not coincidental. Unlike standard regression, ERGM does not consider a network as a series
of values conditioned on univariate distributions. It treats the network as a single realization from
a multivariate probability distribution where many other realizations are possible (Cranmer and
Desmarais 2011). In sum, it is not a comparison between a series of networks. It is whether the
observed network is significantly different from what would happen by random chance.
Therefore, these ERGM results are not necessarily applicable to other types of policy
networks. It is mainly applicable on the Request-Response network for oil policy that includes two
specific EPA programs from 2009 to 2012. If other networks are constructed to include additional
agencies and different time periods, the ERGM may produce different results as these networks
could exhibit various alternative behavior. To make generalizations about the determinants of
rulemaking outputs, more studies are needed. This RR network should be considered a case study
for the behavior of agencies in specific programs and for specific time periods. Applying network
analysis to other policy sectors and comparing the results may be a better approach for making
generalizations about routines and the outputs of rulemaking.
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Since ERGM depends on generating and sampling random graphs or networks, the model
coefficients slightly change each time ERGM is rerun or a variable is added or removed22.
However, some coefficients consistently remained significant and in the same direction even when
the model has been rerun several times, which increases confidence in the results. The variables
and terms that exhibit consistent coefficients are the following: lobbying Congress, consensus,
information, oil industry, significant rules, 2-star for the actors, and geometrically weighted degree
of the issues/rules. The coefficients of the other variables keep flipping between being significant
and insignificant; therefore, providing less confidence in their results. Critically, among the
explanatory variables, lobbying Congress, consensus, and information produced consistent results,
which reinforces the argument and central findings of this study.
Also, several alternative ways of constructing the RR network, such as distinguishing
between the network of the Renewable Fuel Program (RFP) that attracts interest groups from all
over the country, and the network of National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP) that targets different geographic sites to be designated as Superfund sites,
were tried. Additionally, limiting participants of the RR network to organizations only by
removing the trivial actors such as individuals was examined. In doing so, variations in network
behavior and structures emerged. Nonetheless, these ERGMs ran poorly, with these networks
degenerating23 or not converging. As a result, constructing the RR network in the way presented
in this chapter proved to be best from a technical and methodological point of view, but not
necessarily from a theoretical perspective.

22

In ordered to produce replicable results, the seed option in the R statistical software should be set to a fix number.
Degeneracy is a situation when the ERGM simulation produces either an empty or a full graph. For more
information see Cranmer and Desmarais (2011, 73–74) and Hunter et al. (2008b, 9–15).
23
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion

The main objective of this dissertation has been to answer three fundamental questions:
How do the dynamics and composition of the policy subsystem and policy network shape the
outputs of rulemaking? How do punctuations change the dynamics and composition of the policy
network and its rulemaking outputs? What is the temporal sequence for the impacts of a
punctuation on the policy subsystem and network, and in particular the rulemaking outputs? The
key to answering these questions is to track the punctuation effect and study the policy dynamics
at both levels of the principals and the agents. Here, the routines and outputs of the rulemaking
process cannot be fully understood without considering the activities at the congressional level.
Therefore, with a focus on the oil sector, I analyzed the policy subsystem, pointing out the
punctuated events that occurred, and how the oil subsystem reacted to such punctuations. In
addition, the dominant actors that constitute the oil subsystem are distinguished from other
participants in the policy network, displaying the type of interests involved in lobbying the
congressional committees. Then, I examined the rulemaking process, specifically the initiation and
finalization of rules, and the interest groups engaged in such activities.
Not only does a punctuation shape the congressional agenda, but it also affects the
administrative agenda setting as well. However, punctuations appear to generate different
behaviors and reactions at the administrative level from what happens at the congressional level.
While a punctuation increases attention and attracts more actors who previously were unengaged
to become involved in the subsystem, it produces conflicting effects on the rulemaking process.
On one hand, the agencies fall under public and media pressure to take an action addressing the
185

concerned crisis or problem. On the other hand, the increase in activities at the principal level,
especially congressional committees, creates a situation of uncertainty in which a major policy
change may or may not occur, and in turn the agencies become reluctant to adopt new policies that
might be overturned by potential reform. In response to such conflicted pressures, the agencies
tend to finalize already existing proposed rules and/or enact final rules that have immediate effects,
and refrain from proposing new rules, which indicates that the administration prefers to continue
implementing existing policy over adopting new ones at the time of the punctuation. In contrast,
in the post-punctuation period, the agencies endure less media and public pressure and the situation
of uncertainty is alleviated, knowing that a major reform has passed or been blocked. Thus, the
agencies tend to adopt new regulations and policies, which appears as an increase in the number
of proposed rules post-punctuation.
Furthermore, the behavior of interest groups and their lobbying patterns vary between
political principals and agencies, and from punctuation to post-punctuation. When a punctuation
happens, the interest groups prioritize lobbying the principals over the agencies since a window
for a major policy change is open. Therefore, the activities in the congressional network increase
while the rulemaking network experiences fewer activities. After the punctuation passes, the
interest groups shift their lobbying efforts toward the agencies, creating lagged movement. As
Congress becomes less active and the opportunity for policy change fades away, interest groups
turn their lobbying efforts toward agencies so that they may achieve some gain through the
rulemaking process. It does not matter whether the interest groups succeed in passing the reform
or not, there will be an incentive for the winners and losers to lobby the agencies. Since the
agencies enjoy some degree of discretion in rulemaking according to the autopilot argument, there
is always a possibility of deviation from the enacted reforms and laws. Therefore, the interest
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groups shift their attention to the rulemaking process either to ensure the agencies will comply
with current reforms or to achieve some gains they were not able to attain through Congress.
By tracking the lobbying behavior of the oil industry and environmental groups as majority
and minority coalitions, this pattern of lagged movement was observed. As the oil industry was
the dominant coalition in the oil subsystem while the environmentalists were proportionally
disadvantaged in the congressional hearing network, both groups were actively lobbying the
agencies on almost an equal basis, which indicates that the oil industry as the majority coalition
most likely shifts their lobbying effort to rulemaking to ensure the compliance of agencies whereas
the environmental groups as a minority coalition seek to achieve some gains or alleviate their
losses at the congressional level. In addition, the analysis shows that the timing and intensity of
lobbying efforts regarding rulemaking are negatively correlated with punctuations confirming the
sequences of the lagged movement. When the punctuation occurs, the rulemaking process receives
less attention as the interest groups prioritize lobbying Congress over agencies, while in the postpunctuation, interest groups redirect their lobbying effort toward agencies. Furthermore, the type
of punctuations plays a role in exhibiting the lagged movement. For focusing event punctuations
such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the shift from lobbying political principals to agencies in
the post-punctuation period is sharp and easily observed. Meanwhile, the indicator type of
punctuation, such as the oil price increases, tend to generate pressure that remains for a longer time
than a focusing event. Therefore, interest groups seem to balance their lobbying efforts between
the principal and agent levels as time passes.
In general, a punctuation appears to have immediate effects on the dynamics of the
rulemaking network. However, when it comes to the outputs of rulemaking, the situation is more
complicated. To a considerable extent, the punctuation changes and redistributes power and
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resources within the policy network that governs the rulemaking process, which in turn influences
the rulemaking outputs. By examining the administrative responses to the requests and demands
of interest groups, the analysis hypothesizes that the agencies are most likely to respond to actors
who enjoy a higher degree of influence within the policy network at both levels of principals and
agents. Initially, I examined the lobbying effort, power and resources, and degree of consensus as
the three main elements of influence in the policy network and found evidence that partially
supports the central argument of the study. Among the elements of influence, lobbying the
principals, especially Congress, as one aspect of the lobbying effort, and the degree of consensus
have significant effects on the rulemaking outputs and appear to be significant determinants for
the beneficiaries of agencies’ actions. Accordingly, punctuations seem to have substantial impacts
on both elements of influence.
As the public policy literature indicates, the punctuation alters the power and resources of
the policy subsystem. Consequently, the actors who enjoy a higher degree of dominance in the
congressional network in the punctuation and post-punctuation phases are most likely to be the
beneficiaries of rulemaking outputs. For example, the analysis shows that the agencies were
systematically denying the demands and requests of the oil industry during and after the Deepwater
Horizon crisis despite being the dominant interest at subsystem level in general, which indicates
that the oil industry lost their dominance status specifically in the punctuation and post-punctuation
periods. In the meantime, other groups which gained access to Congress during that time were
successful in influencing the agencies’ decisions. Also, the punctuation could affect the degree of
consensus by generating lagged movement. As opposing parties such as challengers and defenders
of the status quo shift their lobbying effort from political principals to agencies, the degree of
consensus among the actors who engage in the rulemaking process is considerably decreased,
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especially at the time of the post-punctuation. By tracking the dynamics of the rulemaking
network, the oil industry and environmental groups, as opposing parties, were actively engaged in
lobbying the agencies at similar levels, which support the conclusion of this study.
In summation, the impact of a punctuation is not confined to the policy subsystem or the
stage of agenda setting. It goes beyond providing an opportunity for reform or policy change. It
continues to affect the rulemaking process through the stage of policy implementation. Even if a
reform is blocked in the subsystem, there is still chance for the competing parties to achieve policy
changes through the rulemaking process. Interestingly, the punctuation generates simultaneous
impacts on the policy network at both levels of political principals and agencies. However, the
direction and the intensity of the impact differ between the two levels. By tracking sequences of
changes from equilibrium to punctuation and then post-punctuation, a better understanding of the
routine and outputs of rulemaking may be achieved.
This dissertation offers several contributions to the literature of public policy. Interestingly,
it connects the studies that analyzes agencies and the rulemaking process with studies of
subsystems and policy dynamics. It demonstrates the effect of punctuations on political principals
such as congressional committees in addition to interest groups, and then connects them with the
changes in the rulemaking routines and outputs. Furthermore, it exhibits the time sequences of the
punctuating impacts such as describing what aspects of the policy network are affected by the
punctuation and in what time sequence these effects take place. In other words, this dissertation
examines policy dynamics, but from the administrative perspective.
In addition, it goes beyond studying agenda setting and policy adoption to incorporate the
bureaucratic and implementation angle into the policy subsystem literature. By mapping and
analyzing policy networks at levels of congressional hearings and rulemakings, both stages of
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public policy are linked, illustrating the simultaneous and various effects of a punctuation on
agenda setting and policy implementation. It is no longer accurate to study public policy in a stagewise fashion. It is important to consider the mutual impacts of the parallel activities at the distinctly
different levels of political principals and administration which provides a different perspective
from the customary approaches that separate the stages of public policy. That perspective is the
main theoretical contribution of this dissertation to the literature of public policy.
From a methodological viewpoint, this dissertation highlights the role of interdependencies
between different types of actors in shaping the routine and outputs of rulemaking in particular,
and public policy in general. Even though it has been used in the social sciences for some time,
only a small number of studies apply SNA and its statistical models to policy networks, and fewer
still focus on the rulemaking process. By promoting the use of SNA and ERGMs for statistical
inference, some aspects of the subsystem and policy network behavior can be examined which
have not previously received enough attention. In this dissertation, the importance of considering
the interdependencies between actors in the network of principal and agents has been demonstrated
in a way that baseline regressions such as linear or logistic models could not.
On the other hand, there are several limitations. Most importantly, the extent to which
generalizations can be drawn from this study is limited. This dissertation studied the rulemaking
process in a specific context related to oil policy and in a particular period of time. I identified
systematic patterns of behavior of the participants of the rulemaking process, provided
explanations for such patterns, and empirically examined the arguments of the study. Even though
statistically significant results were produced, the findings of the dissertation cannot yet be
generalized to other cases and policy sectors without further examination. These results could be
confined to the particular policy and specific time period. Some of the results may be uniquely
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related to the oil policy in that period. Others may be more universal. To make such
generalizations, the process of rulemaking in other policies and in different time periods should be
studied. Comparing the routines and outputs of rulemaking under various circumstances is a better
way to draw generalizations than focusing on a single case study. Still, this case study provides a
perspective for the causal mechanism that could be used for following comparative studies.
Moreover, this dissertation mainly focuses on the study of the relationship between the
congressional committees and administrations. Little attention is paid to the other principals,
specifically the President and the courts. These principals, I acknowledge, play important roles in
shaping the routines and outputs of the rulemaking process. Nonetheless, there are practical and
technical reasons for excluding them from this analysis. The availability of the data throughout the
period of the study was one of the main obstacles. For example, the OMB meetings could form
the network of interest groups lobbying President. Unfortunately, the official OMB website
(www.reginfo.gov) does not provide sufficient information about these for the most period of the
study. At best, it provides only an incomplete network in which tracking changes in lobbying
behavior over time would not be feasible. Another reason is the limited resources and time
available for collecting and analyzing extra data and information. For instance, the amicus curiae
or friend of the court brief could be one of the means that interest groups utilize to influence the
courts and in turn influence agencies’ decisions. Displaying such influence requires deep analysis
of the contents of the amicus curiae to determine the position of the interest groups and compare
them with the actions of the courts and in turn the agencies. Such efforts may need a research team
and/or apply advance software to analyze huge volumes of data and information. Given the limited
time and resources available for this study, I had to choose what to focus my time and effort on.
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Hence, I prioritized studying congressional committees over the President and courts as the most
important and relevant subject of this study.
Last but not least, the complexity of the phenomenon studied here put additional limitations
on what could be analyzed. I studied a network phenomenon where interdependencies between the
entities within the network affect the behavior and actions of each other. Moreover, these entities
hold different status, are connected through several relations, and evolve over time. In some cases,
the set of data I analyzed is more complicated than the current research techniques and models can
handle. For example, it would have been preferable to analyze a network that contains three sets
of actors; congressional hearings, administrative rules, and interest groups. Each set of these actors
has its unique characteristics; however, models that can analyze a network with three modes or
sets of actors have not yet been developed. Existing models can readily analyze a network with
one or two modes. I therefore had to divide the network to two separate two-mode networks. The
first includes the interest groups and congressional hearings while the second network includes the
interest groups and the administrative rules. I then extracted the information from the first network
and attached it to the second network. This is a feasible solution, but it is not a perfect one. Some
important effects have not been captured this way such as the effect of a specific network structure
between two modes on the third or a structure within one mode on the other two. Hopefully, more
network analysis software development will come in the future that enable researchers to handle
such complexity.
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